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Chapter One – Introduction and Literature Review 
 
I.  Introduction 
 
A municipality is responsible for generating the funds it uses to provide 
governance and services to citizens.  Municipalities typically raise these funds by 
charging fees, taxing sales revenues, or taxing property valuation assessments.  
Therefore, creating an adequate taxable base is an important goal of most municipalities.  
Also, each level of government wants to have robust economic activity within its 
jurisdiction because it is beneficial for the economic well-being of its residents/citizens 
(Cochran et al. 1999, 5).  The problem with each government’s reliance on the economy 
for revenue and providing opportunity for its citizens is that in a market economy, most 
levers of control of the economy are in the hands of private investors.  This is even more 
problematic in today’s global environment where there is competition for capital dollars 
at every level – internationally, inter-states, and inter-municipalities.   
Given that the capital investment decisions are made by private investors, 
governments who desire to increase (or retain) economic activity in their jurisdiction 
generally are compelled to find ways to make their jurisdiction relatively more attractive 
to investors than other jurisdictions (Thomas 2000, Anderson & Wassmer 2000).  
Missouri municipalities and counties are authorized by the state to offer various types of 
tax incentives as a tool to attract projects that can increase their tax base.  Many other 
states also provide similar authorizations to lower-level governments. 
One of the more frequently used tax incentive tools in Missouri (and other states) 
today is tax increment financing, more commonly called a TIF.  This tool, authorized by 
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Missouri statute in 1982, is designed to be used for redevelopment projects that otherwise 
would not be done due to some structural issue that makes the project uneconomical, 
except with the use of a TIF.  A TIF allows for most of the increase in property tax 
assessment and sometimes, depending on the state, the increase in other tax revenue to be 
used to fund the infrastructure improvements to the property, as well as some other costs.  
In Missouri, some sales tax and utility taxes are available for use (and earning taxes in St. 
Louis and Kansas City only).  In this way, the property is improved with minimal up-
front cash flow from the municipality and possibly significantly lower up-front cash 
outlay from the developer or other capital investor.  Instead, some future cash flow that 
would have gone to pay taxes (due to the improvement) is redirected towards the costs of 
the improvement.  The types of projects that can be funded using TIF financing include 
office buildings, industrial buildings, retail space, and residential space.  
Problem Statement 
 Policy decisions are seldom simple.  Policies generally require trade-offs, and 
frequently there are winners and losers. The political process of actors with different 
agendas sometimes creates a statute that once implemented, may not be specified 
appropriately to achieve the stated outcomes (Wells & Hamilton 1996, 105-107; Cochran 
et al 1999, 474-477). Also a statute, once enacted, is generally easier to modify than to 
eliminate altogether.  As such, it is important to evaluate policies to determine their actual 
impact, including possible unintended consequences (Grindle & Thomas 1991, 16).  
Changes made to policies such as TIF over time could be meant to:  1) fix problems in 
the original statute, making it more effective regarding the desired outcome, or 2) change 
or alter the impact towards a different or even opposite purpose.  Concurrently, changes 
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may occur in the economic, political, or cultural environment, altering the impact of a 
policy for either better or worse given the intended outcome.  Consequently, as the statute 
ages, what happens to it as it is amended and as the environment changes around it? 
The TIF tool reflects a policy designed to help solve the problem of declining 
levels of private capital investment in developed urban areas. A healthy economic 
environment is important to all levels of government, and disinvestment in a geographic 
area which had previously been thriving creates a variety of challenges. These challenges 
include a reduction in municipal revenue, reduction in revenues to overlapping taxing 
districts (i.e. school district, library district, etc.), and a possible creation of blight 
precipitated by vacant and/or neglected buildings.  The reduction of revenues to the 
municipality and overlapping taxing districts are likely to result in a reduction of public 
services due to budget cuts, which could result in a spiraling situation stimulating further 
disinvestment (Judd & Swanstrom 1994, 339).  On the other hand, a tax incentive 
improperly used can result in unnecessary assistance to private interests with public 
funds. 
This reliance on the status of the economy is particularly challenging in a 
capitalistic market economy, where the multi-levels of governments are limited in their 
ability to “manage” it.  Thus governments are generally occupied with trying to create a 
“friendly business environment” in which to “attract” investments which lead to 
economic activity, including jobs, wages, products, and services (Thomas 2007, 45; Man 
2001, 5).  This often takes place in a competitive environment, in which the owners of 
capital are advantaged (Lindblom 1977).  Yet, while governments are trying to make 
themselves as attractive as possible for capital investments, they are limited in what they 
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can do.  Many state constitutions expressly limit the possibility of public funds being 
used for private gains.  As such, governments are limited in the ways they can partner 
with private investors to entice them to locate within their boundaries versus another’s, 
thus impacting that economy more favorably. 
  Tax increment financing was originally conceptualized in California to be a 
financing option to help make new or continued investment in previously developed areas 
doable.  Designed in 1952, California governments desiring to participate in the new 
urban renewal programs found it difficult to raise their required matching portion (one-
fourth and one-third) with financial instruments that existed then.  TIF allowed 
governments to partner with private investors in a new way (Chapman, 2001, 114).   
Already developed areas generally require some degree of demolition before new 
development can occur, thus increasing building costs. Consequently, developers often 
preferred undeveloped land for new developments, which tended to result in both urban 
blight and suburban sprawl.  In Missouri, the policy objective of pairing redevelopment 
projects with an advantageous financing tool such as TIF was expected to make urban 
redevelopment more cost competitive with new development (Missouri House Bill 1411). 
 Tax increment financing has become a popular economic development tool in 
Missouri, and this degree of popularity has many people debating its use.  The debate 
includes questions such as whether TIF is actually being used by (governments of) 
declining areas in their quest to improve their competitive positioning to attract private 
investment dollars, and if future tax revenues are being unnecessarily diverted to private 
development costs.  Additionally, the possible financial pressures of municipalities within 
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close proximity may involve an unhealthy competition for investment that disadvantages 
all except the developer. 
The statute enabling TIF turned 30 years old in 2012.  After nearly 30 years of 
existence, it is therefore appropriate to study the use of TIF in Missouri. Specifically, this 
study will explore the historical development of the statute and the pattern of adoption 
and usage of TIF.   This study will explore the following questions: 
1)   the political and legislative history/development of the TIF statute, the  
purpose of the modifications over time, whether these modifications moved the 
statute closer or farther away from the original intent, and who the political actors 
and what political coalitions formed or were activated;  
2)   what is the adoption and usage pattern of TIF (specifically who used it when), 
and how has the political and legal development of TIF statute impacted the 
adoption and usage of TIF? 
Within this study, information will be collected to look at the institutional, political, or 
other environmental characteristics which either assisted or impeded the use of the 
statute, particularly in those communities the statute was designed to help. 
Significance of Study  
The study is intended to increase knowledge regarding the development of a 
particular economic development tool in the State of Missouri and how it has been 
impacted by legislative amendments, court decisions, and other environmental conditions 
over 30 years.  Additionally, it will examine whether these institutional impacts have 
Butler, Cassandra, 2012, p. 6 
increased the TIF tool’s ability to meet its objective as originally proposed or whether 
changes to the statute have eroded its intended advantage to targeted areas.  
It is important to understand the policy tools created in attempts to find solutions to 
the different levels of governments’ need to influence private sector investment.  This is 
especially important when the policy tool involves any form of government funds such as 
tax subsidies, tax abatements, or other financial incentives. In Missouri this accounts for a 
significant amount of dollars.  On an annual basis one researcher found in Missouri an 
average of $339 million in approved tax increment financing (Thomas 2007, 5).  In the 
four Missouri counties in the St. Louis metropolitan area alone it is estimated that 
between 1987 and 2008 municipalities approved a total of $2.1 billion in TIFs (East-West 
Gateway Council of Governments 2010, 7) .  Essentially, these types of policy tools have 
a purpose of creating a market distortion (in favor of the government granting the 
incentive/subsidation while benefiting private individuals) to compensate for a perceived 
market failure like disinvestment, by using money that perhaps would go to other public 
purposes.  This requires some dexterity to allow a solution designed for a targeted area 
with particular needs to be used without this same solution being used in others areas 
without that need. As such, it is important that incentives and subsidizations be carefully 
crafted in a market economy in order to monitor and minimize unintended and/or 
undesired consequences.  Even today, it is frequently argued that incentives and subsidies 
that are granted to private corporations are wasteful solutions funneling money away 
from vital public services such as education, safety, and infrastructure (LeRoy 1999, 
Luce 2003, Kelsay 2007, Thomas 2007).   
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An exceptional feature of this study is its window into the interaction among the 
institutions over time, especially including the Courts and its decisions.  Although it is 
assumed that this multi-institutional interaction does occur, it is seldom found in case 
studies following 30 years plus of development.  Since Court decisions are particularly 
sensitive to “path dependency” in the sense of legal jurisprudence and precedence, it is 
enlightening to observe its actions and impacts on a particular statute over time.  It is 
likely that the opinion of the Courts could be especially relevant in economic 
development tools designed to encourage capital investment in fixed assets and/or sunk-
costs, and this particular institution’s impact on policy change has been under-rated with 
respect to economic development.   
Another unique feature of this study is documenting the development of the economic 
tool and the usage of the same tool in the same study.  Often inferences are made 
regarding the generic development and potential changes of statutes and applying a 
generic norm to a specific case, or vise-versa, comparing the development of a specific 
statute and assuming its practical impact of usage.  This study does both, allowing any 
inferences made to be perhaps more meaningful. 
BACKGROUND – Historical Context  
History of Tax Increment Financing 
The TIF tool was innovated by the state of California in 1952.  In 1945 California 
was also the first state to enact a Community Redevelopment Act (Chapman 2001, 114).  
California’s underlying need was to convert from a WWII economy to a postwar 
economy.  The state had many urban areas, a number of which were experiencing 
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decline, especially in housing stock.  The Redevelopment Act enabled the creation of 
redevelopment agencies which could: 1) buy real property (including through the use of 
eminent domain), 2) develop real property (but not construct buildings), 3) sell real 
property (without bidding), 4) grant relocation expenses to new tenants, 5) implement 
land use controls for comprehensive plan development, and 6) finance projects through 
issuance of bonds or borrowing from federal or state governments.  The last activity, 
financing projects, proved difficult and thus crippled the agency’s ability to do anything 
else.  Hence, the TIF tool was devised to resolve some of the financing issues of the 
redevelopment agencies (Chapman 2001, 114). 
By 1970 only six other states (Minnesota, Nevada, Ohio, Oregon, Washington, and 
Wyoming) had discovered and copied the use of the TIF tool (Johnson and Kriz 2001, 
31).  Federal urban renewal funds flowed to cities during the 1960s and early 1970s, and 
perhaps stunted the need for creative financing tools.  But by the late 1970s, the economy 
began to stagnate and federal funds began to dry up.  The 1980s also found a citizenry 
that had become resistant to tax increases, and a change in national leadership (the 
election of President Ronald Reagan) that redirected federal subsidies away from 
metropolitan areas (Judd & Swanstrom 1994, 337).  Consequently, throughout the mid-
1970s and 1980s interest in TIF became widespread, and many states adopted TIF 
statues.  Now all states except Arizona have TIF statutes (including the District of 
Columbia) and all but a few have used it to varying degrees (Marks 2005, 5; Johnson & 
Kriz, 2001, 32).  All states have passed TIF statutes – but Arizona first passed a TIF in 
1977, and later repealed it in 1999 (Purvis, 2003, 6; Crystal & Co. 2003). 
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 Oftentimes states found that enacting TIF legislation first required an amendment to 
their state constitutions (Johnson and Kriz 2001, 31) because state constitutions generally 
include clauses designed to prevent private concerns being the primary beneficiary of 
public funds. This conflict occurs because in a capitalist society such as the United States, 
the market economy depends on private entities to make investment decisions.   In 
general, private concerns using public money to make investment decisions undermine 
the public benefit of having a market economy. The use of TIF as a redevelopment tool to 
remove blight is generally assumed to be a “public purpose” (having public benefit), as 
supported by the Supreme Court decision of Berman v Parker in 1957.  Also, although 
most states allow the TIF to be authorized at the local governmental level, most statutes 
provide for local citizens input.  
Even so, some states’ statutes or provisions of statutes have met with constitutional 
challenges.  Arizona’s statute that was eventually repealed in 1999 had the issuance of 
bonds legally challenged in 1980, and an Appeals Court ruled this provision of the statute 
unconstitutional (Goshorn, 1999, fn104).  Johnson and Kriz (2001) also mentioned that 
North Carolina was unable to amend its state constitution in 1982 (31) and West 
Virginia’s Supreme Court had found their own 1995 TIF law to be unconstitutional (31-
32).  
Nationally, the traditional staple tax of TIF is the real estate property tax.  The 
reasoning behind this is that redevelopment is expected to increase the assessed valuation 
of that particular real estate.  Since increased valuation is not expected to occur without 
the redevelopment, the tax revenue that results from that increase is new.  It is this 
revenue that the TIF tool allows to be used to fund projects that is declared would not 
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occur otherwise.  The benefit to all parties is that the existing tax base is not tapped, and 
thus no one should be worse-off, yet the TIF is set to expire at some point in time (23 
years or less in Missouri) , after which time the new higher assessed valuation would be 
taxable and thus available to relevant taxing districts.  But, this delay in taxability is not 
always a win for some taxing districts.  In fact, the percentage of the captured property 
tax that would flow to the municipal government (as the entity with authority to decide 
whether to implement a TIF district) tends to be relatively small compared to the tax that 
is allocated to overlying taxing districts, especially school districts.  Perhaps the operating 
costs to a fire district will be increased by an industrial redevelopment project or a 
residential project could increase the costs to a school district, before the additional tax 
money needed to service the improved development is available (up to 23 years later).  
This is why affected taxing districts (collectively) are allowed representation on the TIF 
commission in most states, and why overlapping taxing districts may be opposed to their 
portion of the property tax being captured. 
Some states, such as Missouri, have tapped other tax sources such as sales taxes and 
earning taxes.  The mix of taxes available affects the viability and desirability of potential 
projects, as well as the potential future funding sources for governing bodies.   
The enabling and implementation of TIF statutes across the United States is a 
demonstration of federalism in action, as states 1) decide to enact variations of TIF 
statutes tailored for their own state and cities over a 50 year span; and, 2) learn, improve 
and modify statutes based on their own experiences and experiences observed from other 
states.  By 1997, Johnson and Kriz (2001) had observed that: 
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While almost all states [48] authorize TIF, there is a substantial variation in its actual 
use.  In   1987, 467 cities in California had operating TIF districts (TIDs).  In contrast, 
Hawaii, Mississippi, and New Jersey all had laws authorizing TIF since at least 1985, 
but none had an operating TID (Klemanski 1987).  There is also a great diversity in 
the provisions of TIF legislation across states.  The laws range from extremely basic 
(Alaska’s law is only one printed page) to very detailed (California’s provisions take 
over three hundred pages). (32) 
Johnson and Kriz (2001) describe that the variations among the state statutes can occur in 
how TIF is initiated, formulated, adopted, implemented, evaluated, and or terminated 
(32).      Over time, practitioner organizations have been able to synthesize the 
experiences of the “collective” and devise TIF models, such as the joint reference guide 
published by the Council of Development Finance Agencies and the International 
Council of Shopping Centers
1
 and the Government Finance Officers Association
2
. 
Tax Increment Financing in Missouri 
The state of Missouri adopted its TIF statues in 1982, which is officially named The 
Real Property Tax Increment Allocation Redevelopment Act (RSMo 99.800-99.865).  A 
citizenry resistant to tax rate increases was clearly evident before the TIF statute was 
passed in 1982.  The citizens of Missouri had recently passed a constitutional amendment 
that limited the state and its authorized sub-governments to raise taxes without voter 
approval (the Hancock Amendment, passed November 1980).   
The TIF Act has been amended several times since 1982 (Gilmore & Bell 2004, 
section II).  As amended, Missouri allows other taxes generated by economic activities, 
such as sales taxes, earning taxes, and utility taxes, to be available for TIF use.  The 
                                                             
1
 Tax Increment Finance Best Practices Reference Guide, 2007 
2
 Best Practice: Tax Increment Financing as a Fiscal Tool (2006) (DEBT and CEDCP)  
http://www.gfoa.org/downloads/tifsjan2006finalclean.pdf 
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maximum amount of time allowed to divert these taxes into a TIF account is 23 years.  
Financing of TIF accounts can be either “pay as you go,” where the TIF account 
accumulates whatever amount is collected each year in incremental taxes, or debt bonds 
can be used, where the incremental taxes are used to make bond payments.  Reimbursable 
costs include “all reasonable or necessary costs incurred or estimated to be incurred” and 
“incidental to a redevelopment plan ore redevelopment costs” (RSMo 99.805).  These 
include actual project costs such as infrastructure improvements, land assembly, 
demolition of buildings, as well as professional services such as legal, engineering, 
surveys, and studies (RSMo 99.805). 
In Missouri, municipalities (defined as cities, villages, incorporated towns or 
counties) are eligible to use TIF (Gilmore & Bell 2004, section II).  To use this financing 
instrument, certain guidelines must be followed.  A TIF commission must be created (at 
the municipal level except  in St. Charles County, St. Louis County, and Jefferson 
County, which now also have a county-level commission).  These commissions are 
charged with holding public hearings and making recommendations to the municipality – 
but the decision-making authority still resides with the municipality
3
.  One of the 
recommendations the TIF Commission must make is a redevelopment plan which has 
been explained to the public via public hearings.  The municipality must authorize a 
redevelopment plan before the TIF can be implemented (Gilmore & Bell 2004, section 
II).  The redevelopment plan is required to cover specific information, including category 
                                                             
3
 To approve a TIF plan that is not recommended by the TIF commission, the municipal governing board 
must now meet a higher threshold of 2/3rds.  
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(blight, conservation area, or economic development), project costs estimates, cost-
benefit analysis, and projected time schedule. 
  Missouri states that the purpose of local TIF is to “financially encourage 
redevelopment of a designated, economically marginal area” (Missouri Department of 
Economic Development website).  The state also offers a State Supplemental Tax 
Increment Financing Program (“state TIF”).  Again, the stated purpose of the state TIF is 
to “facilitate the redevelopment of blighted areas by providing essential public 
infrastructure” (Missouri Department of Economic Development website).  The state TIF 
allows for up to half of the state “incremental” sales or earnings tax to become part of the 
TIF district under certain circumstances.  The state TIF requires an application for this 
incentive which must first receive approval by state administrators and then the funds 
must be appropriated by the legislature.  This state TIF has seen only limited but 
increasing use. 
A finding of blight is not only a key criterion enabling the use of the TIF tool, but it is 
also generally a necessary criterion to enable another element that is sometimes crucial to 
the proposed redevelopment – the power of eminent domain.  The “taking” of private 
property is not allowed under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the federal 
constitution (and also disallowed by most if not all state constitutions) unless there is a 
“public use,” and the property owners are “justly compensated.”  A use that has been 
confirmed by the United States Supreme Court as meeting the “public use” criteria is the 
removal of blight (Berman v. Parker, 1957).  This Supreme Court case has stood the test 
of time (precedent for over fifty years).  Thus a finding of “blight” allows the city to offer 
private enterprises financial assistance in the form of tax relief, such as a TIF, and it 
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provides a powerful tool for the assemblage of land that may be owned by persons not 
wanting to sell, or at least not wanting to sell at the price offered to them. 
  Many states, including Missouri, also allow TIF and eminent domain to be used in 
“conservation areas.”  This is essentially a “pre-blight” designation, and conservation 
areas by most definitions contain a certain percentage of older buildings.  The Missouri 
Supreme Court has affirmed usage of TIF and eminent domain in a conservation area 
(Commission v. Dunn Construction, 1989). 
The criterion of economic development as a public use or “public purpose” has 
recently been affirmed by the U.S. Supreme Court.  In the Kelo v. City of New London 
decision the Supreme Court, in a closely divided decision, allowed for the definition of 
public use to include economic development, if the city should choose.  The Court 
indicated that the decision of what is or is not a public use should be determined by the 
governing authority (municipality, county, etc.) unless the state laws had a more a more 
restrictive definition.  This decision has the ability to expand the use of TIF under the 
economic development designation by lowering the risk of a court challenge of its public 
purpose.  Recently the Missouri legislature made changes to restrict the use of the 
economic development option on undeveloped land (i.e. “greenfields”) and flood plains 
(RSMo 99.843 & 99.847) in certain areas in the St. Louis metropolitan area. 
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II.  Literature Review 
This research largely taps into the subject areas of both politics and public policy 
– politics affects policy and policy affects politics (Schattschneider1935, 288; Lowi 1979, 
Pierson 1993, 595). Studying the development of the TIF statute and its pattern of usage 
from inception until the present touches on many subject areas in the literature.  An 
overview of the more relevant areas is outlined in this section, and cover both policy 
theories and empirical findings from case studies.  
Policy Process Literature 
There are many theories and theoretical framework about how an issue gets on the 
agenda and subsequently becomes law.    This study starts after this initial process – the 
point in which the TIF law was enacted in 1982.  But the actual enactment of a law does 
not necessarily result in cessation of all activity from the actors involved in getting the 
law passed.  The actors involved can include politicians, bureaucrats, business 
persons/entities and interest groups.  Understanding that politics and public policy are 
intertwined, it is possible that the same actors stay involved to influence the 
implementation of the TIF law.  It is also possible that new actors or groups are formed to 
either help make the implementation more robust to their benefit, or less robust to 
minimize perceived harm (Skocpol 1995; Pierson 1993, 600). 
Once a law is enacted through the legislative process, the next step of 
implementation takes place.  The role of implementation was initially taken for granted 
and its role in policy development underappreciated.  Jeffrey L Pressman and Aaron 
Wildavsky brought this issue to the forefront with their 1973 book Implementation.  In 
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this book they chronicle the implementation of a specific program (through case study) 
and identify many structural, bureaucratic, and political obstacles that impeded the 
program from achieving its expected goal.  Pressman and Wildavsky state that the mere 
act of implementing a policy changes it, because “implementation is evolutionary” (1984, 
176-177). 
Policy design goes hand-in-hand with policy implementation, often described in a 
“policy feedback” type interaction (Schneider and Sidney 2009). In the political phase of 
enacting a law, the resulting statute can vary in its specificity, giving the implementing 
agency more or less discretion (Lindblom 1980, 65).  Cochran et al. (1999) state that 
implementation is also impacted by “clarity of the law, the talents and financial resources 
available to those administering it and a variety of ‘political factors,’ such as public 
support, media attention, socioeconomic conditions, and the attitudes and resources of 
groups affected by the policy” (8).  
Peter J. May (1991) states that it is important when considering policy design to 
distinguish between policies that do or do not have “publics.”  Assuming that tax 
incentive policies do have publics (i.e. “well developed coalitions of interest groups” 
and/or 
“multiple groups with competing interests and differential resources”– p.192) then he 
states that the prototypic design would contain some combination of the following: 
mandates, inducements, capacity-building efforts, or system changes (197).  In this 
scenario, mandates may be challenged or redefined, and inducements are likely to be 
widely accepted and abused (May 1991, 198-199).  He expects that policies with publics 
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are less prone to be captured than policy designed without publics (May 1991, 198), and 
policies with publics are also more prone to provide back and forth discussions that result 
in policy learning (202). 
There is a variety of theoretical frameworks that describe the impetus for stability 
or change of a policy over time.   Charles Lindblom observed a tendency for policies to 
be relatively stable over time, with small incremental changes.  This observation is now 
known as incrementalism, which Lindblom believes to be a normative theory, primarily 
based on its ability to be less exposed to unknown risks (Lindblom, 1959).  Frank R. 
Baumgartner and Bryan D. Jones (1993) observed policies that were changed 
significantly in a relatively short time period.  This change was usually preceded by a 
period of stability. They called this phenomenon “punctuated-equilibrium” – disturbing 
the period of relative stability with “periods of volatile change” (1993, 4) before returning 
to a “new equilibrium” which again becomes relatively stable. Although this theory was 
developed to primarily describe agenda-setting, the politics of agenda setting can result in 
modification and changes to existing policies.  Punctuated-equilibrium builds on John 
Kingdon’s work, in which he describes agenda change as a policy entrepreneur or group 
being prepared with alternatives when a policy “window” opens – this opportunity could 
present itself as a result of many types of changes, such as political administration 
change, economy changes, etc. (1984). 
Historical Institutionalists value studying political and policy development over 
time, and studying the impact of institutions on the subsequent decisions and available 
options. In this setting, institutions not only refer to organizational structure but also the 
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“rules of the game”- norms, regimes, and customs within that society, which reduces 
uncertainty to the decision-maker, as well as frequently reducing the transactional costs 
of a decision/alternative (North 1990, Pierson 1993, Capoccia and Kelemen 2007).  The 
concepts of path-dependency, sequencing, and critical junctures are prominent concepts 
in historical institutionalism.  Path dependency describes how current and future options 
are constrained based on previous decisions. Sequencing can be “self-reinforcing,” 
producing a stability similar to path dependency. It also can be “reactive,” which is likely 
to lead to change in policy direction.   James Mahoney (2000) describes reactive 
sequencing as “backlash processes that transform and perhaps reverse early events” 
(526).  Critical junctures, similar to the “punctuation” in punctuated-equilibria 
(Baumgartner and Jones) and “windows of opportunity” (Kingdon) portray a time period 
in which circumstances allow for loosening of the norms, rules, and customs that usually 
guide an institution/policy.  This opportunity allows for more options to be considered in 
that particular timeframe (Capoccia and Kelemen 2007). 
Jacob S. Hacker discusses policy change based more on the process or “how” it is 
changed given the barriers to change that exists.  Building on Kathleen Thelen’s (1999) 
concept of policy “conversion” and Eric Schlickler’s (2001) “layering” Hacker 
conceptualizes a 2 by 2 matrix that categorizes policy change by whether the change is 
able take place within the existing policy (given the degree of flexibility/discretion 
allowed in the existing policy and the strength of supporting coalitions), and the degree of 
difficulty it would take to “change” the policy formally/authoritative (Hacker 2004, 246-
249).  Including each one in the 2x2 matrix named “Four Modes of Policy Change,” the 
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independent variables are: 1) status-quo bias of political environment (high/low) and 2) 
barriers to internal change (high/low) (Hacker 2005, 248).  
  
         Jacob S. Hacker, 2004 
In this matrix, policy change meets the least resistance when the policy is written 
flexibly and/or the administrator or “street-level bureaucracy” has the most discretion 
(Hacker, 2004, 247).  In this half (right side) of the matrix, Hacker supposes that the 
policy also has “weak support coalitions.”  As such, the tendency would be either to 
“convert” or “revise” the policy as desired.  Conversion (Thelen, 1999) is described in the 
matrix as “internal adaptation of existing policy” and Hacker states that “in general, the 
conversion of a policy should be easier when it delegates administration or lacks clear 
overarching rules or aims, as in decentralized federal-state programs or subsidy 
arrangements that shape voluntary private benefits” (Hacker, 2004, 247).  Conversion 
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would be the expected method of change if the political environment/authoritative 
barriers to change were high.  If the political environment were conducive (i.e. relatively 
low barrier) this change might be by “revision,” which would occur as “formal reform, 
replacement, or elimination of existing policy” (Hacker, 2004, 248).   
Within the Four Modes of Policy Change matrix, the other two categories (left 
side) are cases in which the policy is written such that the bureaucrat has “low levels of 
policy discretion” and there exists “strong policy support coalitions.”  In these situations, 
Hacker theorizes that the policy change process will unfold as either a “policy layering” 
or “policy drift” process.  Policy “layering” is described by Schlicker as a “path 
dependent’ policy,” engaged in as “institution-builders often attempt to add new 
institutions rather than dismantle the old” (Shlicker, 2001, 16). This, again, presupposes 
that the policy as written or administered is not amenable to “conversion.”  If even the 
political environment is not conducive to layering “new institutions upon the old,” then 
the policy that is too tightly written or administered to be “converted,” but yet has strong 
support coalitions, may be allowed to “drift” (Hacker, 2004, 248).  This conceptualization 
is summarized by Hacker as: 
“although the prospects for internal policy change are shaped by a policy’s 
specific characteristics, formal policy change depends principally on whether the basic 
political structure and partisan context privileges the status quo.  When it does, pragmatic 
advocates of change may find it more attractive to adapt existing policies to their ends 
than to wage a frontal assault.  For this reason, political settings that militate against 
authoritative change encourage reformers to seek the conversion or erosion of existing 
policies.  In these contexts, not only do reformers find it difficult to establish new policies 
or replace existing policies, but they are also better able to block efforts to close gaps 
between a policy’s original aims and its actual effects.”  (2004, 247). 
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An aspect of policy change exists when policy innovation occurs.  Jack L. Walker 
(1969) defined innovation as occurring when a government adopts a program it has never 
used before – although it may have been used by others (881). In their article Innovation 
and Diffusion Models in Policy Research, Frances Stokes Berry and William D. Berry 
(1999) state that: 
 “there are two principal forms of explanation for the adoption of a new program 
by a state: internal determinants and diffusion models.  Internal determinants 
models posit that the factors leading a jurisdiction to innovate are political, 
economic, or social characteristics internal to the state.  In these models, states are 
not conceived of as being influenced by the actions of other states.  In contrast, 
diffusion models are inherently intergovernmental; they view state adoptions of 
policies as emulations of previous adoptions by other states” (170). 
Berry and Berry (1999) summarize three general reasons for the spread of innovation at 
the state level: 1) learning from peers, 2) to obtain competitive advantage or avoid 
competitive disadvantage, and 3) public pressure from constituents (171-172).  They also 
state that although these studies are state-level analysis, they are also “extendable” to 
local governments. 
 At the international level there is literature that discusses policy change in the 
context of the political economy in an effort to create a framework for understanding 
what happens in developing countries.  Merilee Grindle and John Thomas make a case 
for looking at policy change through many of the lenses already mentioned but with an 
emphasis on the “role of policy elites in shaping policy agendas, considering available 
options, and managing the political and bureaucratic challenges of implementation” 
(1991, 182).  They describe the policy process of change as having three critical 
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junctures, in which the policy elite either has or does not have room in which to 
maneuver.  They state: 
at each juncture, the exploration of a series of questions enables us to explain the 
subsequent course of agenda setting, decision making, and implementation and 
their interrelationships.  Briefly, our framework indicates that environmental 
context, agenda-setting circumstances, and policy characteristics influence the 
perceptions and concerns of policy elites and shape the nature and scope of 
conflict surrounding efforts to introduce change.  Analysis of context, 
circumstance, and policy characteristics can account for a significant amount of 
variability in the outcome of reform initiatives, as well as variability and 
continuity across countries, issues, and time (1991, 183). 
This description of policy change is reflective of the overlapping qualities present 
in virtually all of the theories of policy processes and change.  It also compatible with the 
following section on the “who” of governance, the politics of coalitions and power. 
 Urban Politics – Who Governs? 
Robert Dahl (1961) asked the proverbial question of “who governs?” and that 
question continually impacts the policy process-making.  The TIF policy was enabled at 
the state-level – and the state allows implementation of the TIF policy to occur at the 
local municipal level of government.  Missouri TIF statutes were enacted with 
redevelopment of the urban areas in mind.  Thus, it is appropriate to review certain 
aspects of urban politics literature – particularly in regards to who governs at the local 
level, and who has the capacity, who has the power, and who has the motivation to 
influence and persuade local policy processes. 
 Harvey Molotch (1976) wrote a seminal article noting that the business class and 
land-owners are keenly interested in politics at the local level. These members 
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collaborate with public officials, often helping particular ones win elections.  Other 
common collaborators in the "growth machine” coalition includes members of the media 
and labor leaders (Molotch 1976).  These individuals have a common interest in 
economic growth and increased land valuation, and thus are motivated to work together 
to keep their interests in the forefront.  These interests include policies/regulation that 
lower the cost of doing business (i.e. low taxes, subsidized transportation systems, etc.) 
and they believe it appropriate that increased “utility and government costs caused by 
new development should be borne … by the public at large, rather than by those 
responsible for the ‘excess’ demand on the urban infrastructure” (Molotch 1976, 313-
314).  Additionally, Molotch (1976) states that the unchallenged priority of local 
governments is the desire or need to continually grow (313).  This “nondecision” 
(Bachrach & Baratz 1962) resulting in growth being the unopposed priority over all other 
policy is a distinct advantage for the “growth machine” coalition – particularly to the 
engine that drives growth - business. 
In expounding the “limitations” cities have in controlling their destinies, Paul 
Peterson (1981) said “each city competes with other cities; if the leaders of any particular 
city are slow to discern city interests or miscalculate the best techniques for achieving 
them, the city will lose to other contestants” (144) and “developmental policies come at 
the expense of other communities, and the local leadership can secure the benefit only if 
it wins a competition for resources” (148).  Not only are cities limited in controlling their 
own economies, but can be highly impacted by the actions of their peers. 
Economic Development and TIF Literature 
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TIF, as a tool, falls within the family of tax incentives made available by states for 
municipalities to use in their economic development efforts.  Jack R. Huddleston began 
to study the TIF tool in the early 1980’s as the enabling legislation for it became popular 
across the nation.  He looked at TIF from a state policy level and questioned if this policy 
served the state’s goal, particularly the goals of promoting urban redevelopment and 
lessening fiscal disparities among cities.  Using Wisconsin as his case study, he 
concluded the following: TIF was unimpressive as a redevelopment tool, TIF was a much 
more useful tool for communities experiencing growth, TIF had the prospect of 
increasing municipal competition, and TIF was likely to lead to increased disparities 
among communities (Huddleston, 1984, 16). 
Debate surrounding which type of municipalities (urban or rural, wealthy or poor, 
large or small, etc.) benefit from TIF statutes and whether unhealthy competition is 
facilitated by the TIF statutes is common even twenty plus years after Huddleston’s 
observations (Peters & Fisher 2004; Markusen & Nesse 2007, 26).  Peters and Fisher 
(2004) did a meta-analysis review of business incentive literature and found very few 
settled issues.  They found literature indicating business incentives did seem to correlate 
positively (yet small) with subsequent growth (Newman & Sullivan 1988, Bartik 1991, 
Wasylenko 1997), and literature indicating ambiguous, little or no, or slightly negative 
correlation with growth (Due 1961, Oakland 1978, Eisinger 1988, Man 2001, and Peters 
& Fisher 2002) (Peters & Fisher 2004, 30).  
 Peters and Fisher also considered which communities were using incentives 
based on the financial condition of the community and also found mixed conclusions – 
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although from a smaller availability of studies (Peters and Fisher, 2004, 32).  Within this 
section they note the following: 1) “poorer places have less money to spend on 
recruitment and incentives,” 2) “most cities and cities in the U.S. appear to believe that 
they are competing with each other for new investment” and 3) “wealthier places may be 
induced to make use of the fiscal advantage they have.”  Acknowledging that many 
incentives are meant to target poorer cities, Peters and Fisher (2004) theorize that this 
targeted “equalizer” cannot remain over time due to political pressure.  They state: 
Politically it is difficult to maintain a truly focused program without acceding to 
the demands of other areas to be granted similar policy instruments.  As targeting 
erodes, one is more and more likely to end up simply giving a wide range of 
localities the tools to better compete with one another for new investment; in 
other words, one is simply subsidizing mobility.  And the older, more distressed 
areas are likely to be the losers in a contest between Greenfield sites with 
incentives and small, congested brownfield sites with similar incentives. (Peter 
and Fischer 2004, 34). 
Fred A. Forgey (1993) surveyed 300 municipalities and observed among 
respondents that cities with over 10,000 residents had a higher TIF usage rate (92% vs. 
48%).  Susan Mason and Kenneth Thomas (2010) also found a higher correlation of TIF 
usage among larger cities in Missouri (176).   John Anderson (1990) found a positive 
correlation between cities experiencing population growth and TIF adoption (160).  Since 
Anderson found in his 1990 study growth preceding TIF adoption, both Anderson (1990) 
and Joyce Y. Man (2001) speculated that TIF is used by growing communities to fund 
increased infrastructure needs.  When used in this way, Man (2001) describes TIF use as 
a “budget manipulation instrument” (5). 
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Man (1999) also looked at TIF adoption among cities in Indiana and did not 
confirm Anderson’s finding of higher TIF adoption in cities experiencing growth. Her 
findings found higher TIF adoption in cities with lower per capita incomes.  In this same 
study Man also found cities were more likely to adopt TIF if they experienced either 1) a 
reduction in state aid or 2) had recently increased property tax rates (1164-1165).  These 
findings lead Man to believe that municipal fiscal stress is a determinant of TIF adoption, 
a conjecture supported by Jeffrey Chapman’s (2001) observation of TIF use in California 
(131).  Richard Dye’s (1997) study of Illinois cities also found higher TIF adoption rates 
among lower per capita income cities.  He also noted that they tended to experience a 
slow rate of growth and have a higher percentage of non-residential property in its tax 
base (17). 
Some studies have investigated the propensity of a government to adopt TIF or 
business incentives based on its usage by neighboring governments (McHone 1987, 
Anderson & Wassmer 1995, Man 1999, Mason & Thomas 2010).  Man (1999) found 
support for increased TIF usage among governments bordering other governments that 
use TIF within the state of Indiana, and Mason and Thomas (2010) similarly found this 
relation in Missouri.   There are two common theories about why a community may be 
more likely to adopt TIF if a neighboring community has done so.  The dominant theory 
is that a community will adopt to become or remain competitive with its neighbors 
(Morgan & Hackbert 1974, Harrison & Kantor 1978).  Another theory is related to 
emulating neighboring behavior (Anderson & Wassmer 1995, 755-756; Man 1999, 
1165).  This mimicking behavior could be a result of competition (strategic response) or 
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policy learning (a community could learn about how to use it by observing a neighboring 
community in its use) (Walker 1969, 897-898). 
An important literature underlying this intergovernmental competition for capital 
investment is the “mobility” of capital and the related subsidies given to influence this 
movement.  This phenomenon has been studied at the international level (i.e. competition 
among nations for corporate investment) and more recently much of this literature has 
been compared to mobility at a more local level.  Kenneth Thomas described the efforts 
of national governments to have some “control” by offering subsidies to influence 
location decisions (1997).   Thomas (2007) has observed that these government efforts of 
“control” are stymied during bargaining with corporations because corporations have the 
advantage of access to governmental public information (vs. government’s lack of access 
to corporate private information) and corporations employ consultants or developers, that 
have repeated experience with such negotiations (vs. relatively few situations on the part 
of each distinct government).   
Possession of relevant information is a key element in bargaining or negotiations.  
The unequal acquisition of relevant information as stated above is called “information 
asymmetries,” which allows corporations and business consultants to “bluff” regarding 
the true amount of “competition” a government faces with respect to attracting a 
particular investment (Bachelor 1997; Thomas 2000; Weber 2004; Reid & Gatrell 2003).  
Accordingly, Weber states that governments tend to be “excessively accommodating and 
assume many of the costs of private land development and infrastructure” (Weber 2004, 
144).   
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Closely related to information asymmetries is knowledge capacity.  In addition to the 
structural asymmetry of accessing public versus private information, there is often an 
asymmetry in access to resources, including “knowledge workers” (Drucker 1973). Neil 
Reid and Jay D. Gatrell note that it is often corporations with lower need and better 
resources that are able to get public subsidies (Reid & Gatrell 2003, 111).  Peter and 
Fisher (2004) state that the targeted poorer communities are not necessarily the prime 
users of business incentives (32-33).  This could be because poorer communities are less 
able to obtain adequate (much less equal) “human capital” to strategize, negotiate, and 
implement possible options (Reese 1997, 148).  Another resource that advantages better 
resourced communities is of course money (Peters & Fisher 2004, 32-33).  Laura A. 
Reese observed in her study of Michigan and Ontario cities that “cities with more robust 
economies are significantly more likely to devote greater resources to economic 
development” (Reese 1997, 105).  Both Reese’s study and the research of Richard C. 
Feiock and Jae-Hoon Kim (2001) show that the administrative structure of the 
government (mayor-council or council-city manager) seem to influence the type and/or 
amount of economic development activity.  
A development that exacerbates both the inequities experienced between 
municipalities and business in the acquisition of relevant information and/or 
accumulation of relevant knowledge (i.e., experience) is the creation of location and site 
specialists, frequently called site consultants (Thomas 2000, 31; Markusen & Neese 
2007, 11-12).  Corporations frequently use their superior “resources” to buy “experience” 
in the desired marketplace through the retention of these consultants. Site consultants are 
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frequently employed or retained by developers. In fact it is questionable how frequently 
TIF adoption is initiated by the municipality versus the developer.  
Nicholas P. Guehlstorf and Andrew J. Thiesing (2005) noted that “the abilities of 
public administrators … vary greatly from locale to locale.” They included a variable to 
measure the impact of “administrative capacity” along with state political culture and 
other complicating factors while looking at TIF usage in the St. Louis metropolitan area, 
with an emphasis on Illinois cities.  Although the sample was too small to be significant, 
the cities categorized as having “moderate capacity” were more represented by TIF users, 
and cities with “high complicating factors” were more represented (25). 
There seems to be a trend towards a significant lag time between passage of the 
enabling legislation at the state level and usage of TIF at the local level.  California (as 
inventor of the tool) only had 27 projects in its first 15 years (Davidson 1979), but once it 
reached that point, it “mushroomed” and was a major redevelopment tool used by more 
than 100 California cities and counties within a few more years (Davidson 1979, 423 & 
note 136).  A similar adoption curve was noted in Indiana.  Although Indiana’s statute 
was passed in 1975, it was 1979 before the first local government attempted to use it 
(county-level).  This TIF district was challenged in the courts, and it remained the only 
TIF district until Indiana’s Supreme Court affirmed the constitutionality of the legislation 
in 1985, fully ten years after the enabling legislation. By 1995 there were 53 cities and 12 
counties that had established one or more TIFs (Klacik, 2001, 179-180). 
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Missouri-Specific Literature 
 The earliest Missouri-specific TIF literature/studies were in law review journals.  
Christina G. Dudley wrote a critique of the as of then unused statute for the 1985-1986 
edition of the UMKC Law Review (vol. 91) titled “Tax Increment Financing for 
Redevelopment in Missouri:  Beauty and the Beast.”  In it Dudley (1985-1986) identifies 
the first court action as being in the interest of bonding agencies desiring to gain certainty 
regarding the validity of the statute’s provisions, and the Court’s position of refusing to 
continue encouragement of this behavior (pre-issue bond decisions by quo warranto 
instead of declaratory judgment) (79-81).  She also reviews the state of blight 
jurisprudence in the state as well as compares some of the provisions of Missouri’s TIF to 
other states such as California, Illinois, Wisconsin, Michigan, and Minnesota.  Dudley 
(1985-1986) identifies that Missouri’s “conservation” provision closely resembles 
Illinois’ provision (82). She (1985-1986) also identifies some evolutions in TIF 
development in other states that Missouri did not copy, such as California’s inclusion of 
housing for instance (86).  She related that the TIF tool favored high-density projects and 
that housing usually was a low-density project, thus not generating enough funding.  She 
expected that Missouri’s statute would be found valid. 
 Richard King (1995), a prominent economic development lawyer and former 
mayor of Independence, Missouri, wrote an article about economic activities taxes 
(EATs) as a recently (1990) allowed source of revenue for TIFs.  Although the essence of 
the article is about how EATs differs from the property tax source of funding, this article 
makes arguments about technical aspects of the new provision, making a case for it to be 
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interpreted in a broader sense, thus making TIF more flexible.  As such, he applauds the 
General Assembly for providing “a rich source for additional innovations in obtaining 
funds for the purpose of encouraging redevelopment in areas where it is desperately 
needed” (1995, 7).   
In 1999, Julie A. Gorshorn suggested reforms for Missouri’s TIF in the Washington 
University Law Quarterly, primarily suggesting that the definition of blight be restricted 
by restructuring “the ‘but-for’ finding with respect to blight conditions on a particular 
parcel of land” (944), and by requiring TIF bonds to be including in a municipality’s 
statutory debt limitations (946).  J.D. Candidate Josh Reinert (2001) also focused on the 
blight and the “but-for” requirement as needing reform in his St. Louis University Law 
Journal article (13).  He noted the legislature had already made attempts and were 
unsuccessful to date, stating: 
These proposals have focused on limiting TIF to deteriorating, inner-city areas.  
However, such proposals have failed to garner the requisite majority of lawmakers, in 
part because they would limit TIF to only the most deteriorated areas within the state. 
(13) 
In the next group of papers, studies began to turn from more or less a technical 
critique of the statutes to the practical use of it.  In a discussion paper for the Brookings 
Institution, Thomas Luce (2003) looked at the two major metropolitan areas of Missouri 
and noticed a trend of TIF being used by “high-tax-base Missouri suburban areas with 
little need for assistance in the competition for tax base” (v).  He identified what he 
perceived to be flaws in the statute that led to TIFs being used by others besides its 
targeted group, stating: 1) “vague definitions of the allowable use of TIF; 2) “weak limits 
on its use for inefficient inter-local competition for tax base,” and the “inclusion of sales 
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tax base in the program [which] tilts it toward lower-wage jobs and retail projects” (v). 
He also noted that this “misuse” was more pronounced in the St. Louis metropolitan area, 
especially St. Louis County.  In a study commissioned by the Reclaim Democracy 
Kansas City’s Chapter, Michael P. Kelsay (2007) looked at TIF use in the Kansas City 
area and called it an “uneven patchwork,” and he noted that the advantage seemed to be 
with better-off areas within Kansas City and that the amount of tax revenue being 
redirected had grown significantly from 2000 to 2004.  He was concerned that the TIF 
law was too “vague” and this led to its overuse, especially with the availability of EATs 
(Executive Summary).  
The Public Policy Research Center of the University of Missouri-St. Louis (2005) did 
a case study of 13 cities in different regions of Missouri for the Department of Economic 
Development in 2005.  This study noted the following four factors as having influence on 
the use of incentives: 1) city size, 2) geographic location within state, 3) accessibility to 
the Department of Economic Development’s staff due to recent relocation of most staff to 
Jefferson City, and 4) whether the city had an economic development plan (2005, 2-3).  
City size was associated with a budget size, which in some case allowed for more or less 
options to use in partnering with private capital and larger cities were found to have a 
more professional staff, possibly including an economic development person. The 
employment of an economic development person lessened the negative impact of not 
having a Department of Economic Development staffer locally. Geographic location 
influencers include potential bordering states competition, especially near Arkansas, and 
nearness to highways and major thoroughfares.  Having a economic plan helped 
municipalities be proactive regarding economic development. 
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 The East-West Gateway Council of Government
4
 sponsored an in-house study 
and two local university studies (St. Louis University
5
; and the University of Missouri-St. 
Louis and Southern Illinois University
6
) in 2009.  An interim release of the in-house 
study was published in January 2009.  The studies were limited to the St. Louis 
metropolitan area (including St. Louis City, and the counties of St. Louis, St. Charles, 
Franklin, and Jefferson in Missouri and Madison, St. Clair, and Monroe in Illinois).  The 
in-house study aimed to inventory all incentives in the area and quantify the amount and 
costs to area governments and to assess benefit.  This study found that area governments 
had granted over $2 billion in TIFs and special taxing districts (transportation 
development district or business development district) (iii). Preliminary findings were 
that uniform reporting of inputs (incentives, expenditures, etc.) and outputs (jobs, 
property assessed valuations, etc.) was sorely lacking and although the total amount of 
incentives granted was large, it did not seem to be accompanied by real growth (iv).  
Also, it noted the association of many incentives with retail projects appeared to be a 
“losing economic development strategy for the region” (v).   
The St. Louis University study by Sarah L. Coffin and Robert W. Ryan attempted 
to build on the initial findings of the interim-release study to determine how TIF was 
used at the neighborhood level, looking for possible socioeconomic well-being factors 
and impact.  The study tried to answer the questions such as:  does the type of TIF project 
                                                             
4
 Quasi-governmental agency providing coordinated planning for the St. Louis metropolitan area’s 8 
counties in Missouri (St. Louis City, St. Louis County, Franklin, Jefferson, St. Charles) and Illinois (St. 
Clair, Madison, Monroe). 
5
 Authors Sarah Coffin and Robert Ryan 
6
 Authors Public Policy Research Center (PPRC) at the University of Missouri—St. Louis and the Institute 
for Urban Research at Southern Illinois University. 
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vary with economic or racial disparities of neighborhoods, and do neighborhoods seem to 
be improved after a TIF has been fully implemented or not – i.e. do blight factors seem to 
be mitigated or to continue to spread?  The study did find a variation of type of TIF 
(residential, retail, industrial, mixed, etc.) by socioeconomic status, and “wealthier 
communities initially use TIF as a tool to preempt distress or creeping blight” (2009, 22).  
They also noted a distinct pattern for St. Louis city, noting their predominant use of TIF 
for residential housing relative to its suburban neighbors – and the authors stated a 
concern that “the city of St. Louis is not competing with the surrounding municipalities in 
Missouri for TIF projects and that there is an opportunity for regional cooperation” 
(Coffin and Ryan, 2009, 23). 
The third 2009 study commissioned by the East-West Council of Governments 
was jointly done by the Public Policy Research Center (UM-St. Louis) and the Institute 
for Urban Research (SIU-E) was essentially described a few TIF cases in St. Louis city 
and St. Louis county in Missouri and Madison and St. Clair counties in Illinois.  The St. 
Louis Marketplace was the TIF discussed from the city of St. Louis.  Particular TIF cases 
illustrated in St. Louis County were in different geographical areas, and included the 
municipalities of Jennings, St. John, Olivette, Maplewood, Brentwood, Richmond 
Heights, Crestwood, Sunset Hills, and Fenton.  Specific TIF cases were explored to either 
find support or lack of support for commonly stated suppositions regarding TIFs.  The 
main question asked by the researchers was “can municipalities use development 
incentives to manipulate the location of retail business to achieve their own financial 
objectives?” (3). In the resulting discussion section, the researcher noted that within these 
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cases “the structure of sales tax collection in St. Louis County7 does motivate 
municipalities to pursue real estate development/redevelopment…. Consideration of what 
and how to change regulation of TIF might best consider change in the structure of sales 
and tax distribution” (34).  The cases did not show evidence of TIF use for to relief fiscal 
stress, and that developers seem to clearly know where they wanted to locate before 
negotiating began (33).  They also noted that “businesses need to grow and expand 
regularly, about every ten years.  Many incentive districts have life spans of fifteen or 
twenty years, which is incongruent with market needs (34). 
Susan Mason and Kenneth P. Thomas (2010) also looked at TIF across Missouri, 
using reported data and returned survey results from 92% (#171) of the municipalities of 
population size of 2500 or more.  Looking at municipalities that had gone through the 
process and actual approved a TIF, Mason and Thomas found an increased likelihood that 
an adjacent city had also approved a TIF.  They also found that a lower poverty rate 
increased the likelihood of a municipality having an approved TIF, and in some models 
they found a significance with unemployment rates and TIF usage.  They did not find 
significance regarding government structure or growth in assessed valuation.  This study 
underpins an underlying concern for the path-dependent dynamics of inter-municipal 
competition, and the authors summarize their findings as “strengthening the case for 
better targeting of incentives.” 
                                                             
7
 St. Louis county has a county sales tax distribution/sharing system which designates municipalities as 
either point-of-sale (or A) cities or pool (or B) cities.  “A” cities retain most of the sales tax they collect, 
while “B” cities collectively share sales tax collected in their area (and a small portion of that collected in 
the “A” cities area) based on each cities population. 
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 No study has been done on the impact of the interaction among the major political 
institutions of the legislature, courts, and bureaucracy (administration) on the 
development and adoption of TIF statute, or other economic development tools in 
Missouri, or possibly any other state.  Various studies have looked at various aspects of 
the TIF statute, alone or in conjunction with other economic development tools.  Some 
studies have looked at the impact of TIF and subsequent growth in assessed valuation, 
some have looked at the type of municipalities and their financial condition, and some 
have looked at municipal size. More recent studies have look at the possible impact of 
inter-municipality competition.  These studies generally look at the impact of the TIF 
statute at a point in time – a snapshot.  They do not go behind the “scene” to notice the 
actors behind the curtains, perhaps changing the statute to be more or less friendly, or 
more or less usable to certain groups of users/potential users.  Until this study, the study 
of TIFs in Missouri that also fully addressed the impact of the Courts and corresponding 
legislation had been left only to legal scholars. 
This study will add the element of time to the literature from a longitudinal case study 
perspective as well as a quantitative analysis.  It is possible that the TIF statute may 
essential be a different statute over time.  It will also bring from behind the curtains the 
“sausage-making” aspects of modifications to the statute of over time, and the actors 
orchestrating changes or resisting such. 
Preview of Findings 
 The following bullet points are highlights of the findings to come: 
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1. Path dependency counts.  The legal definition of blight is technical in nature and 
differs significantly from the common usage of the word. This is the result of more 
than 50 years of legal jurisprudence, starting at the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
determination of blight and what constitutes a public purpose (Berman v. Parker 
1954 and Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff 1984).  Legislators’ initial intent of 
enabling TIF to assist with blight and pre-blight conditions inadvertently allowed TIF 
to be used in broader areas and in broader ways than the original intent would 
endorse.  The mismatch between the common use of blight as intended by legislators 
and the legal definition of blight as known by developers, consultants, lawyers, and  
as understood by the Courts allow for much broader uses than the original intent.  The 
implementation of the original intent would require that usage of blight have 
additional qualifiers to restrict its usage – these qualifiers were not included in the 
original statute.  The actual translation of the TIF enabling bill into legal language 
was done by development lawyers, experts who have developers and municipalities 
as clients, who likely took advantage of this mismatch in blight definition to allow 
TIF to be used in a broader way.  As customary, it is always harder to take something 
away once granted (albeit inadvertently, perhaps) than if it were never granted in the 
first place. 
2. Expertise counts and different levels of expertise can be seen in the different patterns 
of TIF use and adoption. 
3. The expertise of the Kansas City growth machine was vital to the implementation of 
TIF and to the support of and retention of its broader use.  The Kansas City area 
professionals have also been crucial in sharing information about TIF and how to use 
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TIF to others across Missouri state.  They were important players in the creation of 
the Missouri Tax Increment Financing Association (now known as the Missouri 
Economic Development Financing Association). 
4. There is an indication that in some geographical areas that TIF is used by urban areas 
experiencing decline.  A logistic regression analysis supports that at least in one 
important geographical area, TIF-users are municipalities with tendencies of higher 
poverty rates
8
.   
5. Logistic regressions again support previous findings of others that population size 
matter in both whether a municipality is a TIF-user and if they are an earlier or later 
adopter (Mason and Thomas 2010).   
Preview of Chapters Two, Three, Four, and Five. 
Chapter Two is the Research Methodology Chapter.  It will review the overall aim 
of this research and identify the approach to be taken in an attempt to gain knowledge and 
to answer specific questions and hypothesis. The methodology will be mixed methods, 
using both a qualitative case study, quantitative analysis of a dataset, and primary 
interviews.    
Chapter Three is essentially a qualitative, historical development of the statute.  It 
covers 27 years (1982-2009), and includes legislative activity, Court activity, political 
actors, and other events that shaped the development of the statute.  It briefly starts with 
an introduction and a preview of the findings.  The next section is a physical description 
                                                             
8
 Mason and Thomas also found significance with TIF adoption and poverty rates, as well as 
unemployment rate and adjacency 
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of the statute and amendments.  This is followed by two sections that highlight either the 
legislative activity or the judicial activity in isolation.  This is done in order to get a better 
focus and understanding on how each (legislative and courts) developed without the 
distraction of the other.  This also allows for a fuller discussion of the important aspects 
contained in each.  With this “overview” of the statute itself and highlights of the 
legislative and court activities independently, it is hoped that it will be easy to be engaged 
and follow the next section.  The next section chronicles the development of the statute, 
attempting to include in real-time the relationship or occurrence of events, legislative 
activity, court decisions, municipal and state officials, and other political actors in a 
process-tracing format.   An analysis follows the narrative of the historical development 
of the statute, answering the questions and hypothesis posed and making other 
observations resulting from the narrative. 
The Fourth Chapter includes both quantitative and qualitative research.. The 
quantitative section studies patterns of usage and adoption of TIF in Missouri.  Municipal 
characteristics such as population size and location are considered as well as number of 
TIFs adopted, and at what point in time (i.e. “adoption wave”) a type of municipality 
began using the tool.  Also other descriptive statistics about TIF use in Missouri are 
recorded.  The second section is a qualitative segment which includes interviews of a 
small sampling of municipalities and a small number of professionals in the field.  This 
information provides further insight, confirmation, or caution.to the other research 
information. 
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The Fifth Chapter is a concluding chapter and that integrates observations and 
information stemming from all the previous chapters.  It revisits major themes and issues 
presented and/or uncovered in this research and illuminate the process of policy change 
and notes institutional and other types of barriers to effective solutions. 
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Chapter Two -- Methodology 
 
Research Questions and Hypotheses 
 
 The study is a basic analysis of TIF law evolution, and its adoption and use in 
Missouri.  Aspects examined include: 1) the need/circumstances during its inception, 2) 
development of the statute over time by legislative changes, legal decisions, and political 
coalitions, 3) characteristics of users of TIF over time, and 4) contextualization of other 
features that seem to be associated with the pattern of usage/usage of TIFs.  This statute 
has been in effect for 30 years.  As the research shows, in twenty-seven years a fair 
amount of activity has resulted from this statute.  TIF use is near its historical peak – 
additionally, the opposition and level of awareness of TIF usage seems to be equal to or 
near its peak. 
Specifically, the research questions devolve as follows: 
1. What is the political and legislative history/development of the TIF statute?  What 
was the purpose of these modifications over time? Did changes result in 
improvement to statute (to carry out original intent) or were changes a result of 
special interest capture?   
2. What is the pattern of adoption and usage of TIF over its first 27 years of life and 
how did this pattern correlate with legislative changes or legal decisions, 
including:  
a. who is using TIF (municipal characteristics), and 
b. when each began to use TIF. 
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3. To assist in contextualizing the historical development and pattern of use, what 
are some of the other factors that seem to influence TIF use?   
Each question is important individually.  Due to the complex nature of group decision 
making inherent in policy development and lawmaking in a pluralistic democracy, it is 
quite possible for a statute not to perform as desired.  As laws are modified over time, it 
is not assured that those changes are designed to make a law more effective, particularly 
with respect to the statute’s original intent.  Changes may be a result of other interests 
trying to “capture” the statute, and modify it to suite a different goal or to weaken it.  
Using Peters and Fisher’s (2004) erosion of targeting theory, one would expect a statute 
designed with a narrow target as beneficiary to be expanded over time, eroding the 
planned benefit to the originally targeted recipient. 
The first question regards the historical development of the TIF statute.  It is 
qualitative research.  It follows the historical development of the TIF statute through 
iterations of legislative amendments, legislative committee reports, and court decisions.  
It documents the political or economic environment, the “stated” reasons for the changes 
or decisions, and who the expected beneficiaries were or were expected to be.  While 
documenting the historical development, special attention is paid to whether this statute’s 
evolution supports Peter’s and Fisher’s erosion of targeting theory.  
The second question is primarily quantitative but also takes advantage of some of 
the qualitative information ascertained by the first question.  It will address the number of 
municipalities who use TIF and when they began to use it.  It will look for common 
characteristics of early municipal adopters versus later adopters, and for subsequent 
patterns or waves of new users, especially with different municipal characteristics, if any.  
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Overlying the qualitative data (when and what changes were made to the TIF statute 
including court decisions) on the quantitative data (patterns of usage of TIF by whom and 
when) sheds some light on how the legislative and judicial institutions interposed to help 
or thwart the adoption and/or usefulness of the statute and to whom. 
The third question is mostly qualitative in nature, adding personal interviews of a 
sampling of municipal staff persons regarding their municipalities’ experience with TIF 
adoption and use, personal interviews of a selection of professionals in the field, and 
personal interviews with a few involved legislators.  This information is expected to 
enrich the information obtained in the other section.  Information collected from 
municipal interviews include information about how their first TIF came to be in 
existence, their internal staffing and use of external professionals, and whether other 
economic development tools are used either alone or in combination with TIFs.  The 
professionals (lawyer, bondsman, and consultants) were asked similar questions but from 
their perspectives, and also they were asked about their general observations regarding 
TIF use and problems they have noticed or the need for their services in general.  Lastly, 
some legislators that had various roles in TIF legislation or on TIF committees were also 
interviewed about their own experiences and views. 
The following hypotheses correspond to the research questions itemized above: 
 
I. Major changes to the TIF statute broadened the availability of its use by local 
governments, especially to local governments that did not fit the original 
“targeted” definition. 
 
II. TIF using municipalities are more likely to have a higher poverty rate. 
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III. Waves of adoption of TIFs by particular types of municipalities followed 
court decisions and statute amendments that lowered risks for that particular 
type of user/usage/investment. 
 
IV. Use of TIF by a municipality is limited by a municipality’s ability to hire or 
retain outside assistance. 
 
Research Design 
The study will consist of both qualitative and quantitative data and analysis. 
The Quantitative Research Design 
  A quantitative design is employed to ascertain who is using TIF (by municipality and 
municipality characteristics), and when each began using TIF.  From this information a 
pattern of usage can also be constructed.  Specific data collected include: 
 The number of TIFs used by municipality by year  
 Characteristics/independent variables gathered include: population size 1990 and 
2000, year of incorporation, poverty rate, municipal classification, county 
location, size of county 2000, county classification, county assessed valuation, 
urban/rural classification.   
 
The base of the municipal characteristics information is from Missouri state sources, 
including the Missouri Bluebook for municipal characteristic data.  Most of the data 
regarding TIFs is from the Annual Report published by the Economic Development 
Department of the State of Missouri.  The number of TIFs reported for the 2009 period 
was 474.  This data source is supplemented by other readily available and reliable 
sources.  They include a St. Louis County document (Tom Curran’s database of TIF 
users), Kenneth P. Thomas’ database.  This is done to have a more accurate analysis (i.e. 
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not to categorize a TIF user as a non-TIF user by that municipality’s failure to file a TIF 
report or because the TIF has been dissolved or no longer active). 
Regression is performed to discover statistical significance between independent and 
dependent variables.  A binary regression model is used to determine under which 
conditions a municipality is more likely to have used TIF.  Non-TIF using governments 
(population size of 1000 or more) are used as a comparison.  Additionally, summary 
statistics are used to answer who is using TIF and when they started using the tool. 
The Qualitative Design 
Qualitative data is used alone and in conjunction with the quantitative research to add 
context to it, thus allowing for a fuller understanding of TIF usage in Missouri.  The bulk 
of the qualitative research is used to construct a narrative, process-tracing of the historical 
development of the statute.  This segment concentrates heavily on secondary sources, 
although occasionally some primary sources are included.  The secondary sources used 
are to: 
 document the stated original purpose of the Act and note the circumstances 
leading to changes to the Act over 1982-2009 (27 years), and  
 comprehend the interaction of the parts of governing in the development of this 
statute, with an eye particularly on if and how erosion of targeting occurred. 
 (in conjunction with the quantitative) to add context in analyzing the pattern of 
adoption and apparent enabling circumstances that seem to encourage the use of 
TIF.  
Butler, Cassandra, 2012, p. 46 
The secondary sources used include the following: state documents (statutes, legislative 
committee reports), legal research reports, newspaper articles, and other secondary 
research sources 
The primary research provides information and context that is difficult to acquire 
through secondary sources alone.  Also, events discovered in the secondary sources may 
not necessarily have evolved as they seemed.  It is useful to get first-hand information 
and opinions from legislators and practitioners “in the trenches,” to verify or otherwise 
clarify what seems to have occurred or be occurring.  Additionally, the primary research 
will attempt to get a better perspective regarding the role of consultants and other 
anecdotal information that can possibly add insight to the circumstances surrounding the 
development of the first TIF district in a municipality.  Discussion Guides were 
developed and tailored for the following interviewees to gather the following 
information: 
 Legislators:  perspective of TIF purpose, legislation, and use (intended and 
actual); unsuccessful amendment attempts and amendments yet needed;  
 Experts – Consultants, Lawyers, Bondsmen:  their role in the decision-making 
process; the need for their services and how they work with developers and 
municipalities; who generally initiates TIFs from their perspectives; barriers and 
problems they see with TIF implementations; 
 Municipalities: their staffing, internal capacity and need for outside assistance; 
who initiated their first TIF (developer, municipality), why, and the degree of risk 
involved; lobbying representation; and use of other economic development tools.  
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.  This primary research for legislators and professionals was accomplished by 
telephone interviews or personal surveys of selected individuals (legislative committee 
members, consultants, municipal officials, etc.).   The following persons were 
interviewed: 
1) Legislators (4): John E. Griesheimer (chair of  2009 Senate Interim 
Committee on Tax Increment Financing, and member on previous House of 
Representative committees); Henry C. Rizzo (former House of Representative 
member and chair of the 1997 and co-chair of the 2000 House Interim 
Committee Studying Tax Increment Financing); Timothy Green (Senator of 
the 13
th
 District, former co-chair of the 2000 House Interim Committee 
Studying Tax Increment Financing and member of the Senate Interim 
Committee on Tax Increment Financing); and Carl Vogel (former Senator 6
th
 
district, member of 1996 and 2000 House Interim Committee Studying Tax 
Increment Financing) 
2) State Bureaucrats (2): Hal Van Slyck (Missouri Dept. of Economic 
Development Incentives Specialist), Sallie Hemenway ( Dept. of Economic 
Development Director, Business and Community Resources 
3) Consultants (3): John Bancaglione, Peckham Guyton Albers & Viets; Larry 
Marks, Development Strategies; Gene Norber, Economic Development 
Resources; 
4) Bonds banker and Lawyer (2):  Laura Radcliff, public finance bond banker; 
Mark Grimm, public finance lawyer. 
The Discussion Guides for each are included in the appendix. 
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The surveys for the municipalities included an online survey in order to take less time 
on the subsequent telephone survey segment.  Once a municipal official agreed to 
participate they were sent an online survey.  Once that information was returned, a more 
tailored telephone conversation based on the online survey was completed.  
 The population is municipal and county governments within the state of Missouri.  
Because the Act is usually implemented at the municipal level, the focus is on units at 
this level.  In occasional instances, the Act is implemented at the county level.  Since this 
happens so seldom, this level will not be a focus of the study.  The state of Missouri has 
approximately 861 municipalities (Missouri Bluebook 2007, p. 869) and 115 counties 
(Missouri Bluebook 2007, p.968).  
The Act requires that municipalities report to the State any active TIFs on an 
annual basis.  For the 2006 year, 38 municipalities and 2 counties reported use of a TIF to 
the state.  Amendments have been made to the municipal reporting requirements, and 
2009 (reported in 2010) has seen a marked increase in reporting, with 115 municipalities 
(112 cities, 3 counties) filing TIF reports.  The state manager (Van Slyck) who receives 
and compiles the report has observed that this increased reporting does not appear to be 
from first-time reporting of TIFs, but from filings of previously reported TIFs (Van Slyck 
2011, interview). Thus, for the quantitative analysis, the sample will include the entire set 
of municipalities contained in the 2009 TIF Report.  These governments have a total of 
477 reported TIFs in 2009.  The reported information will be used and this data is 
enhanced by additional information gleaned from other sources in order to have as 
accurate a database as possible. Sources used are:  1) Kenneth Thomas’ database of 
Missouri TIFs from 1987-2004, 2) Thomas Curran’s database of TIFs in St. Louis 
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County from 1991 to 2006, and 3) East-West Gateway database of TIF districts in their 
service area. 
 From this group of municipalities, 40 were randomly selected (computer 
generated) to be interviewed.  An attempt was made to contact the person identified on 
the TIF Annual report by phone or email.  Of these 40 municipalities contacted, 20 
municipalities agreed to participate, and were sent the online survey.  Of the online 
surveys, 17 were returned, and 15 follow-up phone surveys were completed on the 17 
returned surveys. 
 The research will be used to test the each hypothesis as follows: 
HI:  Changes to the TIF statute broadened the availability of its use by local 
governments, especially to local governments that did not fit the original 
“targeted” definition. 
 
The null hypothesis: 
HI0:  There were no amendments to the TIF statute that broadened the 
availability of TIF use beyond the targeted group (as defined/indicated in the 
original bill)’ 
 
Predicted value:  There are amendments that widen the availability of TIFs to 
other than the original user or type of use. 
 
The null hypothesis will be accepted only if no amendment to the statute can be found 
that is judged to have expressly broadened the availability of TIF to be used by new users 
(municipalities) or new uses (purposes/type of projects).  
HII – TIF using municipalities are more likely to have a higher poverty rate. 
The null hypothesis: 
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HII0: There is no relationship between municipal poverty rate (percent persons 
below poverty) and whether the municipality has adopted a TIF. 
Predicted value:  There is a positive relationship between whether a 
municipality has adopted a TIF and the municipality’s poverty rate.  In other 
words, the higher the municipality’s poverty rate, the more likely the 
municipality has used a TIF.  
The null hypothesis will be rejected if a binomial regression of TIF-using versus non-
TIF-using municipalities, which includes the percent persons below poverty independent 
variable, finds statistically significant relationship at the 95% confidence level. 
HIII.  Waves of adoption of TIFs by particular types of municipalities followed 
court decisions and statute amendments that lowered risks for that particular type 
of user/usage/investment.  In other words, An adoption wave pattern by type of 
municipality (size of population, growth of population, percent poverty) can be 
observed in an ordered logit regression. 
 
HIII0 – No “adoption of wave” by type of municipality (size of population, 
growth of population, percent poverty) is observed in an ordered logit 
regression. 
 (If no pattern is discerned, then there is no reason to look at what amendment 
or court decision could have impacted the ordered regression result.  If there is 
significance, then court decisions or legislative amendments will be perused 
for possible association.) 
Predicted Value:  Rural municipalities are more likely to use TIF in a later 
wave than municipalities in urban or urbanized areas. 
This null hypothesis will be rejected if there is an independent variable shows 
significance at the 95% confidence level, or if a significant difference can be seen in the 
summary statistics. 
HIV – Use of TIF by a municipality is limited by a municipality’s ability to hire 
particular internal staff or retain specialized outside assistance. 
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HIV0 – A municipality’s particular internal staffing or ability to retain 
particular outside assistance does not impact their ability to use TIF. 
Predicted Value: -- Municipalities are more likely to use TIF if they have 
adequate capacity, i.e. in-house expertise, of a city manager, assistance city 
manager, economic development staffer, etc.  
 
What is meant by “particular internal staff” or “retain specialized outside assistance” is 
the capacity of the municipality to hire, permanently or by project, the expertise needed 
to recognize and understand the potential for projects and to follow through with that 
information.   This hypothesis will not be tested quantitative since this information will 
not be collected at a number high enough to be statistically significant.  Additionally, no 
interviews will include non-TIF municipalities by which to compare.  But a summary of 
the results of the interviewed municipalities and professionals will be used to better 
contextualize this municipal trait, to ascertain whether further research in this area is 
warranted. 
Limitations 
 This data is specific to Missouri, although many lessons are transferrable. 
 The data published in the TIF Annual Report are not necessarily accurate and to 
some degree incomplete.  This could impact the results. Additionally, the 
standards of reporting are not uniform.   
 Sometimes actual motives are hard to uncover and distinguish from stated 
“politically correct” motives. 
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Chapter Three – Historical Development of the Real Property Tax Increment 
Allocation Redevelopment Act 
 
This chapter is designed to answer the first research question, which is: 
What is the political and legislative history/development of the TIF statute?  What 
was the purpose of these modifications over time?  Did changes result in 
improvement to statute (to carry out original intent) or were changes a result of 
special interest capture?   
 
These three questions will be the essence of the two major subheading titles in the 
research findings section within this chapter.  Although the basic information of this 
chapter involves tracking how the statute evolved, which in essence is a legislative 
function, these changes will necessarily be contextualized by the activities of the courts 
and the activities of other actors during the twenty-seven years under study.   The 
literature review does contain some theoretical and empirical suggestions of how the 
statute may develop, policy wise and politically, and reconstructing the historical 
development has the possibility of shedding further light on these theories and other 
empirical findings.   As is sometimes found in narrative research, it may shed enough 
insight that new theories may be postulated.  In particular, much has been written of the 
impact of interest groups on politicians and bureaucrats and how this impacts 
policy/legislation.  Much less has been written about the mechanism of Court interaction 
with lawmakers, bureaucrats, and interest groups on policy development.  It is likely that 
within policies/statutes that impact economic investment activity, Court decisions have 
significant impact on the development and eventual success of the statute fulfilling its 
Butler, Cassandra, 2012, p. 53 
original intent.  This style of historical tracing will hopefully allow this interaction to be 
further fleshed out.  
Closely related to the second and third questions (purpose of changes and did 
changes result in improvement or special interest capture) is the theory of “erosion of 
targeting,” posited by Peters and Fisher (2004.)   Thus, within tracing the historical 
development of the statute, an answer to whether this statute’ evolution included erosion 
away from its intended beneficiary should become evident.  Peters and Fisher expect that 
those not “included” would lobby for changes that would allow them to participate, and 
over time, the targeted advantage would erode.  The specifics of what type of local 
government and for which type of uses the TIF legislation was designed to assist is 
commonly assumed  to be the following – urban governments with redevelopment of 
areas that are experiencing decline.   This research will include investigating whether this 
is in fact the original purpose of this statute.  Given that this assumption is indeed the 
case, then the targeting erosion theory will predict that the statute will eventually be used 
by non-urban areas, and/or for purpose other than “redevelopment.”  Given that the 
intended audience is as expected, the following hypothesis can be tested:  
Ho1:  Changes to the TIF statute broadened the availability of its use by local 
governments to include local governments that did not fit the original “targeted” 
definition. 
 This chapter will follow the following format: first a preview section will be 
presented, with a short review of the anticipated findings based on the literature review, 
and then a preview of the actual findings.  Next the actual research will be presented.  
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This research will be discussed in chronological, story-telling format.  It will be presented 
this way in a chronological narrative format versus a “thematic” format because a single 
event may have bearings on more than one theme mentioned in the literature review – 
thus it could be too redundant in addition to breaking the flow of events to describe each 
event in a “thematic” style.  Lastly, after the reader has followed the intricate web of 
twenty-seven years of historical development, the chapter will analyze the finding and 
again put in into context of the literature and research hypothesis. 
I.  Preview 
Preview – Findings Related to Literature 
 From a policy process, much of the theories in the literature review of chapter one 
center around policy change.  These theories suggest that a study of the historical 
development of the TIF statute may find that the policy changes over time due to:  1) 
policy feedback/policy implementation; 2) policy drift/conversion/layering/revision; 3) 
incrementalism/critical junctures/punctuated-equilibrium; 4) path 
dependency/sequencing; and 5) policy innovation/diffusion.  
Urban politics and “growth machine” theories mentioned in the literature review 
would have us pay more attention to the political actors involved with legislative change.  
These actors have varying levels of the following: 1) capacity, 2) power, and 3) 
motivation.  These characteristics are used or not to influence the local and state-level 
policy processes.  Urban regime theory state that landowners are advantaged, and often 
have influence with politicians and have favor among the press and labor leaders 
(Molotch 1976).  The common motivating factor involves the intersecting relationship 
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between increased land valuation (landowner/developers and city officials) and economic 
activities (labor, media, city officials, developers).  City officials depend on 
developers/landowners to bring investments to drive the economic activity in their towns.  
All of the “collaborators” bring different forms of power to the table. 
Evidence of many if not all of these policy process and political theories are present 
in the historical development of the statute.  There is evidence of policy feedback and/or 
policy drift/conversion/layering/revision as the statute is modified and/or adjusted due to 
committee hearings, court decisions, problem solving, and windows of opportunities 
being opened.  Examples of policy feedback would be the many smaller “clarifying” 
amendments to the statute such as a 1993 amendment stating by which year the base 
assessed valuation would be calculated (“the most recent”), and a 2003 amendment to 
explicitly state a “conflict of interest” clause (which allowed elected officials to publicly 
state their preferences/opinions about potential TIF projects in their areas, but could not 
profit financially from those projects). An example of policy feedback rooted in political 
motivation would be the amendments specifying the makeup of the TIF commissions in 
1991, 1997, and 2007.   
Incrementalism can be seen throughout the historical development of the statute, as 
well as policy change that can be described as punctuated-equilibrium or critical 
junctures.  For instance, sections of the statutes describing what constituted a valid 
redevelopment plan were frequently amended, but generally the modifications were 
incremental in nature.  It is possible that this incremental change has resulted in a 
fundamental change, based on the court ruling in Shelby County. A prominent example 
critical juncture/punctuated-equilibrium can be seen with in the validation of the TIF 
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statute by the Missouri Supreme Court.   Usage of the statute languished until a Missouri 
Supreme Court decision confirmed the validity of the statute (this will become more 
evident in the research in the next chapter as well). Additionally, the policy feedback loop 
example in the paragraph above regarding TIF commission composition could have been 
characterized as a critical juncture in 1991, followed by an incremental change in 1997, 
which led to another critical juncture or punctuated event in 2007 (but which only applied 
to a certain geographical subset). 
Policy conversion could be said to overlap the erosion of targeting as the statute 
targeted for urban areas was “discovered” by legislators as having a use among more 
rural municipalities.  This use was embraced by many legislators who did not have urban 
areas in their districts.  The TIF statute has also been converted into use by well-to-do 
suburban areas such as Des Peres and to new development areas such as Hazelwood’s 
Missouri Bottoms area.  These uses of the statute proved to be controversial, but yet, they 
exist today. 
Evidence of path dependency/sequencing is also present, as well as policy 
innovation/ diffusion.  An example of path dependency/sequencing is the infrequency of 
use of economic development as one of the three allowable purposes, likely a result of an 
early Court decision (1992 in Pettis County) invalidating its use.  A demonstration of 
policy innovation is the Dream Initiative, a program the state implemented to help 
smaller and/or rural areas gain capacity and knowledge to use appropriate economic 
development tools in their own municipalities. 
 The urban politics and the politics of growth (i.e. “growth machine”) were also 
evident is the fairly strong coalitions between municipalities, developers, and politicians.  
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Court cases mostly always included a municipality as one of the parties (plaintiff or 
respondent), but seldom was a developer the municipality’s adversary.  The usual 
plaintiff against the municipality/county govt. was another governmental body (county, 
municipality, or other taxing district such as a school district), the landowner (facing 
eminent domain), or a citizen’s group (that sometimes masked an opposing developer).  
As plaintiff, the municipality was usually opposing the county-level of government about 
releasing collected funds into their TIF district accounts.  The coalition containing the 
municipality usually won the court case, and over time, this coalition has been able to 
retain most of the advantages available to them initially (as included in the original intent 
or not).  
 It has been observed in Chapter 1 that it was many years after the TIF legislation 
became law that it began to be used by municipalities.  A similar lag between instituting 
legislation and actual usage was also noted in California (Davidson 1979) and Indiana 
(Klacik 2001).  In Missouri and Indiana, the missing piece seemed to be some degree of 
certainty that the Courts would not find the potential investment unconstitutional or 
illegal in some way, thus making the investment wasteful (and unprofitable).  The 
importance of validation of the Court before investment is confirmed in this study.  The 
TIF statute is initially challenged fairly comprehensively, and subsequently challenged 
more specifically on more narrow aspects of the law.  The relationship between the lower 
and higher courts is evident, with the lower Court showing tendency to give deference to 
municipalities (as legal initiator of the TIF) that the TIF is legally constituted and within 
its legal boundaries to condemn property and collect/divert taxes. 
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Evidence of the problems of municipal competition was stated in public forums 
such as the media and legislative hearings.  Modifications to the statute to resolve this 
issue often required geographical specification in order to garner enough legislative 
votes. 
This chapter’s research did show that the TIF was used by a broader audience 
than originally intended.  Erosion of targeting did occur resulting in the TIF statute now 
being freely used in non-urban areas, and the statute has been and continues to be used on 
new development as well as redevelopment projects. Yet, this being a study of a single 
statute, the erosion targeting theory is not fully supported because although the statute as 
originally constituted did have a targeted user-type, its use by the non-target group did 
not require much in the way of statute modifications. 
Preview – Circumstances that Shaped Statute’s Development 
 There are pre-conditions and circumstances that help shaped how the statute 
developed.  They include the declining financial condition of municipalities, the shifting 
priority of federal aid away from cities, the fairly recent availability of sales taxes 
authorization at the municipal and county levels, the rural-urban structural composition of 
the state, and the state of blight jurisprudence in Missouri.  Other factors to note are the 
early involvement of very capable leadership in “the right places at the right times.”  One 
set of pertinent leaders would be the involvement of lawyers in the Kansas City area with 
experience in government administration and land-use/economic development in 
Missouri.  Another set would be the involvement of the Clayton School District 
superintendent, and subsequently, the Missouri School Board Association in the 
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redevelopment of the former Cross Roads Shopping Center (now called St. Louis 
Galleria). 
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II. Research Findings – The Political and Legislative History and Development of 
the TIF Statute 
This section begins with documentation from the original state bill, a description 
of the statute and summary statistics of the changes to the statute over the time period 
studied, an overview of the legislative changes, and an overview of the of judicial 
jurisprudence.  Next it tells the story of the development of the statute, with the intent of 
getting a sense of possible interplay among the legislative and judicial activities, along 
with other events and activities that occurred in that time space.  After the storytelling, a 
synopsis and observations of relevant points are made.  
The Statute 
The Real Property Tax Increment Allocation Redevelopment Act was enacted in 
1982, and resulted from House Bill 1411. The Summary of Truly Agreed To and Finally 
Passed Bills (1982, p.15) states: 
This bill creates the “Real Property Tax Increment Allocation Redevelopment 
Act” and deals with the redevelopment of blighted areas and conservation areas in 
municipalities.  The powers of municipalities under the act are specified, 
including the power to adopt redevelopment plans, acquire or lease real property, 
renovate or construct improvements, and create a supervisory commission.  A 
municipality may issue obligations to pay redevelopment costs.  The obligations 
are to be secured by those payments made in lieu of taxes, attributable to the 
current equalized assessed valuation of property in the redevelopment project area 
being placed in a “Special Allocation Fund.”  The bill permits value increment 
allocation financing by which the payment of property tax in the redevelopment 
area will be based on the pre-development assessment of the property until 
financial obligations incurred in the redevelopment are retired.  The bill is not to 
be construed as relieving the property in the project from paying the 
constitutionally required uniform rate of taxes. 
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House Bill 1411 was also combined with House Bill 1587, which made a few 
changes to the Land Clearance for Redevelopment Authority Law which pertained to St. 
Louis City and Kansas City.  These changes gave the Land Clearance for Redevelopment 
Authority (LCRA) permission to issue bonds privately if under $10 million (previous 
limit was $2.5 million) and also increased accountability regarding redevelopment plans, 
completion schedules, and public participation.  Within House Bill 1411 it was 
determined that municipalities would by definition include counties—and if a county 
wanted to “implement a value increment financing project” that was wholly or partial 
within the boundaries of a city or village, it would need the permission of that city or 
village. 
Statute Description 
The 1982 Real Property Tax Increment Allocation Redevelopment Act was 
composed of 11 sections, which subsequently were renamed into 14 subchapters 
numbered 99.800 – 99.865 of the Missouri State Statutes.  The statutes covered the 
standard name, citation, and its own definitions, as well as outlining the circumstances in 
which this economic development tool could be used and how.  It granted the 
municipality permission to issue financial obligations, and outlined the scope of 
allowable redevelopment areas that could qualify and specified a role for public 
participation. 
The original 14 subchapters still exist although a few titles may be slightly 
adjusted.  Since 1982, four more subchapters have been added.  They are 99.843, added 
in 2007 to restrict usage of the Act for the development of greenfields in the East-West 
Gateway Council of Governments service area; 99.847 added in 1996 and later 
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renumbered 99.848, which allows emergency services to get reimbursed in certain 
circumstances, and a different 99.847, added in 2004 to limit Act usage in certain 
floodplain areas in St. Charles County.  Table 1 lists the components of the Act as it was 
enacted in 1982 and its present form as of 2008 by subchapter headings.   
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Table 1 – TIF ACT SUBCHAPTERS – THEN and NOW 
Sub 
Chap. 
# 
Title of Subchapter – 1982 
(Section # in parentheses) 
Title of Subchapter -- 2008 
800 Law, how cited (Section 1) Law, how cited 
805 Definitions ( Section 2) Definitions 
810 Redevelopment plan, contents – adoption of plan, 
required findings – commission appointment and 
powers (Section 3) 
Redevelopment plan, contents, adoption of plan, 
required findings—time limitations 
815 (included in Section 3 above) County implementing project within boundaries of 
municipality, permission required—definition of 
municipality to include county 
820 (included in Section 3 above) Municipalities’ powers and duties—commission 
appointment and powers—public disclosure 
requirements—officials’ conflict of interests, 
prohibited 
825 Adoption of ordinance for redevelopment, public 
hearing required—objection procedure—hearing 
and notices not required, when—restrictions on 
certain projects (Section 4) 
Adoption of ordinance for redevelopment, public 
hearing required—objection procedure—hearing and 
notices not required, when—restrictions on certain 
projects 
830 Notice of public hearings, publication and mailing 
requirements, contents (Section 5) 
Notice of public hearings, publication and mailing 
requirements, contents 
835 Secured obligations authorized—interest rates—
how retired—sale—approval by electors not 
required—surplus fund distribution—county 
collectors’ and municipal treasurers’ duties  
(Section 6) 
Secured obligations authorized—interest rates—how 
retired—sale—approval by electors not required—
surplus fund distribution—county collectors’ and 
municipal treasurers’ duties—no personal liability 
for commission, municipality or state 
840 Obligation, refunded to pay redevelopment costs, 
requirements—other obligations of municipality 
pledged to redevelopment may qualify (Section 7) 
Obligation, refunded to pay redevelopment costs, 
requirements—other obligations of municipality 
pledged to redevelopment may qualify 
843 n/a Tax increment finance projects, greenfield areas with 
counties not subject to authority of East-West 
Gateway Council of Governments 
845 Tax increment financing adoption—division of ad 
valorem taxes—payments in lieu of tax, deposit—
evaluation not to be used in calculating state school 
aid formula, when—surplus funds in special 
allocation fund, distribution – dissolution of fund 
and project area designation (Section 8) 
Tax increment financing adoption—division of ad 
valorem taxes—payments in lieu of tax, deposit 
evaluation not to be used in calculating state school 
aid formula, when—other taxes included, amount—
Missouri Supplemental Tax Increment Financing 
Fund, establishment – redevelopment project costs 
847 n/a Tax increment financing project not authorized, 
when 
848 n/a Districts providing emergency services, 
reimbursement from special allocation fund 
850 (included in Section 8) Costs of project paid—surplus fund in special 
allocation fund—distribution—dissolution of fund 
and redevelopment area 
855 Tax rates for districts containing redevelopment 
areas, method for establishing—county assessor’s 
duties—method for extending taxes to terminate, 
when  (Section 9) 
Tax rates for districts containing redevelopment 
projects, method for establishing—county assessor’s 
duties—method for extending taxes to terminate, 
when 
860 Severability  (Section 10) Severability 
863 n/a Joint committee on real property tax increment 
allocation redevelopment 
865 Reports by municipalities, contents, publication—
satisfactory progress of project, procedures to 
determine  (Section 11) 
Reports by municipalities, contents, publication—
satisfactory project progress, procedure to 
determine—department of economic development 
reports, rules, manual 
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Summary Statistics Regarding Legislative Development of the Act 
During the 27 years of the study period, from 1982 through 2009, the Act has 
been amended 16 of those years (1986, 1987, 1990, 1991, 1993, 1996, 1997, 1998, 2002, 
2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, and 2009).  These changes ranged from very minor 
changes to clarify a requirement, to very major and extensive rewrites.  An example of a 
minor change is in 1993 the amendment clarified that with regards to a redevelopment 
plan it is “the most recent assessed valuation of property within the proposed 
redevelopment area and that notice of the public hearing shall be given to persons who 
own property within the area” (1993 Summary of Truly Agreed To and Finally Passed 
Bills, p.29).  This change was included in the 1993 Omnibus Economic Development 
Act.    On the other side of the spectrum, the 1991 amendments involved rewrites of fully 
eight subchapters of the Act.  These major rewrites occurred in years eight and nine of 
the statute (1990 and 1991) which coincides with the very early usage of the Act. 
Looking at the breadth of impact of the amendments, there are five years in which 
the amendments impacted three or more subchapters of the statutes:  1986, 1990, 1991, 
1997, and 2007.  There are two years that stand out significantly – 1991’s amendment 
impacted a total of ten subchapters, and 1997’s amendment impacted nine subchapters.   
The 1986 amendment impacted five subchapters, the 1990 amendment involved rewrites 
of three subchapters, and the 2007 amendment impacted four subchapters. (See Appendix 
I.) 
Oftentimes amendments that followed within one or two years of other 
amendments were mostly to correct language, clarify, or correct oversights in the prior 
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year’s amendments.  This is the case as already mentioned in 1993; this also occurred in 
1987 (to reinsert a clause to 99.810 inadvertently omitted in 1986’s law) (1987 
Summaries of Truly Agreed to and Finally Passed Bills, p.39) and 1998 (to correct 
language so that St. Louis County would have three representatives on commissions in 
their county instead of two as intended in 1997) (Senate Bill 707). 
In addition to clarifying or correcting technical issues, some of the minor 
amendments involved exempting subsequent or specific taxes from capture – this can be 
seen in the 2006 and 2008 laws, where Jackson’s County’s stadium tax (2006) and capital 
improvement sales tax (2008) were exempted.  Another change that could be considered 
technical was to raise the amount of the state sales tax that is available in any one year to 
$32 million in 2005 from the $15 million cap set in 1997. 
In the earlier years of the Act, amendments were routinely made to subchapters 
805 (definitions), 810 (redevelopment plan, contents, adoption of plan, required findings 
– time limitations), and 825 (adoption of ordinance for redevelopment, public hearing 
required—objection procedure—hearing and notices not required, when—restrictions on 
certain projects).  Before and including 1997, subchapter 805 and 825 were amended four 
times, and subchapter 810 was amended six times.   
After 1997, no changes were made to any subchapters except subchapters 820 
(Municipalities’ duties—commission appointment and powers—public disclosure 
requirements—officials’ conflict of interests, prohibited), 845 (Tax increment financing 
adoption—division of ad valorem taxes—payments in lieu of tax, deposit evaluation not 
to be used in calculating state school aid formula, when—other taxes included, amount), 
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and 847 (Tax Increment financing project not authorized when) until 2007.  During this 
nine year period (1998-2006), subchapter 845 was amended, repealed, or revised in six of 
those years.  Otherwise, these years were relatively “quiet” with only the following 
additional activity: subchapter 820 amended in 1998 and 2003; subchapter 848 (Districts 
providing emergency services, reimbursement from special allocation fund) added in 
2004, and subchapter 847 amended in 2002 and 2005. 
 In 2007 amendments were made to subchapters 805, 820, 825, and 847.  Also, 
subchapter 843 (Tax increment finance projects, greenfield areas with counties not 
subject to authority of East-West Gateway Council of Governments ) was added.  
Subchapters 820 and 825 were amended again in 2008, and subchapter 865 was amended 
in 2009.  
Overview of Legislative Development of the Act 
Changes to the TIF amendment started before actual use of the statute began.  The 
first amendment was made in 1986.  In addition to routine technical modifications 
/clarifications, this year is notable because it expanded the allowable “purposes” to 
include an “economic development area9” in addition to “blight” and “conservation.”  In 
adding this purpose, the Summary stated this addition was expected to help a 
municipality either to retain businesses, increase employment, or preserve or enhance its 
tax base (Summary, 1986, pp. 9, 46).  The allowable purposes up to this point were 
                                                             
9“Economic development area,” any area or portion of an area located within the territorial limits of a 
municipality, which does not meet the requirements of subdivisions (1) and (2) [blight area or conservation 
area] of this section, and in which the governing body of the municipality finds that redevelopment is in the 
public interest because it will: (a) Discourage commerce, industry or manufacturing from moving their 
operations to another state; or (b) Result in increased employment in the municipality; (c) Result in 
preservation or enhancement of the tax base of the municipality;  (statute 99.805(3). Laws of Missouri 
(1986), pp. 492-493) 
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“blight” 10 and “conservation areas.” 11  In this instance, “conservation areas” are 
considered areas at risk of becoming blighted, or, in other words, pre-blighted.  The 
addition of the economic development purpose had the potential of expanding usage 
beyond “urban” & “redevelopment” before anyone had benefited from its existence.    
The year 1990 also saw an important modification – this year the taxes available 
for capture were expanded.  This property likely changed the nature of the type of 
projects favored for TIF consideration.  Up to this point, only the property tax was 
involved.  The new law now allowed for “50% of taxes imposed by municipalities or 
other taxing districts which are generated by TIF projects, shall be deposited in the 
special allocation fund to pay for redevelopment costs and obligations” (Summary, 1990, 
p. 28).   These new taxes made available for capture were subsequently referred to as 
“EATs” taxes – economic activity tax, to distinguish them from the original tax, referred 
to as “PILOTs” – payment –in-lieu-of- (property) taxes.  Thus, projects that collected 
“EATS” had an additional revenue stream to make the project “feasible.”  
                                                             
10
 “Blighted area”, an area which, by reason of the predominance of defective or inadequate street layout, 
insanitary or unsafe conditions, deterioration of site improvements, improper subdivision or obsolete 
platting, or the existence of conditions which endanger life or property by fire and other causes, or any 
combination of such factors, retards the provision of housing accommodations or constitutes an economic 
or social liability or a menace to the public health, safety, morals, or welfare in its present conditions and 
use;  (Section 2. Laws of Missouri, (1982),p. 250) 
11
“Conservation area”, any improved area within the boundaries of a redevelopment project area located 
within the territorial limits of a municipality in which fifty percent or more of the structures in the area have 
an age of thirty-five years or more.  Such an area is not yet a blighted area but is detrimental to public 
health, safety, morals, or welfare and may become a blighted area because of any one or more of the 
following factors: Dilapidation; obsolescence; deterioration; illegal use of individual structures; presence of 
structures below minimum code standards; abandonment; excessive vacancies; overcrowding of structures 
and community facilities; lack of ventilation; light or sanitary facilities; inadequate utilities; excessive land 
coverage; deleterious land use or layout; depreciation of physical maintenance; and lack of community 
planning;  (Section 2. Laws of Missouri, (1982), p. 250) 
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The 1991 law also specified the make-up of a TIF commission.  Prior to this 
change, a commission had the latitude to be anywhere from 5 to 15 persons, all appointed 
by the “chief executive officer of the municipality with the consent of the majority of the 
governing body of the municipality” (Laws of Missouri, 1982, p.252).  The committee as 
specified by House Bill 502 (1991) required the commission “to consist of 9 members 
appointed as follows: (1) two members appointed by the school boards of affected 
districts; (2) one member appointed by all other affected taxing districts; and (3) six 
members appointed by the municipality.”  Another requirement that was made more 
specific is the charge for a relocation plan, including payment minimums and minimum 
time allowances for vacate notices. 
Only two relatively minor changes occurred between1991 and 1997.  In 1993 the 
law clarified that the most recent assessed valuation was to be used in the redevelopment 
plan.  In 1996 a new subchapter was enacted that allowed for direct reimbursement for 
emergency services in TIF districts. 
The 1997 amendment, as mentioned earlier covered many areas and is considered 
a major amendment year.  This amendment had two major impacts:  the first is the 
availability of state-level taxes for the first time, but only available to specific type of 
projects that must first receive state approval (initially from the Dept. of Economic 
Development, and then from the Legislature with the appropriation of funds).  The 
second impact was a wide array of changes design to better manage or restrict the use of 
TIF.  These changes included: a municipality must be in existence at least one year before 
a TIF commission could be formed, a cost-benefit analysis must be a part of the 
redevelopment plan and include projected impact on all taxing-districts, a developer must 
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sign an affidavit stating “but-for” the incentive the redevelopment would not occur, and 
TIF commission are required to establish procedures for obtaining competitive bids (1997 
Perfection Calendar Summary Senate Bill 1).  Also, the (non-county) municipality’s 
discretionary power with the TIF commission was further diluted by this amendment.  At 
this time, all non-county TIF commissions were to add two additional members chosen 
by their county government.  The exception was intended to be St. Louis County, which 
would have three representatives.  Through an oversight, the exception for St. Louis 
County was not made until the following year via a 1998 amendment. 
  These modifications were done in a special session (1997 2
nd
 ex. Session) and 
were part of a major economic development incentives package.  Within this major 
package, one sees the effect of particular lobbyists.  For instance, exclusion from TIF 
capture was given for the Merchants and Manufacturers Inventory Replacement tax 
(M&M Replacement tax), the State Blind Pension Fund tax, the Kansas-Missouri Bi-
State Cultural tax, and the St. Louis County Transportation tax.  Another specification 
was that “gaming establishments” would not be eligible for TIF usage.  Also, a hotel in 
Excelsior Springs was legislatively designated as “qualifying” as well as a levee in Platte 
County.  
The years from 1998 to 2007 were remarkably quiet as far as actual amendments 
to the statute.  The only subchapters amended in this time period were 820, 845, and two 
of the three added subchapters – 847 and 848.  The first change to 820 was to amend the 
number of representatives to TIF commissions in St Louis County as just mentioned, and 
again in 2003 regarding elected officials and conflict of interest.  Elected officials could 
express their opinions about specific projects even if they lived in the TIF area, but they 
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could not profit from a project.   Changes to subchapter 845 were numerous (six) and 
were mostly to fine-tune the state-level TIF, commonly referred to as the “super-TIF” 
since it was to be used in conjunction with a municipal-level TIF.  This is not unexpected 
since the super-TIF was a relatively new addition (in 1997).  Another change made in 
2006 was to exempt the Jackson County Stadium improvement tax from TIF capture. 
The amendments to subchapter 847 during this period were not necessarily 
significant but are somewhat tricky to follow.  This subchapter was enacted in 1996 to 
allay concerns of providers of emergency services regarding increased responsibility of 
providing service to an area without corresponding increase in tax revenues because of 
the tax capture.  This subchapter provided conditions under which emergency services 
could be reimbursed directly.  In 2002 a new clause was added to 847 to limit use of TIF 
in certain floodplains in St. Charles County.   In 2004 another change was made to the 
emergency services clause, and it was placed in a separate and new subchapter (848).   
The older emergency services reimbursement clause in subchapter 847 was eliminated in 
2005 (Senate Bill 516).  By 2007, when another change was made to subchapter 847, it 
had been renamed “Tax increment financing project not authorized, when.” 
Significant changes were again made in 2007 but with one major focus – the St. 
Louis area.  For descriptive purposes, the area impacted was described as being under the 
authority of the East-West Gateway Council of Governments, of course just the segment 
within Missouri.  The county-level TIF commission model of St. Louis County was also 
prescribed for St. Charles and Jefferson Counties and St. Louis City.  Franklin County 
was exempted.  Additionally, the municipalities could no longer approve a TIF area by a 
simple majority vote if it was not recommended by the county TIF commission– to 
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override the county TIF commission’s recommendation a two-thirds supermajority would 
be needed. 
Another change was the enactment of subchapter 843, which stated that TIF could 
not be used in the East-West Gateway Council of Governments authority area if the area 
could be defined as a “greenfield.”  This amendment also went on to define greenfield as: 
Any vacant, unimproved, or agricultural property that is located wholly outside 
the incorporated limits of a city, town or village, or that is substantially 
surrounded by contiguous properties with agricultural zoning and classifications 
or uses unless said property was annexed into the incorporated limits of a city, 
town, or village ten years prior to the adoption of the ordinance approving the 
redevelopment plan for such greenfield area; (99.805) 
A “Hunting Heritage Protection Areas” Act was also enacted in a different chapter of the 
state statutes, but it impacted subchapter 847.  In this law which “preserved” certain flood 
plains for hunting purposes, restriction was put on the potential use of TIF in those 
defined areas. 
The 2008 legislation pertained to Kansas City, and excluded “certain 
transportation sales taxes” from being captured by either the TIF Act or the Missouri 
Downtown and Rural Economic Stimulus Act.  In 2009 legislation was added to the 
reporting subchapter (99.865).  Consequences were set for municipalities with TIF 
districts that failed to meet the reporting requirements.  Municipalities that do not comply 
with the reporting requirements are not permitted “to implement any new tax increment 
finance project for a period of no less than five years from such municipality’s failure to 
comply” (99.865).  Also the Director of Economic Development is directed to annually 
share this information with the state auditor, who is told to make the report information 
searchable in an electronic database on the auditor’s website.  No further amendments 
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had been made to the TIF Act through 2009, the time period under research.  A summary 
of these changes are contained in the next table (Table 2). 
Table 2. The More Important TIF Amendments 
Law / 
Year 
Description of Important Changes / 
Impact to TIF 
L. 
1986 
 Adds “economic development “ as an allowable purpose 
L. 
1990 
 Makes 50% of local sales tax available for capture 
L. 
1991 
 Corrects capture of local sales tax to 50% of increment 
 Specifies composition of TIF commission, to include 3 seats for other 
taxing districts 
L. 
1997 
 Makes available state sales taxes or income tax for some projects 
 Requires cost-benefit analysis 
 Changes to “but-for” (to include developer affidavit) 
 Begins excluding specific taxes from capture 
 Restricts intra-county relocation with TIF funding (by redefining “net new 
revenues) 
 Expanded TIF commission by adding 2 members for county 
representation 
 Excludes use of TIF funding for gaming establishments 
 Specifies how “surplus” should be distributed back to taxing-districts  
 Added restrictions for using “conservation” purpose (must meet at least 3 
of 15 factors) 
 Charged Department of Economic Development with assisting 
municipalities when requested and to provide technical assistance and 
general information regarding using TIF 
L. 
2007 
 Changes TIF commission in the counties of St. Louis, Jefferson, and St. 
Charles and St. Louis City to a county-level TIF commission, and 
specifies membership 
 Requires a 2/3 majority vote by a municipality’s governing body to 
overturn a negative recommendation from a county-level TIF commission 
 
L. 
2009 
 Adds penalty for municipality not filing annual TIF report. 
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Overview of the Legal Jurisprudence of TIF 
The judicial decisions discussed here have primarily been noted for their impact 
on the TIF statutes in at least one of the following sources: 1) V.A.M.S (Vernon’s 
Annotated Missouri Statutes); 2) Missouri Economic Development Law (White, 2010), 
or 3) Summary of Tax Increment Financing in Missouri (Gilmore and Bell, 2007).  
Missouri’s judiciary has three levels – Circuit Court (also called the trial court), Appeals 
Court, and Supreme Court.  The Circuit Court is where most cases enter the system, and 
cases may advance to the Appeals court, and in fewer cases they may reach the Missouri 
Supreme Court.  Many of the cases mentioned were Appeals or Supreme Court decisions.  
The cases mentioned will be limited to those that directly impacted the TIF statutes or 
usage of the statutes thereof, with a few exceptions that have been noted for their 
subsequent impact on other cases.  In total, twenty cases are discussed within this chapter 
(17 TIF-specific, 3 closely related) – and the more impactful of those will be reviewed in 
this overview with the aim helping to give a deeper understanding of the decision’s 
impact than might be possible within the narrative of the interactive storytelling of the 
many other parts. 
The parties involved in the judicial actions have varied.  A municipality (by 
definition including counties if they initiate the TIF) was always one of the two parties, 
either as plaintiff or respondent.   The other party (parties) was (were) generally:  1) 
another level of government such as the county or the state, 2) a landowner facing 
condemnation, 3) a set of citizens, 4) a school district, or 5) a competing 
developer/business owner.  The municipality most often won the case (11 of 17 cases – 
65%) indicating a jurisprudence of deference to the municipalities.  Of the six cases in 
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which a municipality (or county acting as a municipality for TIF purposes) lost, they 
initially won three of those cases before a higher court reversed that decision.  Five of the 
six cases were appealed.  All five cases that were appealed and ultimately lost by a 
municipality were signals from the higher Courts that municipalities were taking too 
much for granted and not following the statute closely enough. The Pettis County was the 
sixth case where the county acting as a municipality was thwarted it its efforts to 
establish a TIF in Dresden city.  In this TIF case the county used “economic 
development” as its stated purpose.  The lower Court indicated the economic 
development purpose as unconstitutional, as well as siding with the school district on 
other lesser points.  This decision is noteworthy because it occurred early in the 
development of the usage of the statute (1992) and was never challenged by an appealed. 
Time wise, the development of the cases seems to be as follows – initially, the 
constitutionality of the set of TIF statutes was challenged.  Next, a specific allowance 
(economic development) was challenged at the lower court level and that decision was 
not appealed.  The next set of cases seem to be testing the boundaries  -  challenging 
exactly what taxes were available for capture, or testing how much flexibility the 
municipality would have in their interpretation of the redevelopment plan requirements, 
and testing the boundaries of the definition of blight.   The most recent cases (2006 and 
after) seem to gravitate around challenging condemnation again or challenging a 
redevelopment plan, but by attempting to use newer arguments.  
Determining the constitutionality of the TIF Act was the aim of the first few court 
actions.  In 1984, Plaza Properties in Kansas City challenged the constitutionality of the 
Act by asking the courts to rule in a “quo warranto” fashion on the validity of bonds that 
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could be issued under the Act.  The courts refused this request, stating that enough court 
decisions had been made regarding bond “pre-issue” that they no longer felt it necessary 
or desirable to continue making individual decisions on this subject.   
Thus the first significant case concerning the TIF Act is known as the Dunn case 
– Tax Increment Financing Commission of Kansas City v. J. E. Dunn Construction Co., 
Inc.  This case was decided by the Missouri Supreme Court after a Missouri Circuit Court 
had approved a condemnation proceeding.  The landowner appealed to the Missouri 
Supreme Court based on the question of constitutionality of some of the provisions of the 
Act.  The Supreme Court affirmed the condemnation, stating in the opinion: 
“(1)Act did not violate state constitutional provision requiring that increase in 
government revenues and expenditures be approved by vote of people affected by 
increase; (2) Act did not violate state constitutional provisions requiring uniform 
levy and assessment of taxes; (3) payments in lieu of taxes into special allocation 
fund securing revenue bonds for redevelopment project did not constitute taxes; 
(4) revenue bonds were not subject to constitutional provision permitting political 
subdivision to incur certain debt only upon approval of two-thirds of its qualified 
voters; (5) city’s eminent domain extended to condemnation of land within 
conservation area; and (6) condemnation of land for redevelopment purposes 
constituted condemnation for a public purpose, and thus condemnation of 
landowner’s property was permissible.”  (Dunn) 
In 1992 a school district in Pettis County sued to stop Pettis County from creating 
a TIF district in Dresden, Missouri.  This case was held at the Circuit Court level and a 
summary judgment was issued in favor of the school district.  This Court found the 
economic development purpose for this instance unconstitutional.  The outcome was not 
appealed, and there is not another “economic development” case where this question is 
settled at a higher level (White 2010, p. 5-305; Gilmore & Bell 2007, p.4).  
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In 1994 the County of Jefferson sought a “declaratory judgment” from the courts 
confirming that it was proper and mandatory that special taxes be placed in their 
corresponding special accounts, and hence not captured by TIF.  The situation that they 
used to request this declaration impacted the I-55 TIF District in Herculaneum in which 
the Quiktrip Corporation had made some interstate interchange improvements with the 
expectation of being reimbursed from the TIF special allocation fund.  The county asked 
the courts to confirm that the county had first responsibility to deposit special taxes in 
their respective accounts.  The lower court disagreed, stating that these taxes were not 
expressly excluded by the statute, so therefore were to be captured along with the other 
“EATs” (economic activity taxes).  Jefferson County appealed this decision, and the 
lower court’s decision was affirmed by the Missouri Supreme Court in 1995. Other 
arguments were struck down in this decision and the courts determined that capturing 
EATs is not subject to Hancock Amendment restrictions because “changing the 
distribution of revenue is not the levying of a new tax requiring voter approval,” and does 
not “mandate a new activity by a local government” (County of Jefferson et. al. v.  
Quiktrip Corporation et. al, 912 S.W. 2d 487 (Mo.banc 1995)).  Relatedly the Missouri 
Supreme Court rejected the argument that “the capture of sales taxes constituted an 
unconstitutional diversion of the tax from their intended destination” (Quiktrip). 
  This scenario of the county-level government not being willing to remit any or 
all of the funds a municipal level government was a fairly common theme which played 
out in slightly different ways in three subsequent court cases:  Village of Bel-Ridge et. al. 
v. Lohman and St. Louis County, 1998; City of Desloge, et. al. v. St. Francois County et. 
al. 2007; and City of Shelbina v. Shelby County, et. al., 2008.  In these court decisions the 
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county was required to remit the expected funds to the municipality in all but the last 
case.
12
  
The second case that a municipality lost (the first being the County of Pettis 
regarding TIF in Dresden, Missouri) was the City of St. Charles v. DeVault Management 
case.  The city of St. Charles attempted to condemn apartment buildings owned and 
managed by DeVault Management in June of 1995, shortly after a purchase offer from 
the developer had been rejected.  In court proceedings it was determined that the 
redevelopment plans approved by ordinances in 1993 and 1994 were not in compliance 
with their most recent comprehensive plan – the 1974 Comprehensive Plan.  In affirming 
the lower court’s finding, the Appeals Court stated that “the intent of the legislature was 
to require full conformance, not substantial conformance,” and that the “City’s 
determination that the Redevelopment Plan conforms to the comprehensive plan was 
arbitrary, contrary to fact and an unwarranted abuse of discretion” (City of St. Charles v. 
DeVault Management, 1997).  Basically, the redevelopment plan intended the area to be a 
convention, hotel, and entertainment area with support facilities and a park, while the 
Comprehensive Plan designated the area for “moderate density residential” and park land.  
The redevelopment plan was designed with the Ameristar Casino in mind and the city 
could not “make it be compatible” with its comprehensive plan by decree. 
Shortly thereafter another school district sued a municipality and though they 
initially lost, they were able to win an appeal at the Supreme Court (Ste. Genevieve 
School District R-II et. al. v. City of Ste. Genevieve et. al., 2002).  The court again asked 
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 Shelbina lost because Shelby County changed the case to one regarding whether the TIF district was 
properly constituted, which the Court determined it was not, making the issue of remittance moot. 
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the municipality to stick closer to the guideline in the statute, stating that projects in the 
redevelopment plan had been changed and this indeed would require that the TIF 
Commission be reconvened to approve the revised redevelopment plan.   
Two court cases near the end of the study period are also similar to the City of St. 
Charles and the City of Ste. Genevieve cases.  They again involve what constitutes a 
proper redevelopment plan.  Initially the City of Shelbina v Shelby County, et. al case was 
the usual case about a TIF district attempting to get the County to remit funds into its 
district, but it ended up being a case that challenged how their redevelopment plan was 
constituted (which they lost).  The city of St. Peters’ TIF (on 1,640 acres of farmland near 
Highway 370) was challenged in court by a citizen’s group (the Great Rivers Habitat 
Alliance) who challenged the TIF on more than one account.  Ultimately the Court ruled 
against the city’s TIF district for the following reasons: 1) the city did not meet the 
definition of blight, because it stated that the road system serving the redevelopment area  
would not be adequate for future uses (instead of present uses);  2)  the plan to use TIF 
funds to pay off already issued general obligation bonds on a levee that is already being 
constructed fails the “but-for” test; and 3) the city could not show conclusively that the 
document presented as an amendment to their comprehensive plan was an official 
amendment, and thus they could not show that the redevelopment plan “conformed” to 
the comprehensive plan at the time of adoption of the redevelopment plan. 
Lastly, a high profile case in the St. Louis area tested the definition of blight and 
the visual image of the purpose of TIF and the type of municipality that it was intended to 
benefit.  The Appeals Court made its decision on the J.G. St. Louis West v. City of Des 
Peres on January 2, 2001.  The city of Des Peres began discussions in 1994 with 
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Nordstrom Department Stores about possibly locating in the West County Center.  
Considered an upscale department store, it was to be their first store in the St. Louis area 
(J.G. St. Louis West).  Nordstrom’s requested redevelopment of the mall and suggested 
tax increment financing be used.  After further negotiations and further redevelopment 
analysis by outside experts, a redevelopment plan and TIF financing was agreed to with 
the developer and approved by the TIF commission and the city’s Board of Alderman by 
the end of 1997.  The plaintiffs in this case included a number of taxpayers from both the 
city of Des Peres and a neighboring city of Kirkwood
13
.  The lead plaintiff though was 
the owner of a competing mall in the city of Chesterfield, approximately 10 miles west of 
West County Center.  The main argument presented by the plaintiffs was regarding the 
determination of blight, but also questioned was whether the “but-for” clause had been 
met. 
Regarding  the determination of blight each court (Circuit and Appeals) again 
followed precedence,  with the Appeals Court stating “judicial review of a legislative 
determination is limited to whether it was arbitrary or induced by fraud, collusion or bad 
faith or whether Board exceeded its powers” (J.G. St. Louis West).  They also stated that 
as long as the issue is “debatable” the courts would not “substitute our opinion for that of 
the Board” and thus the burden of proof to show that a debatable issue is really “arbitrary 
or induced by fraud, collusion or bad faith” is on the plaintiffs – a burden which they did 
not met in this case.  An interesting aspect of the argument that the city of Des Peres used 
is that they had determined the mall was an economic liability due to the “existence of 
statutory blighting factors [which] jeopardize the viability of [the] shopping mall” (J.G. 
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 Des Peres and Kirkwood have an overlapping school district.  
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St. Louis West).  Although the city acknowledged that the mall was currently its biggest 
economic asset, the decrease in sales tax revenue and the projection of further loss in 
sales tax revenue was accepted by the court as grounds on which the city also labeled the 
mall an economic liability. 
Both the plaintiffs and the respondent presented expert witnesses regarding 
whether development would occur even without the use of tax increment financing.  The 
court stated again that with a fairly debatable issue the burden of proof is on the plaintiff.  
The court stated the plaintiffs did not meet this burden of proof – it was not good enough 
for an expert to say he/she thought development would occur otherwise, but not be able 
to give substantive evidence of such opinion.  A summary of the major court decisions is 
included in the next table (Table 3). 
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Table 3.   Court Decisions by Parties Involved, Affirmed Party, and Impact on Statute Use 
 
Year 
Court 
Case Issue (primary) Party 1 Party 2 Decision 
in favor of 
broaden/ 
restrict usage 
1989 
Sup. Ct. 
Kansas City TIF 
Commission v J.E. Dunn 
Construction (appellant) 
condemnation 
/validity 
municipality municipality muni  
1992 
Trial Ct. 
Pettis School District v 
Pettis County 
validity of economic 
development purpose 
school district (county as) 
municipality 
school 
district 
restrict use of 
econ. devel. 
purpose 
1995 
Sup. Ct.  
County of Jefferson 
(appellants) v. Quiktrip 
Corp. 
validity of diverting taxes, 
validity of EATs 
muni 
(Herculaneum
) & developer  
county muni & 
developer 
 
1996 
Sup. Ct.  
Consolidated School 
District (appellant) v.  
Jackson County 
taxes – inclusion/exclusion school district municipality (& 
county) 
muni (& 
county) 
 
1996 
App. Ct. 
ED 
Smith v. Independence technical aspects of the 
approving the redev plan 
citizens 
(competing 
mall?) 
municipality muni  
1997 
App. Ct. 
ED 
St. Charles (plaintiff/ 
appellant) v. DeVault 
Mngmt. 
eminent domain; 
redevelopment plan must 
be compatible with 
comprehensive plan 
municipality property owner property 
owner 
 
1998 
App. Ct. 
ED 
Bel-Ridge et. al.. Lohman 
(respondent/ appellant) 
Remittance of taxes to TIF 
account 
municipalities  State Dept. of 
Revenue & St. 
Louis County 
munis  
2000 
App. Ct. 
ED 
Hazelwood Yellow Ribbon 
Committee v. Klos 
Question of whether TIF 
district formation could be 
restricted by voter 
referendum 
citizen group municipality muni  
2001 
App. Ct. 
ED 
JG St. Louis West LLC 
(appellant) v. Des Peres 
 blight determination and 
“but-for” test 
competing 
mall owner 
and citizens 
municipality and 
developer 
muni & 
developer 
Affirmed 
broadening 
blight definition 
2002  
Sup. Ct.  
Ste. Genevieve School 
District (appellant) v. City 
of Ste. Genevieve  
Standing to sue and when a 
redev.  plan needs to be 
reapproved by TIF 
Commission 
school district municipality school 
district 
 
2006 
Sup Ct.  
Broadway-Washington v. 
Honorable Manners 
condemnation proceedings, 
technicality 
landowner judge and 
municipality 
land 
owner 
 
2007 
App. Ct. 
ED 
Desloge et. al (plaintiff – 
respondents)  v. St. 
Francois County 
taxes – remittances to TIF 
district 
munis county munis  
2007 
App. Ct. 
ED 
Adams et. al v. City of 
Manchester 
Citizens challenged 
technical procedures of plan  
citizens 
(competing 
developer?) 
municipality muni  
2008 
App. Ct. 
ED 
Shelbina (appellant) v. 
Shelby County et. al 
taxes – remittances to TIF 
district; properly 
constituted redev. Plan 
municipality county, other 
taxing districts 
county restrict  
2008 
App. Ct. 
WD 
Great Rivers Habitat 
Alliance (appellant) v. St. 
Peters 
blight and “but-for” test citizen group 
(i.e. wealthy  
family) 
municipality Citizen group Restrict blighting 
to current uses 
2008 
App. Ct. 
WD 
Kansas City v. Chung Hoe 
Ku, et al (appellant) 
condemnation municipality landowner muni  
2009 
Sup. Ct.  
Meramec Valley R-III 
School District (appellant) 
v. Eureka 
Redevelopment plan (large 
size and inclusion of 
farmland) 
school district municipality muni Broaden when 
farmland can be 
included in 
redev. plan 
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Interplay of Legislation & Court Cases with Political Actors and Context, Etc., 
The style of government in the United States, and in Missouri, is designed so that 
there is interplay, commonly referred to as checks and balances, among the three 
branches of government – legislature, judicial, and executive branch.  Also it is designed 
to provide space for participation by the people – via elections, public hearings and 
disclosures, and collectively as interest groups.  This section will attempt to recreate the 
story of the historical development of the Real Property Tax Increment Allocation 
Redevelopment Act by looking at the impact each of these segments had on the other, or 
not.  This section places into context the amendments and court cases discussed prior in 
time sequence and includes the activity of other actors and environmental factors.  
Additionally, it will draw upon secondary sources, such as articles, books, and legislative 
hearing reports, as well as first-hand interviews of legislators and professional 
consultants. 
Economic Environment 
It is important to quickly summarize the economic environment around the 
enactment of the statute.  The United States was in a deep recession in the period of 1980 
– 1982.  The new President of the United States, Ronald Reagan, cut non-military 
government spending under the philosophy that “big government was bad.”  As a result, 
cuts were made to a variety of federal programs for urban and local governments, 
reducing federal aid from $43 billion to only $17 billion (a 60% cut) (Dreier, Mollenkopf 
& Swanstrom, 139). 
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Within this environment the Missouri legislature created a few significant laws 
that have impact even today.  One was the Hancock Amendment, named after Melton 
Hancock who helped draft the amendment and then spearheaded a statewide initiative to 
amend the state constitution.  The business man from Springfield was successful in this 
endeavor.  Richard King described the Hancock amendment as “’property taxes and other 
local taxes and state taxes and spending’ cannot be increased without voter approval in 
accordance with the Missouri Constitution” (King 1995, p.12).  This constitutional 
amendment became effective November 4, 1980.  Achieving an amendment to the 
constitution is not easy, and is a great barometer of the mood of the people of Missouri. 
Also, just one year earlier in 1979 the state legislature authorized the means by 
which all counties in Missouri could collect a county sales tax if approved by their voters.  
St. Louis County was the first county authorized by the state to collect a county tax in 
1978 (Columbian Missourian, Sept. 13, 1979), and this authorization was expanded 
statewide a year later.  Fully 28 (of 114) counties immediately put the sales tax on their 
November 1979 ballot and it was approved in 24 of them (The Kansas City Times, Nov. 
7, 1979).  The following spring an additional 18 counties attempted to enact the county 
sales tax, 14 of which were successful.  An important aspect of this county sales tax was 
that 50% of the collected taxes would be used to replace property taxes then being 
collected, thus reducing real estate property taxes. 
The Kansas City Star called the property tax “rollback” provision of the county sales tax 
“Missouri’s answer to Proposition 13” (November 20, 1979).  The Star noted with great 
surprise how quickly the county sales tax was embraced, calling it “a startling 
development.”  Remarking on the legislators’ debate surrounding the legislation, The Star 
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stated that even the legislators “thought that the new formula might catch on – in time.”  
The Star described the “norm” for Missourians as being cautious “in adopting new 
ideas,” which was described as a few years for allowing “time for the message to soak in” 
followed by “two or three (or more) elections” before the new idea has the public’s 
affirmation.  The Star described that the anticipated slow process that did not occur with 
this county sales tax is exactly what had happened approximately ten years earlier with 
the availability of a city tax (November 20, 1979). 
But even with these anticipated changes, county and local governments were 
concerned about their budgets.  Barely a month later (December 23, 1979) an article in 
The Kansas City Star emphasized this concern.  Titled “Sales Tax Revenue Declining in 
Cities,” many cities had begun to see a slowdown in the rate of sales increase, causing 
their revenue projections to be overstated.   
The nation officially entered a recession for the first six months of 1980, and a 
second recession period quickly followed covering the period of July 1981 to November 
1982.  This was the environment in which the Real Property Tax Increment Allocation 
Redevelopment Act was passed in the Missouri legislature in November of 1982. 
Usage of the Statute 
 Kansas City formed its TIF Commission in 1982, immediately after the legislation 
became law.     Even as such, it was another four years before the first tax increment plan 
was adopted in Kansas City.  St. Louis city showed minor interest initially. St. Louis’ 
interest lied more in the companion House Bill 1587, which made modifications to the 
Planned Industrial Expansion Authorities.  These modifications were expected to 
“streamline the process and cut down on paperwork” and to “cut the time to process a 
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bond issue from six to eight months down to approximately three months” (Perfection 
Calendar Summary, HCS HBs 1411, 1587, 1982).  The Planned Industrial Expansion 
Authority applied to St. Louis and Kansas City only. 
 Attorney Michael White
14
 gave a lecture on November 20, 1985 in Kansas City 
about tax increment financing and Chapter 353 tax abatement for the Midwest Research 
Institute.  He stated in this lecture that tax increment financing “has not been used 
because bond attorneys will not give an opinion on that statute until there are some state 
Supreme Court decisions that say it is free from constitutional challenge” (White 1985, 
p.6).  He even stated slightly earlier in the lecture that Chapter 353 projects had only 
begun to be used in the six to seven years prior (although Chapter 353 statutes, called the 
Urban Redevelopment Corporation Laws, were first created in 1943), and that this 
increased usage was due to a few Missouri Supreme Court decisions in the late 1970s 
regarding the definition of blight (Tierney v. Planned Industrial Expansion Authority of 
Kansas City and Crestwood Commons Redevelopment Corp. v. 66 Drive-In).  The two 
important aspects of the Court decision were that blight “need not be a slum area” and 
“not each and every structure need be blighted” (White 1985, 6).  These Court definitions 
are in line with the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Berman v. Parker (1954).  He noted 
that this validation of the definition of blight, along with the increase usage of Chapter 
353, had created controversy, mostly over the finding of blight – and that this could be 
because the statutory definition of blight does not match people’s intuitive notion of 
blight (White 1985, p.6).  Another program that had been used by cities was industrial 
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 Attorney White is considered an expert in economic development law in Missouri. 
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development bonds
15
, and he acknowledged that their use had been subject to well-
known abuses.  He said “instead of economically depressed areas using the bonds to 
attract development to their area, economically well off areas were using the bonds to 
attract industry from their less-well-off neighbors.  You can’t blame them for that 
because as long as the financing tool is available they’re going to use it” (White 2010, 
p.4).   Lastly, he mentioned that he had recently drafted language for an amendment to 
“clean up” the TIF statute (White 2010, p.13).  He has also been credited with being a co-
author of the original TIF statute
16
. 
 The amendment was approved in 1986 by the legislature, and included the 
addition of the “economic development” purpose to the statute.  The “economic 
development” purpose was drafted by Roger M. Grow, director of planning and 
development for the city of Webster Groves (White 2010, 5-74).  Later that year, in 
November 1986, the Kansas City TIF Commission approved its first TIF plan, called the 
Tenth & Troost TIF Plan.  The Kansas City TIF Commission (which was formed in 1982 
right after the enabling legislation) attempted to condemn property within this district on 
May 6, 1988 (J.E. Dunn Construction Company, Inc. v. Kansas City TIF Commission).  
Property owner J.E. Dunn Construction Company challenged this condemnation in the 
Missouri Court.  Dunn stated that his individual property was not blighted, and he 
challenged the overall validity of the statute on a variety of grounds.  White, in his 
capacity then as General Counsel to the Kansas City TIF Commission, argued the case at 
the Missouri Supreme Court when Dunn appealed the Circuit Court’s finding on 
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 Industrial Development Bonds was a federal-level program. 
16
 Mentioned in his biography as the 2010 Richard A. King Awardee given by the Missouri Economic 
Development Financing Association. 
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constitutional grounds.  He won.  This is the necessary court challenge and outcome 
White had stated needed to occur before bond attorneys would feel comfortable giving 
opinions on TIF bonds.  This case was decided by the Missouri Supreme Court on 
December 12, 1989. 
During this time, the city of Richmond Heights was working with developers about 
renovating the Crossroads Mall into what is now known as the St. Louis Galleria.  Tax 
increment financing was considered as part of the financing package, but the Clayton 
School District had reservations.  They did not totally object, but the school district’s 
administrators thought it was unfortunate that the real estate taxes increment that would 
be due to them would be the primary captured tax – meanwhile the facility would be 
generating other taxes that would dwarf their captured amount but benefit others 
(Brancaglione 2011, interview; Norber 2011, interview).  By the end of the 1990 
Missouri legislative session, the TIF Act had been amended to allow the capture of local 
and county sales tax, known as “’EATs” – economic activity taxes.   
Another notable modification to the law in that legislative session was that the 
composition of a TIF Commission was made more specific and representative.  Instead of 
five to fifteen members all selected by the city administrator, the commission would be 
nine members of which only six would be municipal representatives.   The remaining 
three members would be selected by overlapping taxing districts – two would come from 
impacted school districts, and the remaining member would be from among any other 
overlapping taxing district.   
The school district of Clayton had an obvious hand in these changes, but also 
visible was the Missouri School Boards Association.  They are recorded as attending the 
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1991 hearing in the House Committee on Commerce, objecting to the correction that was 
about  to be made to the 1990 amendment.  Although the legislature intended to only 
allow 50% of the incremental economic activity tax, the omission of the word 
“incremental” allowed it to be 50% of all economic activity taxes.  The Association was 
the only opponent to this correction, and the bill passed the committee 18 to 0 (Perfection 
Calendar Summary, HCS HB 502).  Kenneth Hubbell and Peter J. Eaton (1997) wrote in 
a short report on TIF the following: 
The use of sales taxes to help finance TIF districts is the direct result of actions by 
school districts.  This is a result of their relatively greater reliance on property 
taxes as a source of revenue.  In 1993, the average school levy was $3.13 
compared to an average property tax rate of $0.78 for cities.  (p.2) 
 
Another school district started court proceedings around this time (1992) to 
prevent the formation of a TIF district in Dresden, Missouri.  The municipality forming 
the TIF in this instance was the County of Pettis.  The Pettis County School District R12 
claimed that the TIF district violated procedural requirements, and more importantly, 
claimed that the economic development area category was unconstitutional.  The Circuit 
Court granted summary judgment in favor of the school district, and the county did not 
appeal (White 2010, p.5-305). 
The city of Herculaneum, located in Jefferson County, was an early TIF user.  It 
established an I-55 TIF district in 1989, intended to help them benefit from the traffic 
traveling on Interstate 55.  The Quiktrip Corporation paid money upfront to make 
improvements to the interstate exchange, with the expectation of being repaid from the 
TIF special accounts.  Herculaneum established another TIF district in 1992 called the 
Riverview TIF District.  Jefferson County did not remit funds to any of the special 
accounts (PILOTS or EATS) for either TIF district, and in 1994 requested the courts to 
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confirm that the county had a duty to deposit collected funds into other accounts which 
preempted their remittance to the TIF special accounts.   During the same timeframe, on 
the other side of the state the Consolidated School District of Jackson County made a 
similar argument as Jefferson County, trying to exclude the M&M Replacement tax.   
In both cases the Supreme Court supported the TIF Act and thus the 
municipalities enacting it, stating that if the taxes were not explicitly excluded from the 
TIF Act by statute, then it would not be excluded from capture.  The Herculaneum 
(Quiktrip) decision was made in December 1995 and the Consolidated School District 
case was decided December 1996. 
 It is during 1996 the House Commerce Committee began a series of hearings “in 
response to concerns voiced to legislators” about “possible misuse and abuse” (Report of 
the House Interim Committee Studying Tax Increment Financing 1997, p.1).  In the fall 
of 1996 a House Interim Committee was established and they held five public hearings – 
three in Jefferson City, one in St. Louis, and one in Independence (Kansas City area).  
These hearings were held from November 19, 1996 to January 29, 1997.  Approximately 
80 people either spoke in person or submitted written testimony.  These persons included 
“private citizens, city and county officials, city managers, representatives from school, 
library, and fire protection districts, chambers of commerce, merchants associations, and 
local officials from rural areas” (Report, p.2-3).  The report submitted in February 1997 
stated that the testimonies covered the following subjects:  1) additional representation by 
adding others on the TIF commission (i.e. private citizens, existing business owners, 
county);  2)  abuse of the “but-for” test,  3) redefining blight, conservation area, and 
economic development area;  3) distribution of surplus funds;  4) inclusion of a cost-
Butler, Cassandra, 2012, p. 90 
benefit analysis;  5) the relocation of business within the same county with the aid of 
incentives;  6) lowering the pay-back period allowed;  7)  use of TIF in rural 
communities;  8) need for technical assistance and information for complying with TIF 
regulations;  and 9) the need for local control and for controlling abuses. 
In reading the Committee report there appears to be two distinct types of 
testimonies –leave the statute as is, or modify it to curb abuses.  There did not appear to 
be any push to expand its usage into more areas or to new users.  It was recognized by 
many that momentum was gathering to limit or scale back usage of TIF.  Three cities 
submitted written pleas – St. Charles, Harrisonville, and Lee Summit, all requesting that 
the statute not be changed.  
 Lee’s Summit’s letter included a seven page position statement, which provides a 
good feel for the debate during this period.  They requested that the definition of blight 
remain the same stating that any changes would invite court challenges and add to a 
municipality’s cost.  They advocated that TIF time limit remain at 23 years (not less), and 
that retail and residential projects remain eligible.  Additionally, they argued against 
allowing associated taxing districts from having the ability to “opt out” of a TIF project.  
The city of Harrisonville stated in their letter to the Committee that as a relatively rural 
community of 8500 population, TIF is “perhaps the only remaining tool” available to his 
city to assist in their attempt to “sustain acceptable growth rates and quality of life.”  The 
city of St. Charles’ letter also made reference to how useful the TIF tool was for 
redevelopment and “development.” The letter further stated that 70% of the county’s 
population lived within municipal boundaries, and “by the use of TIFs, development is 
accelerated in areas where there is a good possibility that no developments would occur 
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without the use of TIFs” (Report 1997, Appendix B).  These letters document, in essence, 
the expanded use of TIF for rural areas, development areas, and for greenfield areas, was 
already taking place. 
The Committee made eleven recommendations which they hoped would “reflect a 
commitment to local control of local economic development projects, while 
strengthening the consumer protection aspects of this law” (Report 1997, p.11).  The 
eleven recommendations are reprinted below.  The law was amended in 1997 largely 
along the lines of these recommendations with minor changes in some instances. 
1. Ensure county representation on non-county TIF commissions, by increasing the 
size of these commissions from 9 to 11 members, with the 2 additional members 
to be appointed by the county in which the TIF project is located; 
 
2. Require, after the effective date of the TIF legislation, that proposed TIF projects 
meet at least 3 of the criteria listed under the definition of “conservation area” in 
order to ensure that only economically vulnerable areas are qualifying for the use 
of TIF under this designation; 
 
3. Require that a cost-benefit analysis accompany all redevelopment proposals, and 
that such analysis include information about the economic impact on affected 
jurisdictions and on the economic stability of the developer or developers; 
 
4. Strengthen the “but-for” test, by requiring developers to submit a signed affidavit 
to this effect with the proposal; 
 
5. Require surplus funds to be redistributed to local jurisdictions on a pro rata basis, 
to ensure that redistribution is equitable and fair; 
 
6. Require a 2 year waiting period for newly established jurisdictions before they are 
authorized to use TIF; 
 
7. Prohibit the use of TIF for gambling establishments; 
 
8. Require additional public hearings in the event there are major changes to a 
redevelopment plan; 
 
9. Provide information and technical assistance to local jurisdictions on the use and 
implementation of TIF through the Department of Economic Development.  Such 
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assistance should include the development of a written manual on implementing 
tax increment financing; 
 
10. Require regular legislative review of the TIF statutes, with a report on the review 
and any recommendations for legislative changes; and  
 
11. Prohibit the intra-county relocation of retail establishments using TIF for at least 1 
year. 
 
It should be noted that the chairman of the House Interim Committee Studying Tax 
Increment Financing, Henry Rizzo (Kansas City), was also the chair of the House 
Commerce Committee.   The TIF amendment was part of a larger economic development 
project which was ultimately passed in a 1997 special session.  This TIF amendment 
included the addition of a new source of revenue – state level sales taxes or income taxes.  
Another interesting aspect of this committee report is the attendance to the public 
hearings from representatives of more rural municipalities, and the committee’s 
recognition of their participation.  The committee’s report included in its summary of the 
hearings a section labeled “rural areas” and stated that the five rural representatives 
(cities of Cameron, Trenton, Harrisonville, Mexico, and City of Lake Ozark) were 
“especially encouraged to present their views and concerns” (Report 1997, 8).  The 
paragraph continues, stating: 
Without exception, the committee was told that TIF is very beneficial and critical 
economic development tool for rural areas in Missouri.  Witnesses stated that 
rural areas do not receive a great deal of federal or state assistance for business 
development, and they have limited local funds for redevelopment.  While TIF is 
not used as extensively in rural areas, as compared to the urbanized regions, it is 
one of the few economic development strategies available to rural areas for job 
creation and economic growth.  Making infrastructure improvements under the 
economic development area designation is particularly important use of TIF in 
rural areas.  (Report 1997, p.8) 
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This interaction with rural representatives expressing need and interest in using TIF 
could have been a key reason for the ninth recommendation – charging the state 
Department of Economic Development with providing technical and information 
assistance on the use and implementation of tax increment financing.  These rural 
communities are less likely to have in-house staff or have the financial resources to be 
able to contract the know-how to correctly implement and maintain a TIF project.  
In this 1997 legislative process, it is possible to see the impact of the two schools of 
“leave it alone” versus “curb the abuse” factions.   The first House Bill (HB 131) 
sponsored by Henry Rizzo made an early introduction in the session and was designed to 
restrict TIF use.  It was referred to the House Commerce Committee where no further 
action was taken.  The stricter provisions of this bill that did not make it into a latter 
version of another bill included elimination of the economic development area purpose 
all together, and a stricter  definition of blight which included references to poverty level, 
vacancy or abandon building rates, and crime rates.  Reduction of the time period for 
acquisition of property through eminent domain from five to three years and prohibition 
of the special use or sales tax within a TIF plan four years after this bill was effective also 
did not make it into later versions.  Near the end of the session, the House had agreed on 
HB589, which the Senate made some minor changes and substituted SB165 for HB589.  
At the hearing for HB589, testifying in favor of the bill were the following:  Missouri 
Association of Counties, Jackson County Legislature, Clay County Commission, St. 
Charles County, city of Maryland Heights, city of Mexico, and city of Cameron.  The 
proponents’ position was summarized as “[it] is a valuable economic development tool 
which needs to be reformed but not dismantled.”  Opposing the bill were the Missouri 
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Tax Increment Financing Association and the city of Fulton, whose position was noted as 
“[it] works well as outlined in the current statutes” (Committee Summary, Debra 
Cheshier, research analyst).   
Richard King, another Kansas City attorney with strong economic development and 
tax increment financing ties, wrote two articles in the Missouri Municipal Review about 
the economic development changes from the 1997 legislature.  With respect to the state 
TIF, he remarked “however, obtaining the state revenues for use in a TIF plan may 
require the dexterity of the oft-cited long-tailed cat in a room full of rocking chairs” 
(King 1997b, p.10).  Recall that the state TIF requires approval from the Department of 
Economic Development and appropriation of funds from the legislature.  Next, he noted 
the negative effect of the amendment’s exclusion of specific taxes –the M&M 
Replacement tax and the tax levy on the Blind Pension Trust Fund, Kansas City’s Bi-
State Cultural tax, and Metrolink’s Transportation Sales tax – and said that “revenue 
formerly available for all TIF plans was severely restricted” (King 1997b, p.11).  But, as 
may be expected from a well- respected economic development attorney, he already had 
a work-around.  He wrote: 
In approving new TIF projects in blighted areas, it may be possible to avoid the 
impact of the elimination of the M&M Replacement Tax and the blind pension 
trust fund tax by approving a redevelopment plan under Chapter 353, RSMo, in 
tandem with a TIF plan.  While the TIF plan cannot directly capture these real 
estate taxes, a 353 plan could abate real estate taxes and require the developer to 
contribute sums equal to the abated taxes to the special allocation fund to be used 
in conjunction with economic activity taxes to carry out the TIF plan.  (King, 
1997, p.11) 
 
He acknowledged the intent of legislators to” tighten” the approval process and 
“eliminate” abuses, but wondered if the true beneficiaries of the new amendment would 
be developmental lawyers and consultants as cities tried to comply to the “tighter” 
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processing requirements (King  1997b, p.13).  He drew attention to the revised definition 
of “economic development area” and stated it was “intended to prevent large retailers 
from using tax increment financing in an economic development area to subsidize 
development costs and, in turn, compete against existing small locally owned businesses” 
(King  1997b, p.14).  The revised definition added the phrase that economic development 
areas “will not be solely used for development of commercial businesses which unfairly 
compete in the local economy” (99.805.(5)).  
Other economic development tools were either created or modified in 1997, as 
previously mentioned.  Richard King wrote the other article to highlight three of these 
tools – the Transportation Development Districts (TDDs), the Museum Districts, and the 
Community Improvement Districts (CIDs).  He noted that the “extensive amendments” to 
the TDD should result in TDDs being used almost immediately.  He said that although 
the TDD statute was almost ten years old, that “to date, however, no Transportation 
Development District has been authorized or utilized to construct a local or state road 
improvement” (King, 1997a, p.21).  The changes made it easier to create a district and to 
impose a tax.  He stated that the Museum District was a newly created program and had 
features similar to the TDD (King, 1997a, p.22).  A particular advantage of CIDs over 
Special Business Districts (SBDs) and Neighborhood Improvement Districts (NIDs) was 
the maintenance (i.e. upkeep and repairs) provisions of the legislation, which was absent 
in both the SBDs and NIDs. 
The 1997 amendment definitely showed a response to a few of the previous court 
cases.  The specific exclusion of particular taxes had remnants of the County of Jefferson 
and the Consolidated Schools of Jackson County court cases, as well as another case that 
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was rising through the courts at that time – Village of Bel-Ridge et. al.  v. Lohman.   Bel-
Ridge was joined by other cities in this action to have collected taxes allocated to their 
TIF Districts by the state (via the county if appropriate).  Although some of these taxes 
were finally excluded as a result of the 1997 amendment, these exclusions would not 
apply to TIF Districts formed prior to December 23, 1997. 
The City of St. Charles v. DeVault case was heard in 1997 at the Appeals Court level 
(transfer to Missouri Supreme Court was denied).   The case, which outlined the 
requirements for constituting a valid redevelopment plan (per 99.810) was a test for how 
stringent or lax a municipality could be in its interpretation and implementation.  The 
Court suggested that wording in the statute used to describe the requirements of a 
redevelopment plan is important, and that the requirement that a redevelopment plan be 
compatible with an existing comprehensive plan is not fungible. 
Senator Phil B. Curls of the Kansas City area was chair of the Senate Insurance and 
Housing Committee, and repeatedly attempted to obtain a 20% set-aside of TIF capture 
for affordable housing.  This goal replicates a provision in California enacted in 1976 that 
requires 20% of TIF funds be set-aside for low and moderate income housing.  He 
introduced bills in 1995 (SB0303), 1996 (SB0621), 1997 (SB0095), and 1998 (SB0878).  
He was unable to advance these bills any further than having a hearing in the committee 
he chaired, and he left the Senate in 1998. 
The year 1997 saw opponents of TIFs in Kansas City area gather some momentum, 
resulting in the Kansas City Council referring two TIF projects to their voters in 1998.  
During this timeframe the city’s Auditor, Mark Funkhouser, released his first audit of 
Kansas City TIFs primarily noting that the projected payoffs were not materializing, 
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stating that only about 25% of projected TIF revenues had occurred to date (Karash, 
2008).   The first referendum went to voters in February 1998, after opponents had 
gathered enough signatures to put in on the ballot.  Centertainment, the developer, and 
other proponents of the Power & Light District project challenged the signatures to no 
avail.  The voters approved the project.  In an opinion piece in the Kansas City Star, Yael 
T. Abouhalkah applauded the petition process, stating that “some thoughtful debate 
occurred over how downtown should be redeveloped and how much taxpayer revenue 
should be dedicated to the cause” and that “pressure is now on developers to deliver on 
crucial campaign promises, such as building housing that’s needed to give the project a 
better chance to succeed” (Abouhalkah, 1998).  At the same time though he felt a down-
side was that developers may become “more brazen” (Abouhalkah, 1998).   
Abouhalkah’s opinion piece also gave the impression that the opponents were 
concerned about the impact on the district’s schools and the trustworthiness of the 
governing body.  A few months after the voters approved what was described in another 
article as “the city’s largest redevelopment project,” the Kansas City School District 
threatened to sue the City over this TIF district unless they could renegotiate the amount 
of its captured taxes (Heaster, 1998).  Later that year the Kansas City Council voluntarily 
(without requiring a petition) put another project (Brush Creek) to the voters, which they 
also approved.  A school board member (Lance Lowenstein) attending the Kansas City 
Council’s meeting was quoted as stating that the Kansas City School Board had been 
prepared to sue the City had they approved the TIF that evening (Heaster, 1998).  Also, 
Lowenstein and a Councilman mentioned that “voluntarily” putting the issue to the voters 
Butler, Cassandra, 2012, p. 98 
would allow the issue not to be on the same ballot as the spring elections for the 
councilpersons. 
In an article written in 1999 for the Washington University Law Quarterly, Julie A. 
Goshorn clearly stated that the TIF statutes were still in need of reform.  As examples she 
mentioned two TIF projects in St. Louis County – one in Olivette and the other in Des 
Peres, and both regarding retail.  She highlighted what she perceived to be abuses in both 
cases, and concluded with how she believed specific reform could help curb those type of 
abuses.  The Olivette district involved replacing residential property with retail property 
and required acquisition of the residential property.  The residential area was not 
considered housing stock in poor condition, and the developer’s intention was not to use 
eminent domain, but to purchase these private properties at well above market rates – at 
two and one-half times market rate.  This relatively expensive acquisition of parcels 
inflated the project costs, and $40 million in TIF was requested, which was almost one-
third cost of the total project costs (Goshorn 1999, 920; Billingsly 1999, (see footnote 7)).  
In this case the developer wanted to use tax incentives to buy property at well-above 
market rate for retail purposes, and this purpose did not neatly fit the public purpose of 
blight removal or the “but-for” requirement.  The city leadership decided to approve the 
TIF, but to address public dissension that had developed, also agreed to put the question 
of whether to proceed with the TIF plans to their voters (Goshorn 1999, 920). 
Two citizen groups were formed to rally the voters to their cause – and named 
themselves Committee to Repeal the TIF (against the TIF, and the first of the two groups 
to organize), and Citizens for Olivette First (in favor of the TIF). The project involved 
approximately 300 houses, and 500 people attended an Olivette City Council special 
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meeting. The Committee also filed petitions to recall the mayor and three councilpersons 
and to amendment the city charter (Billingsley, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, November 8, 
1999).  Those in favor of repeal won during the February 2000 election with 53% (1,656 
to 1,435 – St. Louis County Election Board website), but the recall of officials and the 
charter amendment efforts was not successful.  The TIF district was dissolved. 
The other project Goshorn mentioned as an example is the West County Center TIF 
plan.  Mentioned previously as a TIF project that led to a major court case, the case at the 
time of the article had just been decided at the Circuit Court level on September 28, 1999 
(Goshorn 1999, 922 fn 12) and was being appealed.   Goshorn noted that the circuit judge 
felt that he could not second guess the city’s determination of blight, and could only look 
for evidence of “bad faith or fraud” (Goshorn, 1999, p.922, fn12).  Although he ruled in 
favor of the city and thus for the TIF for West County Center, Gorshorn also noted that 
“the judge criticized the city’s decision to declare the area blighted, noting the irony of a 
blight declaration in one of the wealthiest areas in St. Louis County” (Goshorn, 1999, 
p.922, fn12).  Goshorn recommended the following reforms to the TIF statute – “a more 
restrictive definition of blight, and the application of constitutional debt limitations to TIF 
bonds” (Goshorn, 1999, p.944). 
The political upheaval in Olivette which led to the voters deciding not to have a TIF 
district also included voting on the same ballot on whether or not to recall two aldermen.  
The aldermen kept their seats in that election.  Similar activity occurred in another nearby 
committee of Rock Hill, Missouri.  A proposed TIF by the governing authority met with 
public debate.  The project did not occur (the developer backed out due to the conflict) 
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and many of the council members who had backed the project were not reelected (find 
citation). 
The success of the Committee to Repeal the TIF in Olivette is contrasted with lack of 
success achieved by the Hazelwood Yellow Ribbon Committee which formed in the 
summer of 1998.  Not to imply that the projects were comparable because in many ways 
they were not.  The Hazelwood “Missouri Bottoms” TIF was on undeveloped land in a 
floodplain, versus Olivette’s proposal was to replace residential housing with retail.  The 
Hazelwood Yellow Ribbon consisted of approximately fifty citizens of Hazelwood 
(Hazelwood Yellow Ribbon Committee v. Klos 2000).  They opposed the $17 million in 
subsidies to a private corporation and the use of eminent domain.  They circulated a 
petition to make changes to the charter that would 1) require the city council to get 
supermajority voter approval before approval of a TIF plan and 2) even if they did get 
this approval, they would not be able to use eminent domain with TIF.  The also 
submitted a petition to that would repeal two ordinances.   The Appeals Court had ruled 
against the group (supporting the lower court’s decision) in November 2000 and the 
Missouri Supreme Court refused to hear or transfer the case (Hazelwood Yellow Ribbon 
Committee).  The Hazelwood Yellow Ribbon Committee was headed by Leon Steinbach, 
a Hazelwood resident.  A coalition composed of other Hazelwood residents, especially 
those living in the affect farmland area, made up a significant portion of the committee 
membership.  Greg LeRoy (1999) described them as “Forty-nine volunteers, many of 
them past retirement age, braved winter drifts to go door to door.  To signal their support, 
residents adorned their homes and mailboxes with yellow ribbons” (28-29).  The city was 
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aggressive in defending its cause.  LeRoy (1999) mentioned a “shrill mailing” sent to 
residents, and Margaret Gillerman (2000) of the St. Louis Post Dispatch wrote:  
municipal officials lobbied door-to-door, made phone calls and sent letters to 
encourage residents to support the project and remove their names from the 
opposition  petitions.  Deb Faber, a spokesperson for the municipal government, said 
city officials were entirely justified in working on behalf of the project.  She called 
the mall the best proposal to come to Hazelwood in decades. 
 
The city officials also argued that  the farmland would be developed regardless of 
whether it was this particular mall or not, and so stopping this project would only mean 
that the development would occur with another project that would have lower economic 
returns to the community (Gillerman 2000, T.R. Carr 2000).  With the Court decision in 
its favor, the city of Hazelwood proceeded with its plans. 
Meanwhile, the House convened another House Interim Committee on Tax Increment 
Financing in September 2000, and they held three public hearings in November and 
December of 2000 – one each in Kansas City, St. Louis, and Jefferson City.  The public 
testimony again had factions that fell across the same line – those that wanted reform to 
curb abuse and those who wanted it to remain the same.  Again, no one seemed to be 
advocating for program expansion.   Fourteen witnesses were listed as attending the St. 
Louis hearing, and sixteen for the Kansas City hearing (no list was provided for the 
Jefferson City hearing).  The St. Louis attendees included county representatives 
(Jefferson, St. Louis County and St. Charles County), city representatives (St. Louis and 
St. Peters), organizational representatives (East-West Gateway, St. Louis Municipal 
League, Missouri Growth Assn., St Louis Regional Chamber & Growth Assn., United 
Food & Commercial Workers Union), a representative from the Hazelwood Yellow 
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Ribbon Committee, a state Senator, and a university professor
17
.  The Kansas City 
witnesses had a similar type of constituent makeup from their area, but also included 
many Kansas City TIF commissioners, County Economic Development Councils (Clay, 
Platte) and a member from the Cooperating School Districts of the Suburban KC area 
(House Interim Committee on Tax Increment Financing Report 2000, p.3). 
What is specifically different in this report is that the first observation noted by the 
committee was labeled “Differences in the Experience with TIF in Kansas City and St. 
Louis” (House Interim Committee on Tax Increment Financing Report 2000, p.7).  Under 
this heading they noted “Overwhelming support was voiced to the Interim Committee 
from those testifying about the experiences with TIF in the Kansas City area….In 
contrast, the assessment of TIF from those testifying from the St. Louis area was far less 
positive, and generally contained recommendations to the Interim committee to make 
substantial changes in one or more aspects of the TIF program” (House Interim 
Committee on Tax Increment Financing Report 2000, pp.7-8).  The committee did note 
the “political and geographical differences found between the two metropolitan areas” as 
the likely cause for this difference.  They recognized that the St. Louis area, with over 90 
municipalities in close proximity would be subject to more competitive pressures (House 
Interim Committee on Tax Increment Financing Report 2000, pp. 8-9). 
Attendees at the Kansas City hearing basically supported the TIF Act as is, and the 
testimony seemed to be how well they were managing the TIF process in order to avoid 
some of the negative aspects of known issues.  It is recorded in this report that in the 
Kansas City area “independent evaluation is obtained to ensure that the ‘but-for’ test is 
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met,” that good relationships are maintain with all taxing districts, and often-times “pay-
go” is the financing method used.   A criticism was registered in the Kansas City hearings 
though, regarding the negative impact that TIF still could have on school districts.  
School districts were concerned with residential development adding to the demand for 
their services, and they requested training for school board members so they could 
understand the impact of TIF.  They also voiced concern about the school district funding 
formula and TIFs impact on it, and wanted lawmakers to change the laws so that when 
TIFs expired and new revenues became available to the schools, they would not be 
negatively impacted in the school funding formula. 
On the other hand, the St. Louis contingent had specific suggestions on how the law 
could be improved.  Some witnesses requested strengthening the definition of blight, and 
/or the “but-for” test, and for shifting the burden of whether blight exist to the 
municipality/developer. Others suggested independent review of whether the “but-for” 
test had been met (referring to Kansas City’s example), elimination of TIFs for retail 
projects, or that a “good jobs” requirement be met.  Also suggested was the creation of a 
St. Louis area “super-TIF Commission,” and or that the state provide an increase 
oversight of TIFs over a certain dollar volume. 
After including an almost two-page summary of the West County Center case, the 
Interim Committee said that they were not making “specific recommendations on the 
aforementioned problems and concerns, but does recommend the filing of legislation in 
the upcoming session to address and further the discussion of these issues” (House 
Interim Committee on Tax Increment Financing Report 2000, p.16).  The 
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“aforementioned problems and concerns” were listed in a subheading of “Committee 
Findings and Recommendations.”  A summary of the five points listed follows below. 
1.  Perhaps the use of TIF for residential development should be limited.  They 
particularly noted the problem surrounding new construction and the problems that 
“hold harmless” districts may face. 
 
2.  There may be a need to limit TIF use as an incentive for “large discount retailers.”  
They voiced particular concern for small local retailers, stating that this problem is 
mainly in smaller cities and towns. 
 
3.  Incentive use for relocating existing businesses from one nearby location to 
another was acknowledged as a problem, and it was suggested that the creation of 
“regional TIF cooperation districts” could help solve this problem. 
 
4.  Creation of a state oversight committee to review local TIF projects for adherence 
to the statute “may spurn regional cooperation and provide standardization among the 
various local TIF Board recommendations.” 
 
5.  As a result of the West County Mall case, the legislature might “need to review 
and possibly re-write various elements of the TIF law as it relates to the “but-for” test, 
the definition of “blighted area” and inclusion of parking garages and other associated 
structures in TIF projects.”  It was felt that the courts needed more structure to make a 
determination regarding blight and the “but-for” test. 
 
Despite the suggestion by the committee that there be “some filing of legislation” to 
spur discussion and to make changes, very limited changes were actually made in the 
time period of 1998- 2006.  As mentioned earlier, the only changes in this time-period 
were provisions for reimbursement for emergency services provided, modifications to the 
state TIF, and the exclusion of a new tax in Jackson County.   Perhaps the timidity of the 
recommendations marked by the passive tone used (ultimately suggesting that the 
legislature “file something”) and the lack of actual amendments passed, both reflect the 
inability of those in favor of further restriction to garner enough votes to do so. 
Yet given the lack of actual bills that made it into law, there was considerable 
legislation introduced and evidence of interest group lobbying.  Timothy Green and 
Butler, Cassandra, 2012, p. 105 
Catherine Hathaway in the House and Wayne Goode in the Senate seemed to present as a 
team to introduce significant legislation in the years of 2000 (HB1629 and SB0802), 
2001 (HB599 & SB0079), and 2002 (HB1496 & SB0066).  Two opposing commentaries 
by well-respected professionals and opinion-leaders illuminate the debate during this time 
in the St. Louis area – Les Sterman, executive director of the East-West Gateway Council 
of Governments
18
, and John Brancaglione, vice president and director of urban consulting 
at Peckham Guyton Albers & Viets (PGAV). 
The commentaries were published in the St. Louis Business Journal one week apart – 
Mr. Brancaglione’s commentary was in response to Mr. Sterman’s commentary.  Mr. 
Sterman made mentioned of the two bills in the legislature (HB1629 and SB0802), and 
praised the legislators who sponsored them by concluding with “Let’s thank them for 
taking this brave step by helping to pass the TIF reform legislation” (March 13, 2000).  
He mentioned the February 8
th
 vote in Olivette a month earlier, and mentioned the Senate 
hearing on SB0802 also on February 8
th
 in Jefferson City which was attended by many 
St. Louisans, including “neighborhood residents, public officials, attorneys, consultants 
and developers,” who were “entangled in questions about policy, procedure, profit and 
community values.”  He mentioned that many of the issues were the result of a lack of a 
“well-constructed regional strategy” leading somewhat to every municipality for 
themselves while the “region as a whole is sliding backward in a zero-sum game of 
competing metropolitan marketplaces.”  This state of affairs he writes has brought 
together an unlikely coalition supporting SB0802 and HB1629 – urban, suburban, and 
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Butler, Cassandra, 2012, p. 106 
rural sponsors – who have come together to “restore order and fiscal responsibility to tax 
increment financing” and to restore TIF “to its originally intended purpose – support for 
the redevelopment of areas where private investment cannot otherwise be anticipated.”  
He makes obvious that the Missouri Tax Increment Financing Association and others in 
the professional development community oppose his position (March 13, 2000). 
John Brancaglione responded in his capacity of one of those from the professional 
development community.  He titled his commentary “TIF: It’s time for responsible 
legislative reform,” so as to not make whether or not to reform TIF the main point.  
Rather, he stated, he opposed the legislative bills on the basis of the way they would 
reform the Act.   He preferred a reform approach that “focused on the factors that cause 
economic disinvestment, rather than one that focuses on the characteristics of an area’s 
population,” and that TIF should be used for economic development, in addition to 
redevelopment.  He stated that the current proposals “will do nothing more than further 
hamstring the municipalities’ and the counties’ abilities to maintain and enhance their 
existing economic base with the already meager tools at their disposal.”  This really 
comes back to a statement he made earlier in the commentary -- that “the concept of tax 
increment financing has evolved in many states as a redevelopment tool and an economic 
development tool,” and that “this evolution occurred, in part, because of the drastic 
decline in federal dollars to assist local governments in economic development” (March 
20, 2000).  In essence, Sterman was arguing for a return to the “original intent,” and 
Brancaglione was making a case for the “evolved” purpose.  Brancaglione also 
mentioned that Sterman’s organization had drafted both bills.  The bills did not make it 
through the legislative process. 
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While mentioning that the East-West Gateway Council of Governments had drafted 
legislation then circulating in the legislature, Brancaglione also mentioned that he had 
drafted legislation in an earlier year that was not successful because it was introduced too 
late in the session.  These disclosures expose the role organizations and other interested 
parties played in writing legislation.  In particular, Sterman mentioned the Tax Increment 
Financing Association and its opposition to the circulating bills.  The Tax Increment 
Financing Association was begun in 1991, and its founding members included 
Brancaglione, as well as the other two Kansas City attorneys previously mentioned, 
Michael White and Richard King.  During this year (2000) the organization renamed 
itself to encompass a wider scope.  The organization was renamed the Missouri 
Economic Development Financing Association.  Its stated purpose is “education and 
advocacy concerning all economic development financing tools available in the State of 
Missouri” (http://www.medfa.com/about.htm). 
The House Commerce Committee held a public hearing on February 23, 2000, but no 
further action occurred.  The Senate Bill went considerably farther, finally passing in the 
Senate on April 4
th
 before it went to the House, where it was referred to the House 
Commerce Committee.  The House Commerce Committee did hold a hearing on April 
18
th
 but that was its last activity.  The 2001 bills (HB599 & SB0079) may have made it to 
the point where hearings were held but no further.  In 2002 the HB1496 seemed to be 
headed for passage, reaching the point where the bill had been “perfected” and passed the 
House (115 to 34).  But on April 17
th
 after the second reading in the Senate, the bill was 
referred to the Senate Commerce and Environment Committee, where it apparently 
stayed (Missouri House of Representative Activity History for HB1496).  Senator Goode 
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proposed a bill (SB0172) the following year that was slightly weaker, but the last 
reported activity was a hearing in the Senate Ways and Means Committee.  HB 1496 
would have made the following changes:   
1)  limit TIF use in new developments (“25% or more of the area is vacant and 
not been previously developed, qualifies as ‘open space’ as defined in Section 
67.900 RSMo, or is presently being used for agricultural or horticultural purposes, 
except in certain cases”); 
 
2) require retail projects in the St. Louis area including counties of St. Louis city, 
St. Louis, Jefferson, Warren, St. Charles, Franklin, Lincoln, St. Francois, and Ste. 
Genevieve to  meet additional requirements generally related to decline and 
stress; 
 
3)  create a regional review authority for TIFs in the counties mentioned in above; 
 
4)  limit public funding amount to 30% of total project costs; 
 
5)  require an economic feasibility analysis with projected return of investment 
figures and verification that the property has not already been redeveloped 
through private enterprise. 
 
Again, this bill did not make it through the Senate, and after a multi-year effort, was 
abandoned. 
A few other bills were introduced but also did not gain traction.  A St. Louis 
coalition (Tom Villa, Maida Coleman) attempted a few years to exempt the St. Louis 
Schools from participating in tax abatements and TIFs (2002 HB2141, 2003 HB30, 2003 
SB0634).  Bills were presented in two consecutive years (2002, 2003) by Representative 
Tom Dempsey (2002 HB1480 and 2003 HB119) to require school board approval for TIF 
plans that have a residential or multifamily component.  Representative Holt submitted 
HB585 in 2001 to require that taxing districts receive distributions from special allocation 
accounts in a timely manner.  These plans did not progress past a committee referral.  
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The Ste. Genevieve School District v. city of Ste. Genevieve case which covered 
TIF activities in Ste. Genevieve in the late 1990’s was decided in 2002, just one year after 
the West County Center case.  The conclusion in the Ste. Genevieve case differed in 
contrast to the West County Center case, because the Supreme Court did not appear to 
“go along” with the reasoning presented by the city, and thus remanded the case back to 
the trial court that had accepted the city’s argument.  The city posited that a change in a 
redevelopment project did not change the nature of the overall plan because changes had 
been made in other parts of the plan to counter the increase in costs expected in the 
changed project.  The Supreme Court disagreed with this analysis, and stated that 
according to the wording of the statute, if there is significant change at the project level 
(not necessarily only at the plan level), then the TIF commission should be reconvened to 
consider the changes. 
 Although not much change occurred within the TIF statute during this period, 
there were modifications and new legislation closely related to the TIF statute.  In 2003 
the Missouri Downtown and Rural Economic Stimulus Act was passed.  The enacting 
legislation labeled 99.915 to 99.980 is known as the downtown portion (MODESA) and 
the statutes 99.1000-99.1060 is the rural portion (MORESA).  MODESA & MORESA 
have many similar goals and provisions as the TIF Act, but is specifically for downtown 
revitalization or rural needs.  The municipality must make application to the state 
Department of Economic Development, and have a median household income of under 
$62,000  
(http://www.missouridevelopment.org/upload/moresaguidelines(012706).pdf , and 
http://www.missouridevelopment.org/upload/modesa.pdf ).   A few years later a 
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MODESA lite version was added (2005) to specifically aid smaller communities, and is 
known officially as the Downtown Revitalization Preservation Act (2005).  The 
paperwork is said to be much less, but the incentive amount is also less (99.1080-
99.1092, http://www.missouridevelopment.org/upload/dwntwn_rev_pres.pdf). 
 The use of TIF in Missouri came to the attention of the Brookings Institution as a 
result of a larger project in which they were “examining growth trends and challenges in 
the state of Missouri” (Luce, 2003, iv).   With support of the Ewing Marion Kauffman 
Foundation (located in Kansas City) they analyzed TIF use in St. Louis and Kansas City 
particularly and published the results in 2003.  The study looked at “three issues of 
special concern – allowable purposes for TIF districts, the “but-for” clause and project 
evaluation” (Luce, 2003, p.1), and it looked at the variation of TIF use between the two 
major metropolitan areas.  Luce commented that “TIF districts were located 
disproportionately in the Kansas City and St. Louis metropolitan areas” (89 of 125 TIF 
districts as of February 2001) (Luce, 2003, p.8).  He stated that the Kansas City area 
showed “a pattern very consistent with the generally stated goals of TIF” because of their 
location in the city core or inner ring suburbs, and higher percentage in “fiscally stressed 
areas” (Luce, 2003, pp. 8,11).  Noting a different pattern in the St. Louis area, he saw a 
“greater predominance of TIF districts in outer parts of the region” and that cities using 
TIF on average “already fare relatively well in inter-local competition for tax base” 
(Luce, 2003, pp. 8,11).  He recommended the following in his conclusions: 
These patterns [referring to St. Louis] clearly imply that the law should be revised 
to: (1) narrow the scope of activities or types of places eligible for TIF; (2) require 
review of the “but-for” implications of TIF projects by some outside reviewer; 
and (3) require local TIF administrators to reconcile TIF plans with land use and 
economic development needs locally and in nearby areas. 
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If such reforms were put in place, TIF could be returned to its attractive main 
purpose in Missouri: that of providing resources that would not otherwise be 
available to localities that badly need them to promote economic development and 
redevelopment.   (Luce, 2003, p.16) 
 
 The St. Louis Business Journal reported on the Brooking Institution finding, and 
solicited comments from three developers, two who testified that they would not have 
been able to do specific projects were it not for the assistance of TIF.  Terry Jones, a 
professor at a local university, felt that the media coverage of the study was very 
disappointing, with the major area newspaper, the St. Louis Dispatch, not mentioning it at 
all, and the coverage of the St. Louis Business Journal primarily focusing on the opinions 
of a few developers and mentioning the essence of the study in three sentences plus a 
quote from Thomas Luce, the study’s author (Jackson 2003).  He went on to highlight a 
few of the major points that he felt should have been shared with the “citizen-readers” of 
these news organizations.  He pointed to TIF being used by more than the original target 
which was the urban core, and the study’s finding that suburban areas with, as Dr. Jones 
describes, “little need for assistance in the competition for tax base” are regular users of 
TIF in the St. Louis area (Jones 2003). 
 The Senate convened an Interim Committee on Tax Increment Financing in 2005, 
held public hearings from July 27
th
 to November 1
st
 in Jefferson City, Kansas City, and 
St. Louis, and issued its report in January 2006.  No list of witnesses was provided in the 
report.  The testimony mentioned in the report that comments from Kansas City were 
positive, and it appears that representatives from Mayor Barnes’ office (Kansas City) 
gave an upbeat presentation, again highlighting their achievements, how well they work 
with taxing districts, and that they have developed a standardized manual for use in 
“determining the merit of proposed tax increment finance plans” and to provide 
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uniformity in procedures and oversight (Report of the Senate Interim Committee on Tax 
Increment Financing 2006, p.11). 
 And, like before, the testimony in St. Louis was filled with concerns of abuses.  
Unfortunately, the Sunset Hill TIF project had just collapsed resulting in real hardships 
for many of the residents that were in the TIF district.  What made this hardship more 
difficult was that the city’s TIF Commission had recommended against using TIF, but the 
governing board of alderman approved the redevelopment plan with the use of TIF.  As it 
was, the developer was unable to complete acquisition of the primarily residential 
properties because he could not secure the financing for the total project.   
Other concerns mentioned by witnesses included revenue shifting – referring to 
corporations “pitting” communities against each other, and “big box” national retailers 
putting small local businesses out of business (like the mall project in Hazelwood).  Some 
witnesses spoke against TIF use on greenfields or floodplains.  Another contingent 
brought up the hardship on school districts when TIFs are used for residential projects 
and the negative impact to school districts in general when the tax base is increased under 
the Missouri schools funding formula.  The last complaint registered in the report was 
that newly approved taxes are being captured by TIF projects instead of their intended 
purposes (Report of the Senate Interim Committee on Tax Increment Financing 2006, 
p.11). 
 The Senate Interim Committee on Tax Increment Financing made twelve 
recommendations.  They were:   
1.  Expand tax increment finance commission membership by adding two more 
members representing affected taxing districts (including but not limited to fire 
districts, ambulance districts, library districts, etc.) other than school boards and 
municipalities.  These additional members should be prohibited from being 
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employees of the municipality.  In addition, there should be additional 
qualifications or restrictions on a municipality that wants to proceed with a project 
the TIF commission has rejected. 
 
2.  A regional or county-wide tax increment finance committee could be formed 
for certain geographic areas such as St. Louis County. 
 
3.  Place restrictions on the use of tax increment finance in Greenfield areas.  
Greenfield areas could be defined as follows: 
“Greenfield area,” any vacant, unimproved, or agricultural property that is 
located wholly outside the incorporated limits of a city, town, or village 
and that is substantially surrounded by contiguous properties with 
agricultural zoning classifications or uses. 
 
4.  Consider using the same percentage of tax revenue (ie. EATs, PILOTs) from 
all political subdivisions. 
 
5.  Prohibit future tax increases from existing tax increment finance project 
revenues. 
 
6.  Restrict the use of tax increment finance funds for payment of developer’s 
attorney fees. 
 
7.  Upon the sale of tax increment finance project property, the developer should 
realize a profit that is proportionate to the community investment. 
 
8.  Create new reporting requirements and penalty provisions for a municipality’s 
failure to report to the department of economic development.  Such report should 
be compiled annually by the department of economic development and made 
available the general assembly. 
 
9.  Place restrictions on the layering of tax increment finance projects and chapter 
353 projects to eliminate certain abuses. 
 
10.  Prohibit use of purely residential tax increment finance projects in non-urban 
core areas. 
 
11.  Prohibit the use of TIF in undeveloped flood plains except for river-front 
development. 
 
12.  Legislative reform is necessary to provide objective measureable criteria for 
the determination of blight. 
 
 The chair of the committee, John Griesheimer, did not sign the report and stated 
in a letter included in the report that he would have been pleased to sign the report had it 
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not included the twelfth recommendation regarding the definition of blight.  He argued in 
his letter that “I strongly believe that any attempt to redefine the word “blight” ultimately 
will result in the polarization of those on both sides of this issue and would eliminate any 
possibility for much needed tax increment financing reform” (Report of the Senate 
Interim Committee on Tax Increment Financing 2006, section VI).  That year the chair of 
the Interim committee (Griesheimer) introduced SB0832 to enact many of the 
recommendations of the committee.  The bill made it to conference before the session 
ended. 
 In the background of this activity was the Kelo v. New London U. S. Supreme 
Court decision handed down in June 2005.  Governor Matt Blunt convened a task force to 
make policy recommendations regarding the use of eminent domain in Missouri.  This 
effort culminated with the passage of HB1944 in 2006.  This bill did not amend the TIF 
statute directly, but does affect how eminent domain is implemented.  Eminent domain 
now cannot be used solely for economic development purposes, and disallows farmland 
from being blighted (http://missourisenate.blogspot.com/2006/05/lawmakers-agree-on-
bill-limiting-use.html). 
The city of Shelbina created a TIF district in 2003 and in December of 2005 had 
to ask the courts to grant a declaratory judgment against its county government, the 
county of Shelby.  The county had not remitted any funds to Shelbina’s TIF accounts, 
and in October the county also asked the courts for a summary judgment against the city.  
The county was joined in their efforts by many other taxing districts – Shelby County R-
IV, Monroe City R-1, Salt River Ambulance District, and Monroe City Ambulance 
District.  These other districts only appear in the case title, they do not appear in the 
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opinion.  An “extensive hearing” was held in December 2006 and the Circuit Court ruled 
in favor of the County, stating that the TIF districts were void because there were no 
actual, “identifiable” projects within the redevelopment plan.  The city appealed the 
decision which was upheld by the Appeals Court in 2008.   This decision had the effect of 
creating uncertainty regarding the validity of redevelopment plans of the “proactive” sort.  
It was not uncommon, particularly with municipal-initiated plans, for a municipality to 
recognize the need for redevelopment and to create a TIF district to begin needed 
infrastructure improvements, with the hopes of attracting development that had yet to be 
identified.  This unexpected ruling has created some concern in the economic 
development community about how this ruling will curtail a municipality’s ability to plan 
ahead in an effort to be “ready” when the right opportunity comes along, or to proactively 
make the right opportunity happen (Grimm 2011,  interview).  
In Kansas City use of TIF was becoming a major political issue.  The mayor at the 
time, Kay Barnes, was first elected in 1999 and was reelected in the 2003 elections.  She 
was a major supporter of TIF, and had been the chair of the TIF commission prior to 
becoming mayor.  The Kansas City Auditor’s Office had audited the TIF program in 
Kansas City four different years from 1998 to 2005 (1998, 2000, 2003, and 2005), and 
issued a “follow-up” report in April 2007 (Performance Audit Tax Increment Follow-Up 
2007, p. 4.)  But, the follow-up report was released by the Acting Auditor, because the 
Auditor, Mark Funkhouser, was a candidate in the 2007 race for mayor.  Funkhouser was 
a critic of TIF use, and the release of the Follow-Up report in the “heat” of the race was 
considered calculated and unfair by many (Grenz, 2007, .  Some of the criticism made by 
the auditor’s office included:  1) projected revenues were frequently significantly 
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overestimated, 2) lack of a stated “public strategy” for using TIF, and 3) need for more 
oversight of TIF staff, commission, and the funds they control (Follow-Up 2007, p.4).   
Funkhouser won the election for mayor in 2007. 
Another report was released by Michael Kelsay, economics professor at the 
University of Missouri-Kansas City, three months before the follow-up auditing report 
was released.  This study was commissioned by the Kansas City Chapter of 
ReclaimDemocracy.org.  It makes many references to the 2005 auditing report with 
particular references to the poor performance of projecting revenues.  But he also made 
an important distinction different than the analysis Luce had made a few years earlier.  
Luce had concluded that Kansas City was using TIF more as it was intended to be used – 
in the urban core.  Kelsay looked at Kansas City proper, and subdivided it into its six 
districts.  This analysis, which used more specificity, concluded that TIF was being used 
at a significantly higher rate in the better off communities within Kansas City, and the 
two districts with highest poverty and unemployment rates, contained one-third of the 
population but “received only 12% of TIFs” (Kelsay 2007, Executive Summary). 
During 2007 Senator Griesheimer introduced SB22, which included changes that 
impacted a wide range of statutes.  The bill description is “modifies laws affecting 
political subdivisions,” and subsection 99.847 is included, which prohibits using TIF in a 
flood plain in St. Charles County except under certain circumstances.  This bill also 
included changes to the TDD Act and the CID Act.   
 But other changes were accomplished in 2007 through a bill originating from the 
House.  HB741 was sponsored by David Pearce in the House and Chris Koster in the 
Senate.  Changes were made to subsections 820 and 825.  Subsection 820 was specific to 
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the St. Louis area, and this was done by making it relevant to any municipality in a 
county under the authority of the East-West Gateway Council of Governments with the 
exception of Franklin County.
19
   As a result, the city of St. Louis and municipalities in 
the counties of St. Louis, St. Charles, and Jefferson now have a county-wide TIF 
commission with the composition of six persons appointed by the county and three by 
municipalities, two by school boards in the county, and one for all other taxing districts 
within the county.  Griesheimer considers this change alone as being “huge” and possibly 
underappreciated at this time.  He believes when the economy recovers and development 
and redevelopment starts to occur again that the actual impact of this change will become 
evident (Griesheimer 2011, interview).  
 The change to subsection 825 may be a result of the Sunset Hill debacle and the 
controversy taking place in Eureka, Missouri, where the city governing bodies overrode 
their TIF commission’s recommendations not to go forward with the TIFs.  After this 
change, a municipal governing body needs a two-thirds vote to override a negative 
recommendation of a TIF commission.  Griesheimer had also included in his 2006 bill 
that did not become law provisions requiring a developer to disclose contingencies and 
conditions related to financial commitment for redevelopment plan. 
 Ron Richards, a House co-sponsor of HB741 was also able to sponsor HB1 in an 
executive session later in 2007.  In this session he was able to add a new subsection –843.  
This subsection disallowed TIF projects in areas considered “greenfields” in the St. Louis 
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 John Griesheimer, the chair of the Senate Interim Committee on Tax Increment Financing and bill 
author, is from Franklin County. In a 2011 interview with this author he explained that Franklin County had 
only one TIF district, and thus was not experiencing misuse, overuse, or competitive pressures. 
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metropolitan area (city of St. Louis and counties of St. Louis, St. Charles, Jefferson and 
Franklin (East-West Gateway Council of Government areas). 
 The city of St. Peters had created a TIF district in late 1999 and a citizen group 
was begun shortly thereafter with an interest in preserving the area that St. Peters had 
plans to develop.  The Great Rivers Habitat Alliance claimed some credit for assisting the 
National Rifle Association in the passage of the “Hunting Heritage Preservation Act, 
enacted in 2007 by the passage of SB225.  http://www.grha.net/site/about-grha/).  
Although this legislation is not part of the TIF statute it included language that many 
areas in the state that are in 100-year floodplains cannot be developed using TIF funds. 
St. Peters’ TIF district covered “1,640—acre tract of farmland in the Northeast 
corner of the City” (Great River Habitat Alliance v City of St. Peters, 2008). In its 
finding of blight on this farmland, the city said that the existing road system serving the 
farmland at the time was inadequate for anticipated future use.  Although the circuit court 
had ruled in favor of the city, in 2008 the Appeals Court reversed and remanded the case 
back to the circuit courts, directing them that the finding of blight based on anticipated 
future use was improper and the “but-for” test had not been met since the levee was 
already under construction(Great River Habitat Alliance v City of St. Peters, 2008). 
 In November 2007 condemnation process were started on property in Kansas City 
owned by Chung Hu Ku and Myong Suk Ku.  Their property was part of a 
redevelopment plan in a TIF district.  The Kus argued against the blight designation and 
that the compensation amount was inadequate.  They lost in the circuit court and in the 
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appeals court argued that the Centene case
20
 determined that in order to have a finding of 
blight the city must show the Ku property to be both a social and economic liability.  The 
appeals court rejected this argument because this was a TIF plan, not a Chapter 353 plan.  
Each statute has its own definition of blight, and it would be improper to apply Chapter 
353’s definition of blight to a TIF plan.  The Appeals Court affirmed the lower’s court 
decision in February 2009. 
 Another school district case was decided in February 2009 in the Appeals Court 
(petition to transfer to Supreme Court denied May 2009).  The school district, Meramec 
Valley R-III, attempted to take advantage of a few newer legislative amendments, 
arguing that the city of Eureka’s redevelopment plan included farmland that, as it fitted 
the definition of “greenfield” should not be subject to TIF, and it objected to farmland 
being blighted.  The court refused to entertain these arguments stating that the statute did 
not envision individual parcels within the plan being analyzed in a “piecemeal” fashion.  
The redevelopment plan had documented blight within the “plan as a whole,” and that 
was adequate.  Regarding the “greenfield” status – the redevelopment plan existed prior 
to the amendment, so was not subject to that requirement. 
 Also in January 2009 the East-West Gateway Council of Governments released 
an interim study titled “An Assessment of the Effectiveness and Fiscal Impacts of the Use 
of Development Incentives in the St. Louis Region.”  As mentioned earlier the executive 
director of the Council, Les Sterman, was very concerned regarding TIF use, particularly 
in the St. Louis region.  The Council has an inherent interest in creating an environment 
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 Centene Plaza Redevelopment Corp. v. Mint Properties, (Mo. banc 2007).  A Clayton, Mo. project 
involving Chapter 353 tax abatement.  The Court disallowed a finding of “blight” because the definition of 
blight in Chapter 353 required a finding of BOTH an economic liability and a social liability.  The social 
liability was not shown. 
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for cooperation and collaboration among the many municipal and county governments in 
the St. Louis area including near counties in Illinois. 
 The report attempted to look at TIF use in the region and quantify in dollars the 
actual costs to the region and the return received for this investment.  Using 
“conservative assumptions,” it estimated that between TIFs and special development 
districts, already $2.5 billion in local taxes had been diverted (13).  The executive 
summary of the interim report made the following observations: 
1.  There have been massive public investment in private development in the last 
15 years across the St. Louis region: about 80% of that investment includes retail 
development. 
 
2.  Across all incentive programs, the provisions for uniform reporting of 
revenues, expenditures, and outcomes (jobs, personal income, increases in 
assessed value, etc.) are remarkably weak, particularly considering the 
involvement of public funds. 
 
3.  There should be a complete database of public expenditures and outcomes for 
all publicly supported development projects. 
 
4.  Broad measures of regional economic outcomes strongly suggest that massive 
tax expenditures to promote development have not resulted in real growth. 
 
5.  Focusing development incentives on expanding retail sales is a losing 
economic development strategy for the region. 
 
Each point included elaborations.  Also, 90 development professional and local officials 
were interviewed.  From these interviews, the following information was gleaned.  
Municipalities seem to use development incentives to:  1) improve its fiscal health by 
developing/redeveloping under-utilized land, or 2) “redevelop urban core or other 
distressed areas,” especially in competition with non-urban areas that are also using 
incentives, and 3) to “change” a community’s “character,” that has not evolved without 
this extra encouragement (2009, 31).   Issues still remain regarding trying to make the 
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“but-for” test have meaning, and curbing abusing to the determination of blight (2009, 
32).  One abuse of “blight” identified is that the relationship between the amounts of 
subsidy needed to compensate for the blight disadvantage is not required to be a 
consideration in determining the total TIF subsidy granted.  The other points gleaned 
centered around actual economic productivity and benefit, especially within a regional, 
potentially competitive environment (2009, 33) 
The lone change in the TIF law in 2008 was SB1131 which made a minor change 
to allow the exclusion of Kansas City capital improvement tax from TIF capture.  In 2009 
a change was made to the reporting requirements in an attempt to achieve better 
compliance (HB191).  Prior to this amendment there were little consequences for not 
reporting as statute 99.865 requires.  Now failure to submit a TIF report as required can 
result in a five year suspension in the ability to create a new TIF district (HB191).  This 
bill also increases the ease by which TIF information should be accessible.  The 
Department of Economic Development is directed to give the annual TIF reports to the 
State Auditor, who is then directed to make the reports available on a website in a 
searchable format.  These two changes are in line with the East –West Gateway 
organization’s recommendation in their interim report, released near the beginning of this 
legislative session.  The St. Louis Municipal League and Missouri Municipal League are 
on record for opposing the new penalty for a municipal’s failure to report annually.  The 
Missouri Municipal League has suggested the penalty be reduced to a municipality not 
being able to create another district only until they have submitted the delinquent return 
(website). 
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 The executive branch of the state had to grow to accommodate the increase in 
responsibilities directed to it by the growth of these economic development programs.  
The state’s capacity to handle TIF Reporting requirements improved in 1997 and after, 
and Hal Van Slyck, Business Incentive Specialist in the Missouri Department of 
Economic Development has access to the reports received from 1997 forward.  It is 
unclear where any reports received before those times are now (Van Slyck 2011, 
interview).  In 1997 the charge to the Department of Economic Development increased 
significantly with the adoption of a state-level TIF and direction from the legislators to 
assist municipalities with information and with the technical aspects of using TIF.  Van 
Slyck arrived at the Department of Economic Development in 2004 for the purpose of 
managing the municipal and state TIF programs.  He recalls a significant number of new 
hires in the Business and Community Services section during the 2003 and 2004 time 
period, in which he was a part. Before his arrival, the responsibility of this recordkeeping 
belonged to his supervisor (Ann Perry, director of business services) along with her many 
other duties.  Before her, another division (within the Department of Economic 
Development) handled it.   In his responsibilities as a business incentive specialist, he is 
the state person for reporting and analysis of local and state TIFs, MODESA, MORESA, 
and CIDs (Van Slyck 2011, interview). 
In 2005 the Department of Economic Development announced a program called 
the “Dream Initiative.”   The Missouri Dream Initiative website describes this program as 
“an innovative statewide partnership that provides Missouri communities the technical 
and financial assistance they need to accomplish downtown revitalization plans.”  Cities 
must apply with the Missouri Dept. of Economic Development, and if accepted, they 
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obtain customized assistance in working with their citizens to develop an ideal 
redevelopment plan.  This is a three year process and state commitment.  In the years 
2006, 2007, and 2008 10 cities were selected each and in 2009 five cities were selected.  
These cities are/were provided with outside professional services of which PGAV is the 
primary provider.   TIF is one of the tools that the cities may decide to use as a result of 
this technical assistance.  This program uses a “toolbox” approach to redevelopment – 
allowing the municipality to learn which economic tool would work best for them after 
an analysis of their situation, strengths, weaknesses, and needs.  Using TIF is one 
possible outcome that may result from participating in this program.  This program is 
administered through the economic development department, but has other state 
institutions as sponsors as well.  This program is a collaborative effort that includes the 
Missouri Development Finance Board and the Missouri Housing Commission.  As a 
result, towards the end of this study period, 35 Missouri cities were in some stage of 
participation in the Dream Initiative. 
Interestingly, the TIF Act was enacted during a recession period, and the twenty-
seven years under review in this study ends during another recession period.  There are 
five recession periods within this study:  1) January 1980 to July 1980 (six months), 2) 
July 1981 – November 1982 (sixteen months), 3) July 1990 to March 1991 (eight 
months), 4)  March 2001 to November 2001 (eight months), and 5) December 2007 to 
June 2009 (eighteen months).  Many legislators, and consultants have noted the impact of 
the last recession on the lack of new TIF districts, and the lack of actual development in 
TIF districts created in the years closer to the beginning of the last recession 
(Griesheimer, Brancaglione, Marks, Van Slyck, 2011 interviews).  In fact, Van Slyk 
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commented on reading in a newspaper that the city of St. Charles is currently considering 
a TIF, and remarked how unusual that is these days.  He also mentioned that the use of 
CIDs has picked up over the last few years and is something he now sees on a regular 
basis.  (He has responsibility at the state for receiving the TIF Reports and the requests 
for CID creation.) 
Summary and Observations on the Historical Development of the Statute 
The original intent of the TIF statute as written in the 1982 HB1411 bill was to 
“deal with the redevelopment of blighted areas and conservation areas in municipalities,” 
and the bill’s proponents stated that “this type of financing encourages the redevelopment 
of blighted urban areas making those projects more cost competitive with projects on 
previously undeveloped sites” (Perfection Calendar Summary, 1982).  This statement 
confirms that in the minds of its proponents, this statute was intended to be an advantage 
to the targeted group – redevelopment projects in urban areas. 
The statute saw little use until after the first court case that confirmed its validity 
at the Missouri Supreme Court level in 1989.  By the mid-nineties a growing debate was 
occurring regarding the actual way in which TIF was being used which resulted in 
hearings in the House Commerce Committee in 1996 and the establishment of a House 
Interim Committee Studying Tax Increment Financing later that year.  The testimony in 
the letters showed evidence that by this time many municipalities had embraced TIF as a 
“development tool” (instead of just as a redevelopment tool) and did not appear to feel 
that this was improper - conversely, it appeared they considered it one of the generally 
accepted purposes of TIF.  Harrisonville’s letter stated that TIF was important in helping 
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it manage growth and quality of life, and St. Charles’ letter seems to indicate (using 
different words of course) that “sprawl” would not have happened without TIF. 
 Michael White had in many ways foreshadowed this attitude of using TIF for 
development with the statement he made in his 1985 talk in which he referenced how 
Chapter 353 bonds were being used.  Recall he said “instead of economically depressed 
areas using the bonds to attract development to their area, economically well off areas 
were using the bonds to attract industry from their less-well-off neighbors.  You can’t 
blame them for that because as long as the financing tool is available they’re going to use 
it” (White, 1985, p.4).   This seems to be what happened in the case of the TIF statute 
also.  Originally intended to help the urban areas to compete with non-urban areas, 
evidently the way the statute was written did not preclude non-urban areas or non-
distressed areas from its use.   
 It may not be that better-off communities were trying to “attract industry from 
their less-well-off neighbors” as much as these communities were trying to continue to 
provide for their citizens in at least the manner to which they were accustomed, or put 
another way, an attempt for better-off communities to maintain (or even improve) their 
level of revenues.   Joyce Man’s theory that cities use TIF to address municipal stress, 
including municipal stress that occurs as a result of growth appears to have some 
empirical support in Missouri.  Both Harrisonville and St. Charles expressed this use in 
their letters.   The East-West Gateway Council of Governments’ 2009 study also found 
municipalities using TIF to relieve fiscal stress.  The legislators also began to recognize 
that TIF was of interest to smaller towns in more rural communities, and seemed willing 
to encourage this activity.  Thus the aim of providing a “redevelopment” advantage gave 
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way to including plain development, and a solution drafted to allay an urban problem 
found a use among rural cohorts, as well as municipalities experiencing financial distress 
(East-West Gateway Council of Governments, 2009; Missouri House Interim Committee 
Report, 1997). 
 The year 2000 commentary debate in the newspaper between Sterman and 
Brancaglione further establishes this difference, with Sterman still supporting the 
narrower use envisioned by the original proponents, but Brancaglione introducing the 
concept that the original intent had “evolved” for good reasons and now included 
“development” in particular types of cases.  The primary debate prior to then and even 
now seem to be regarding whether or not this evolution is proper and “settled.” 
The more “evolved” use of TIF for “development” outside of urban areas did not 
require an amendment to the original statute, even though some amendments had been 
made, especially the addition of “economic development” as an allowable purpose and 
the addition of other taxes in addition to real property taxes for capture.  It appears that 
the provisions that allowed TIF to be used for development purposes and in rural 
geographical have been there from the beginning. The “culprits” that seems to allow 
others than the original intended beneficiaries to use TIF are:  1) the lack of geographical 
or other indicators within the statutes, such as poverty, vacancy rates, etc. to narrow its 
use to urban areas, and 2) the definition of blight.  It is also interesting to note that a 
leading municipal/development lawyer (Michael T. White) with experience with the 
development and usage of Chapter 353 laws was said to be a co-author of the TIF 
statutes.  He made mention of “cleaning-up” language, etc., of the law before ultimately 
being the lawyer who successfully defended it in front of the Missouri Supreme Court.  
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Along the historical tracing of this statute, evidence of legislation being written by 
interested parties (versus the legislators themselves) has periodically been revealed (i.e. 
Sterman and Brancaglione commentaries). 
 Many attempts have been made to change the definition of blight to preclude 
areas in non-distressed areas from being able to use this category, but this attempt has not 
been successful.  A difficult argument to overcome is that the current definition of blight 
has been court tested for about a half-century  - getting its validation from the U.S. 
Supreme Court in the 1950s (Berman v Parker) and later in the 1970s in the Missouri 
Supreme Court  (White 1985, p.6).  Changing the definition would result in uncertainty 
which would require court challenges to remove, as stated as a concern in one of the 
position points  brought up by Lee’s Summit (1996 letter).  Even still there are court 
cases that attempted to challenge blight findings throughout the history of the statute.  
There have also been legislative attempts to narrow the TIF tool to geographic areas 
meeting certain economic or other indicators of poor economic conditions, but they have 
met with little success. 
 Recall the targeted erosion theory posited by Peters and Fisher: 
Politically it is difficult to maintain a truly focused program without acceding to 
the demands of other areas to be granted similar policy instruments.  As targeting 
erodes, one is more and more likely to end up simply giving a wide range of 
localities the tools to better compete with one another for new investments; in 
other words, one is simply subsidizing mobility.  And the older, more distressed 
areas are likely to be the losers in a contest between Greenfield sites with 
incentives and small, congested brownfield sites with similar incentives (Peter 
and Fischer 2004, 34). 
 
In this regard, the theory that targeted erosion occurs, as Peter and Fischer stated, cannot 
be entirely supported for one reason – the policy instrument used to grant advantaged to 
“older, more distressed areas” did not require “acceding to the demands of other area” for 
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the most part.  The legal structure of the TIF statute already allowed “other areas” to use 
the tool.  This ability, or as many refer to as a loophole, came as a result of the broad 
definition of blight. It is also possible that the statute, although purposely designed to 
meet one need, was also skillfully written not to preclude other municipal possibilities 
(recalling that lawyer Michael T. White was a co-author of the statute).  Others also 
believed that the “economic development purpose” also contributed.  This was an early 
amendment that occurred before the first TIF was constituted.  With this exception (the 
statute did not need much amending in order to be used by other areas), it is evident that 
other areas did use the TIF tool, and by 1997, seemed to feel entitled to its use.  Although 
the erosion of targeting occurred without noticeable pressure of political mobilization and 
advocacy, interested parties did mobilize to keep the advantages to which they already 
had access.  In this way, the rest of Peter and Fisher’s theory is supported by the 
historical developments that occurred with this statute.  The legislature on a whole did 
not object to the “evolved” purpose of TIF, and in some instances created or improved 
other statutes specifically for other communities to use, such as MODESA, MORESA, 
TDDs, and CIDs that helped facilitate this erosion.  This supports the section of Peter and 
Fisher’s statement that “as targeting erodes, one is more and more likely to end up simply 
giving a wide range of localities the tools to better compete with one another for new 
investments” (Peter and Fischer, 2004, 34).  And as can be seen in later legislation and 
court cases that tried to limit greenfield development with TIF, that battle is still being 
waged and decided. 
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To summarize – since the statute as written did not expressly preclude its use by 
others, groups did not need to “mobilize” to erode the targeting effect.  In fact, 
mobilization occurred to “restore” the original intended targeting.   
 Another way in which the battle for how TIF could be used occurred in the legal 
system.  There is ample evidence that courts paid attention to the legislators, and paid 
particular attention to the words that legislators used as they assumed that the wording 
was purposeful.  Likewise, it is evident that legislators responded to TIF court decisions 
and made modifications to the law if they so desired.  Sometimes these modifications 
were in support of the court case outcome, but were intended to make the decision-
making more clear cut in the future thereby perhaps avoiding future court challenges (i.e. 
Ste. Genevieve and St. Charles).  In other cases the legislators made modifications 
indicating their preference for having a different outcome – an example of this would be 
the exemption of particular taxes (i.e. Consolidated School District of Jackson County).  
In no situation did it seem that the courts widened the use of the TIF statute (i.e. judicial 
“activism”).  But of course, the Courts affirmed uses of TIF that was already broader then 
the legislators seemed to originally intend.  The Courts followed a fairly predictable 
course of jurisprudence, giving deference to governments in their determinations of blight 
and establishments of redevelopment plans.  But perhaps governments tested these 
boundaries, and over time, the Courts signaled that there were limits to this deference. 
 The legislature struggled with whether to change the definition of blight or not.  
The judiciary continued their historical precedent by in most cases continuing to defer to 
the “governing authorities” determination of what was “blight” and what was a valid 
redevelopment plan.  The beginning of a “chink in this armor” seemed to appear with the 
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ruling against the city of St. Charles (1997), where the city found out they needed to pay 
more attention to meeting the letter of the law, particularly with how they “amended” a 
comprehensive plan that needed to be compatible with their redevelopment plans.  Later 
the city of Ste. Genevieve found out through a court case settled in 2002 that changes 
even in a redevelopment project required the reconvening of a TIF commission.  This 
“chink in the armor” seemed to be “repaired” with the West County Center decision, 
which deferred to the governing authorities determination.  But it is important to note that 
the court did seem to follow carefully the wording of the statute before determining that it 
was in proper order, even if some aspects were “fairly debatable.”  By 2005 the Missouri 
Supreme Court reversed a decision that originally supported the city of Kansas City – it 
said that “acquisition” of a property meant “acquisition,” and that beginning 
condemnation proceedings within the five-year limitation does not count as acquisition. 
 Then an Appeals Court also decided that Shelbina’s redevelopment area needed to 
include “identifiable” project(s), thus voiding its redevelopment plan.  Another Appeal 
Court reversed the circuit court regarding the St. Peter case, stating that the city could not 
show that the comprehensive plan was amended and thus compatible with the 
redevelopment plan before it was approved by ordinance, and the supposition that the 
project would not have been done “but-for” is unbelievable by fact.  Yet another Appeals 
Court just a year later did not strike down the city of Eureka’s redevelopment plan, even 
though it contained farmland (because it was part of a total redevelopment plan). 
 It seems that there is some movement in the jurisprudence of redevelopment plan 
determination, and that Missouri Courts are looking more closely at procedures 
municipalities are using to implement TIF.  It seems that lower courts are still giving 
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great deference to municipal declarations, but the Missouri Supreme Court has sent a 
signal that has filtered to the Appeals Courts, which seems to be reversing lower court 
decisions at a higher rate in more recent times. 
 In summary, the role of the Courts in influencing whether actors even need to 
lobby legislators in order to effect policy change should not be overlooked.  Especially 
with respect to investors, the desire to lower the risk of an investment is high and whether 
or not the Courts have made a ruling that would affirm the investment they are 
considering is just about mandatory.  If this support is available without any additional 
policy changes – none will be requested of the legislators.  Thus, over the twenty-seven 
years, there was little need for lobbying to broaden use for the statute – this contingent 
only needed to lobby to keep the statute from being narrowed.  The Courts were highly 
influenced by statutory definitions.  It revisiting Hacker’s Four Modes of Policy Change, 
court decisions impacted the flexibility that municipalities had in implementing their TIF 
districts, either narrowing the room they had to work within or allowing more freedom.  
Acknowledging this role of the courts (at least regarding economic development laws) 
could enhance the policy change framework presented by Hacker.   
 Many organizations have shown interests in the TIF Act and some organizations 
have developed as a result.  Some of the organizations already in existence that are 
evident in this study include the Missouri School Boards Association, Missouri PTAs, 
Commerce and/or Merchant Associations, Missouri Municipal League, St. Louis 
Municipal League, the East-West Gateway Council of Governments, 
Reclaimingdemocracy.org and unions (especially of grocery workers).  Examples in this 
study of organizations that have been created as a result of the legislation include the 
Butler, Cassandra, 2012, p. 132 
Missouri Tax Increment Financing Association (which then became MEDFA), the 
Hazelwood Yellow Ribbon Committee, and the Olivette groups of Citizens for Olivette 
First and Committee to Repeal the TIF.   
 Although there is a great deal of variation relating to the impacts of the different 
organizations, they all seem to have some degree of impact, even if it is minor.  At the 
local level, locally organized groups have stopped projects from proceeding in some 
cases (Rock Hill, Olivette), and local groups have had their issues noted by state 
legislators who have in many cases attempted to find remedies at the state level for 
problems that have occurred at the local level (i.e. Sunset Hills). 
In this study it appears that the state legislature interim committees did have 
influence on legislation that followed their studies, and that the interim reports 
recommendations were heavily influenced by public hearing attendees – although this 
study cannot be sure since it is also possible that the study is written in a way to support 
what the committee already intended to recommend.  It is interesting to note that of the 
three interim committee reports, two resulted in major legislation soon after.  The 2000 
Interim House Committee on Tax Increment Financing did not result in major legislation.  
Perhaps the study itself was a precursor of some type.  The report listed five suggestions 
in a fairly meek manner.  Perhaps the committee’s make up made it difficult to make 
strong recommendations, or perhaps because they did not make strong recommendations, 
it was difficult for the legislative body to capture any momentum. 
 The Missouri School Boards Association and various school districts had a great 
deal of influence on TIF legislation once TIFs started to be used.  In fact, it was a school 
district that had some responsibility for the amendment stated by many as being the most 
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important amendment to the TIF statute.  This statute is the one that allowed for capture 
of other taxes besides the real property tax, which happens to be the main revenue stream 
for financing school districts.  They were able to help get this amendment through the 
legislation process it seems within a year.  The School Boards Association also seem not 
to be embarrassed to take a situation to the limit  -  they opposed the correction to the 
1990 amendment which inadvertently allowed for 50% capture of all EATs taxes instead 
of 50% of the incremental amount.  They have noticed how the availability of new taxes 
(that were no longer being captured) negatively impacted the school funding formula, and 
aggressively sought to protect their new found tax base from negatively impacting their 
other revenues from the state.  They asked the legislature to provide them (the school 
boards) with regular training regarding TIF impact on their budgets.  Even the St. Louis 
Public Schools was able to get legislation introduced whereby TIF capture and tax 
abatements would not apply to portions due to the school district – although it did not get 
past the introduction stage. 
Schools kept housing projects with TIF off the agenda.  House Representative 
Curls introduced legislation numerous years in an attempt to get TIF use for affordable 
housing – this legislation never made it past a hearing in the committee he chaired.  To 
the contrary, there are many instances where introduced legislation included specifically 
that TIF not be used for housing.  And it appears that for a while at least there was a 
credible possibility that taxing districts (such as schools) would be able to “opt-out” of a 
TIF plan (1996 Lee’s Summit letter). 
The other area in which the school organizations showed capacity is in their 
ability to get a “seat at the table.”  Along with adding new taxes that would result in their 
Butler, Cassandra, 2012, p. 134 
captured funds being released in a shorter time period, they got the statute to specifically 
reserve two seats for affected school district on TIF commissions (1991).  This same 
legislation in 1991 limited the municipal’s representation to six and one more “ally” was 
added with the ninth member being selected from another participating taxing district. 
School districts were not afraid to sue municipalities, or even counties.  These 
suits have impact from the jurisprudence surrounding approval of redevelopment plans to 
the exclusion of the M&M Replacement Tax.  Even though the Consolidated School 
District was unable to get the M&M tax excluded through the courts, they were able to 
get it exclude through subsequent legislation in 1997.  The actual use of the “economic 
development purpose” was challenged by the Pettis School District in 1992, and since the 
circuit court found this purpose “unconstitutional,” lawyers today are hesitant to 
recommend this pathway for TIF usage.  It is uncertain whether this decision would hold 
up in a higher court decision – yet it remains unchallenged. 
Emergency services seemed to be able to get their concerns met.  This category 
generally includes fire protection services and ambulance services.  These services are 
handled in varied ways across cities and counties in the state– some services are within 
municipalities, and some services are in created districts.  These districts are eligible to 
serve on TIF commissions along in that seat reserved for “any other taxing district.”  
Emergency services coalitions were able to get the statutes to provide for reimbursements 
to them for services rendered in cases where their remissions from the district were not 
adequate to cover their costs.  These changes occurred in the old version of 847 prior to 
2005 and the new subchapter 847 created in 2004.  
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Many municipalities rely on either or both their regional and state Municipal 
League to keep them aware of all legislation regarding municipal affairs, including 
economic development and TIFs.  Smaller cities in particular use the Municipal Leagues 
as their “lobbyist” in Jefferson City.  An example of their lobbying efforts includes their 
recent attempts to change a penalty for failure to report reduced to a much lesser 
consequence.  
The relationship between counties and their municipalities is apparently 
“complicated.”  A number of court cases involved city versus county, and most often 
involve remittance of funds.  Counties sometime challenged whether a redevelopment 
plan was properly instituted (Shelby County and Shelbina), or if they had duties that 
preempted remittances to TIF allocation funds (Herculaneum and Jefferson County; St. 
Louis County, and numerous cities). 
Perhaps counties were concerned they had no say in the number of TIFs that 
individual municipalities in their own counties could create, but each TIF created could 
negatively impact even taxes collected to provide other services.  In 1997 counties were 
able to obtain their own seats on each individual municipality’s TIF commission, 
obtaining either two or three seats of eleven or twelve.  Now this representation is even 
higher in the areas served by the East-West Gateway Council of Governments.  With the 
exemption of Franklin County, counties in this area have a county-level TIF commission 
and these counties have six members appointed by the county executive, fully 50% of the 
commission’s membership. 
Yet some counties provide the capacity that enable municipalities within their 
region to create a TIF district.  This has been seen with St. Louis County, which has 
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provided assistance to the city of Jennings with one or two of their TIF districts, and with 
the cities of Berkeley, Kinloch and Ferguson with the NorthPark Project.  But, it is 
suspected that St. Louis County also prevented the city of Hazelwood from obtaining a 
state-level TIF for their Robertson redevelopment project because they thought it might 
compete with the NorthPark project, and thus impact the level of success they could 
achieve at the NorthPark project (Butler, 2006, 27).    
In some interviews with municipalities of TIF users in the state, it is apparent that 
some counties are situated where one city, generally the county seat, is the “economic 
engine for the entire county.”  In these counties there really is no competition for 
investment among municipalities.  But there are some entire counties within Missouri 
that barely have 5,000 population total, and they may find it difficult for any funds to be 
divert to any one municipality’s project. 
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III. Modifications to the TIF Statute Over Time – Purposes, Improvement, or 
Special Interest Capture? 
The modifications to the statute over time tend to fall in one of three categories:  
1) to clarify ambiguousness or correct omissions or other unintended situations/conflicts; 
2) to improve the process or rectify other problems that were not foreseen in advance; 
and 3) to make TIF less user friendly to some types of municipalities, or more user 
friendly to other types.  The preponderance of amendments were in categories one or two, 
and although these changes sometimes met with opposition, it was not usually effective 
or sincere opposition.  Modifications did fit category three also, and changes in this 
category frequently met with participation from interested parties, and generally included 
parties both for and against the proposed change. 
 The modifications in category three generally were not to “add” new users (thus 
eroding the targeted advantage), but some modifications were to make the statute more 
user friendly for some groups who were not the original intended users of the tool.  
Examples of these would be assisting smaller cities in more rural areas with TIF usage, 
although it was originally said to be for distress in urban areas.  Also, urban areas such as 
Kansas City and Chesterfield used TIF on farmland, floodplains, and other undeveloped 
land, and in some cases the statute modifications attempted to restrict this usage, but in 
other ways, it did not. Restriction on TIF use in floodplains was applied to areas of St. 
Charles County only, and restriction on TIF use in greenfields was applied to areas in the 
St. Louis metropolitan areas (East-West Gateway Council of Government area) only.  
 It appears that the strong lobbying efforts of the “evolved” purpose of using TIF 
for development and redevelopment have come to an “equilibrium” where the 
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“originalists” are not able to take away any benefits that the pro-development parties 
have been able to assume.  An exception is in particular geographical areas that have 
been able to restrict usage on floodplains or greenfields.  Even with the success of the 
pro-development parties has retained, they need to stay vigilant not to lose ground. 
Improvement or Special Capture? 
 Whether the overall changes to the TIF statute are positive or negative is subject 
to debate.  The addition of EATS to the statute is universally seen as the most important 
and impactful amendment to the statute.  It is surprising that the addition of EATs seems 
not to have been driven by developers, and could have come into being as a result of 
school districts in their attempt to preserve their revenue streams.   To many, this change 
alone has changed the nature of TIF projects in Missouri to an unhealthy emphasis in 
retail (East-West Gateway Council of Governments 2009; Thomas 2007, Luce 2003).  
This change influences the nature of the types of businesses that individual municipalities 
prefer, and also impacts the ranking of retail projects versus other economic development 
projects (industrial, etc.) in the shorter time needed to repay borrowed money (i.e. TIF 
bonds). 
For developers and municipalities of all types, it seems that they would say that 
the statute has either stayed the same or slightly improved over time, and the tool is a 
necessary and useful to them – municipalities in their efforts to fund their governments, 
and developers as they partner with municipalities to do private projects that they assert 
would not otherwise be financially feasible. 
  Some people question use of government subsidies to private investors, stating 
that if a project is not otherwise financially feasible then perhaps it should not be done.  
Butler, Cassandra, 2012, p. 139 
They argue that some projects would not be financially feasible because this service is 
being provided in another nearby location, and thus the project has no net value to the 
public.   This is frequently referred to as “subsidizing mobility” which is generally not 
considered a “public purpose” worthy of subsidy. 
 The 1997 requirement that a developer include an affidavit stating that without the 
inclusion of TIF the project would not be financially feasible was made to strengthen the 
“but-for” test.  It was felt that up to that time, many municipalities just stated that “but-
for” existed perfunctorily, without any proof or analysis.  This statement was intended to 
put the developer somewhat “under oath” that this was indeed the case.  But many 
consultants and city officials have noted a “power-shift” from municipalities to 
developers, because this affidavit must come from the developer (Brancaglione 2011, 
interview; Grimm 2011; interview).  
 The legislators were willing and able, at least some of the time, to “target” 
amendments to meet different geographical needs. Of course different taxes in different 
municipalities were exempted on an individual basis.  An extra county representative was 
added at first to just St. Louis County, and later a special TIF commission composition 
was design specifically for the areas served by the East-West Gateway Council of 
Governments.  A hotel in Excelsior Springs and a levee in Platte County was legislatively 
designated as TIF eligible.  This “tailoring” seem to be a result of in some case, like the 
county-wide TIF designation, solving a problem that is particular to a specific 
geographical area.  In other cases, such as the exemption of special taxes, this tailoring is 
likely the result of special interest lobbying.   
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The factions have remained fairly constant over time – the faction to better limit 
the use of TIF and the faction to leave the TIF statute as is.  The modifications over time 
show that the faction to limit TIF is getting on the agenda but achieving only minor 
and/or geographically-bound modifications through the legislature.  But when one looks 
at the projects that are still “getting done” with TIF support, one has to acknowledge the 
effectiveness also of the other faction in not letting through legislation that would 
materially impact their ability to use TIF. 
That type of legislation that seems unable to pass the legislature seems to be regarding 1) 
the definition of blight and or the “but-for” test and, 2) geographical restrictions limiting 
TIF use to areas presenting with particular distressed area indicators, and 3) affordable 
housing.  
Still, at first glance it may seem that the “privileged” position of the business class 
underperformed by having a mere goal of maintaining status quo, but that is an effective 
strategy if they feel that the TIF statute already allows them to do many of the things they 
would like without even trying to amend the statute to expressly grant them access.  But 
the real effectiveness in the pro-development group may be what they have been able to 
achieve outside the scope of the actual TIF statute.  Many statutes have been created and 
made more developer friendly over this time period, especially in the 2001- 2005 time 
period when actual amendments to TIF were difficult to achieve.   The rural areas have 
TIF-like tools made specifically for them such as MORESA and MODESA lite.  The 
TDD districts don’t even have to have residents in them for approving districts, and CIDs 
are available and being used by more and more municipalities.    The barometer for this 
paradigm shift may have been when the Missouri Tax Increment Financing Association 
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changed their name to the Missouri Economic Development Financing Association in 
2000. 
 
Hypothesis 1 
The narrative in this chapter is sufficient to address the first hypothesis: 
I. H1:  Changes to the TIF statute broadened the availability of its use by local 
governments, especially to local governments that did not fit the original 
“targeted” definition. 
 
 
There were a few amendments that did sanctioned the availability of TIF to other users, 
such as the 1986 amendment to add economic development as a purpose, and the 1997 
amendments to support rural areas in their attempt to use TIF.  The 1997 amendment 
occurred after the fact – and thus did not make TIF newly accessible to rural areas.   The 
economic development purpose was an attempt to broaden the usage of TIF, although this 
avenue did not seem to get the traction anticipated due to a Court decision finding this 
use unconstitutional.   
Tie in to the Next Chapter 
 The TIF Act was enabled with the intention of being useful to certain 
municipalities in certain areas – i.e. urban cores that were either experiencing or on the 
verge of experiencing blight, and needed redevelopment.  Acknowledging that 
redevelopment can be a more expensive proposition as compared to new development, 
the TIF Act was designed to give urban areas in need of redevelopment a tool to help 
them compete.  This chapter discussed the development of the TIF statute over its first 
twenty-seven years, and identified some of the forces involved and events that occurred 
to help shape the statute to the provisions it has today.  The next chapter will analyze the 
Butler, Cassandra, 2012, p. 142 
who of TIF usage – it will describe basic municipal characteristics and patterns of usage 
in effort to see who is using TIF, and at what point certain types of municipalities began 
to adopt TIF plans and districts.  The second section of the next chapter will also contain 
survey and interview results with anecdotal information from municipal users of TIFs and 
TIF professionals. 
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Chapter Four– TIF Usage and Pattern of Usage; and Surveys and Interviews 
  
Chapter Four is divided into two separate sections.  The first section is primarily 
quantitative in nature and addresses specifically who is using TIF and discernible patterns 
of usage and adoption.  The second section reports findings and results of primary 
research surveys and interviews of personnel in a sampling of TIF-using municipalities, 
and of professionals that assist municipalities and/or developers in their use of the TIF 
tool.   
 
I.  TIF Usage and TIF Pattern of Usage 
 
This chapter is designed to answer the second research question, which is: 
2.  What is the pattern of adoption and usage of TIF over its first 27 years (1982-
2009) of life and how does this pattern correlate with legislative changes or legal 
decisions, including: 
a. Who is using TIF (municipal characteristics), and 
b. When each began to use TIF (adoption of new program). 
This research does show distinct patterns of adoption and usage of TIF over time among 
different type of municipalities.  This analysis can be used to contextualize the historical 
development of the TIF.  Quantitatively, these questions will be operationalized by 
hypothesizing the following: 
HII – TIF using municipalities are more likely to have a higher poverty rate; and 
HIII – Waves of adoption of TIFs by particular types of municipalities followed 
court decisions and statute amendments that lowered risks for that particular type 
of user/usage/investment.  In other words, An adoption wave pattern by type of 
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municipality (size of population, growth of population, percent poverty) can be 
observed in an ordered logit regression. 
It is expected that regarding Hypothesis II, a binomial regression model (to be 
specified later in this chapter) will show a positive and significant coefficient with the 
independent percent below poverty variable and the dependent binomial variable of 
whether a municipality has used a TIF or not.  With respect to Hypothesis III, it is 
expected that an ordered logit regression model using a municipality adoption waves 
variable as the dependent variable and using the following independent variables might 
have significance:  municipalities with smaller population sizes will more likely be in 
later adoption waves, more rural municipalities will more likely be in later adoption 
waves, municipalities experiencing growth will more likely be in earlier adoption waves 
(this model will be specified later in this chapter).   
In answering the question of “who is using TIF,” the above information gleaned 
from testing the hypothesis listed above will also be added to simple summary statistics 
available from the database used.  Summary statistics will be used to look at: population 
size, county location, urban-rural location, etc.  Also, the database has included “status” 
information, relating to the stage of completion of the project.  This information will be 
reviewed in regards to its impact on counts.   
Another item collected in the data collected by the state of Missouri is the official 
qualifying “purpose” used to establish the TIF districts reported.  Given the relative 
importance that the qualifying purpose (blight, conservation, or economic development) 
was shown to have in the historical development of the statute, a short summary 
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statistical discussion is included on whether and to what degree these purposes have been 
used. 
Data 
The primary database will be the 2009 Missouri TIF Annual Report (Missouri 
State Department of Economic Development, 2010).   Analysis using this database will 
use each reported TIF as the unit of analysis, and will be referred to as the basic database.   
This database reports usage of 477 TIFs.  This includes 13 TIFs reported by six county-
level governments, which for the most part, will not be counted, leaving 464 TIFs in the 
basic database to be analyzed. 
  The basic database will be supplemented by other information, and will be 
referred to as the enhanced database.  The unit of analysis for the enhanced database will 
be municipalities that have adopted a TIF.  Although many of the TIFs that have ever 
been adopted are in the base database, some TIFs are no longer reported in the basic 
database for a variety of reasons.  Some of these reasons include that the TIF district may 
have been dissolved because it has met its goal, met with political challenges, the 
developer was unable to get financing, or the municipality was unable to attract a 
developer.   The sources of supplementation of the enhanced database are:  1)  The 2006 
Missouri TIF Annual Report, 2)  Kenneth Thomas’ database of Missouri TIFs from 1987-
2004, 3) Thomas Curran’s database of TIFs in St. Louis County from 1991 through 2006, 
and 4) East West Gateway database of TIF districts in their service area
21
.   Also a few 
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 The enhanced database adds 14new municipalities that have adopted TIF during the study period --two 
municipalities added from the 2006 Annual TIF Report (Branson, Shelbina), four added from Thomas’ 
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TIF districts were made evident within the exploration of the development of the statute 
(see previous chapter).   The supplementation of the database occurs in two ways – new 
municipalities may be included which were not in the basic database, and/or new TIFs 
may be added that were no longer reported by municipalities that reported other TIFs.  In 
some instances these new additions indicate that a municipality had experience adopting 
a TIF earlier than it would seem by using the basic database.  Because this study desires 
to capture the moment of first use of the TIF tool, the 2009 Annual Report database will 
be supplemented with the data mentioned.  This action results in the addition of 32 TIFs, 
bringing the total of TIFs in the enhanced database to 496. 
This analysis will use the 2000 United States Census (versus either the 1990 or 
2010) because it is the more representative of the time period surrounding TIF use and 
adopting activities than the most recent census.  The number of TIF municipalities (after 
excluding six counties) in the 2009 Missouri Annual Report are 108. Three municipalities 
under 1000 population (Clarksville, New Florence, and Unity Village) have adopted 
TIFs.
22
 Having just three municipalities in this category (under 1000 population) is 
dwarfed by the total number of municipalities within this category (about 600) so these 
three municipalities will be dropped from most analysis. For comparison purposes 
between TIF-adopting municipalities and non-TIF-adopting municipalities, the remaining 
municipalities (1000 population and over) will be added to the enhance database.  The 
105 (108 less 3 under 1000 population) on the basic database, 14 added TIF-adopting 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
database (Carthage, Hillsboro, Mexico,  Moberly), seven added from Curran’s database (Berkeley, 
Chesterfield, Cool Valley, Green Park, Olivette, Pine Lawn, and Sunset Hills), and one from East-West 
Gateway’s database (Washington). 
22
 Wayland adopted a TIF in 2005 and appears on the 2006 Annual TIF Report, but since it has population 
of under 1000 it was not added.  Thus there are a total of 4 municipalities under 1000 population that have 
adopted TIFs. 
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municipalities, and 223 non-TIF adopting municipalities with population of 1000 or 
more) creates an enhanced database of 342 observations.  Approximately 36% of the 
municipalities (cities, towns, villages) in Missouri are of the size of 1000 population or 
more (342/950) (Missouri Blue Book 2001). 
The following municipality characteristics have been added to the enhanced 
database:  county name, 2000 population, percentage population change from 2000 to 
2009, percentage of persons below poverty 1999 (U.S. Census), county classification, and 
2000 county assess valuation (2001 Missouri Blue Book).   
The Who of TIF Adoption / Usage 
Population Size  
Of these 342 municipalities, 119 have adopted at least one TIF during the study 
period (35%).  Breaking out the municipality TIF adopting cities by municipal size shows 
a significant difference in adoption among the study size of municipalities over 1000 
population.  There is a wide range of TIF usage or nonuse based on municipal size. 
All 10 municipalities of 50,000 or more population have adopted at least one TIF, 
and nearly all 33 municipalities in Missouri over the population size of 17,000 have 
created at least one TIF plan with the two exceptions being Wildwood and Cape 
Girardeau (94%).    The percentage TIF adoption among cities between 20,000 and 
49,999 population is 90%. 
Of the 35 municipalities between 10,000 and 20,000 population 24 have adopted 
at least one TIF plan (69%); of the 134 municipalities between 2500 and 9999 
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population, 52 (31%) have adopted at least one TIF.  For the 143 municipalities with at 
least 1000 population but less than 2500 only 13 have adopted TIF plans—which is still a 
significant 9%.  
County Location, Metropolitan and Rural Areas 
The state of Missouri has 115 counties including the city of St. Louis.  Sixty-two 
counties (54%) have no TIF areas within their boundaries – municipality of any size or at 
the county level.  Three of the four dropped cities (cities under 1000 population) are the 
only municipalities in their county with a TIF (New Florence in Montgomery County; 
Clarksville in Pike County; and Wayland in Clark County)
23
.  Of the 62 counties without 
one TIF, five counties do not even have one municipality containing population over 
1000 (Carter, Hickory, Ozark, Schuyler, and Worth).   
Fifty-three of the counties have at least one municipality (any size) that has 
adopted a TIF (46%), and 50 of these counties have at least one municipality containing 
1000 population that has adopted a TIF (43%).  The two major metropolitan areas in the 
state account for a large number of municipal TIF adopters and users.  The city of St. 
Louis itself a significant user of TIF and the adjacent county of St. Louis County is also 
home to 37 municipal TIF adopters.  St. Charles County has four municipal TIF adopters, 
and Jefferson County has three.  The subtotal for the St. Louis metropolitan area is 45 
TIF adopting municipalities, amounting to 38% of the 119 municipalities statewide being 
located in four counties in the metropolitan St. Louis area. 
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 The fourth city under 1000 population is Wayland.  Technically it is not “dropped” city, but a TIF-using 
city on the 2006 TIF Report that was not added to the enhanced database because its population was under 
1000. 
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Kansas City is also a heavy TIF user, and within Jackson County (where it is 
located), there are another eight cities with TIF areas.  Clay County, adjacent to Jackson 
and within the Kansas City metropolitan area, contains another six TIF-adopting 
municipalities.  Cass County and Platte County are also mostly within the Kansas City 
SMA, and each have three municipalities that have adopted a TIF area.   The subtotal for 
the Kansas City metropolitan area (including Harrisonville and Platte City) is 21 TIF 
adopting municipalities, amounting to 18% of the 119 TIF adopting municipalities being 
located in four counties in the Kansas City area.  Adding the totals for the St. Louis and 
Kansas City areas together, 55% of the TIF adopting municipalities are in eight counties 
located in either the St. Louis or Kansas City area. 
Fifty-eight TIF adopting municipalities are outside of the two major urban areas 
of Missouri
24
 and are contained within 45 counties.    The census has designated five 
other areas as being “urbanized areas.”25   They are the Springfield (Greene County), 
Columbia (Boone County), Joplin (Jasper and Newton Counties), St. Joseph (Buchanan 
County), and Jefferson City (Callaway and Cole Counties).  While all of these 
municipalities report using TIF, Springfield is the only one of these urbanized areas that 
has other municipalities within the urbanized area also reported using TIF [Battlefield, 
Ozark
26
].   One other city in Greene County has adopted a TIF.
27
  Joplin has no other TIF 
adopting municipalities within its urbanized areas, but it does have four TIF adopting 
                                                             
24
 For county analysis purposes, the three TIFs adopted by the municipalities under 1000 population will be 
included --  Clarksville (Pike), New Florence (Montgomery), & Wayland (Clark). 
25
 U.S. Census definition of “urbanized area” – an ‘urban area’ with 50,000 or more people.  An ‘urban 
area’ is defined as  “core census block groups or blocks that have a population density of at least 1,000 
people per square mile and surrounding census blocks that have an overall density of at least 500 people 
per square mile.” 
26
 Ozark, while in Springfield’s urbanized area, is located in a different county (Christian County). 
27
 Strafford, population 1845. 
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municipalities in the two counties in which it resides – Carthage and Sarcoxie (Jasper 
County); and Neosho and Granby (Newton Counties).  Jefferson City also is contained in 
two counties (Calloway and Cole) but only Callaway has another TIF-adopting 
municipality – Fulton. 
Thirty-seven counties with at least one municipality that has adopted TIF contain 
no urbanized areas.  These include the three municipalities TIF adopters with population 
under 1000.  Thirty-three of these counties have only one municipality that has adopted a 
TIF (29% - 33/115).  The only four counties outside of the seven “urbanized areas” that 
have more than one municipality that has adopted a TIF are St. Francois (#4), Miller (#2), 
Pulaski (#2), and  Scott (#2)
28
.  Twenty of these 37 counties outside of urbanized areas 
have one TIF adopted by their county seat government.    It is worth noting that 18 of the 
33 counties (55%) in non-“urbanized areas” that only have one TIF within their 
boundaries had that TIF adopted by the municipality that also governs the county affairs. 
When viewed spatially on a map of Missouri which includes roadway arteries, it 
is striking to see how close nearly all the TIF-adopting municipalities are to roadways 
that are considered major thoroughfare.  It appears that just a few municipalities are not 
within three miles of a major thoroughfare – Appleton City, Hermann, and one of the 
municipalities under 1000 population (Clarksville). 
TIF Characteristics, Properties (Basic Database) 
The (TIF) Numbers 
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 St. Francois – Bonne Terre, Desloge, Farmington, Park Hills; Miller – Lake Ozark, Osage Beach; Pulaski 
– Waynesville, St. Roberts; Scott – Miner, Sikeston.  Another interesting observation – Miller County itself 
has adopted two TIFs.   
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The numbers of TIFs vary among municipalities with a high of 115
29
 in St. Louis 
to a low of one, a number that belongs to thirty municipalities.  St. Louis and Kansas City 
are the outliers, with a count of 115 and 108 respectively.  Four other municipalities, all 
located in the Kansas City area, are in the next five highest, with a very distant 17 in 
Independence, 14 in Grandview, nine in Lee’s Summit, and eight in Blue Springs.  St. 
Joseph, just north of the Kansas City area, has nine TIF areas (the 5
th
 one).  Jennings, 
from the St. Louis area, is the only other municipality with more than five TIFs (Jennings 
has seven)
30
.  Municipalities reporting five TIFs are Belton, Brentwood, Maplewood, 
Raytown, and St. Charles; and municipalities reporting four TIFs are Excelsior Springs, 
Liberty, Riverside, and Wentzville.  Independence is the fourth largest municipality in the 
state with a 2000 U.S. census of 113,288, so it is not unexpected that it would be the third 
highest user.  But it was surprising to see Springfield, the third largest city with 151,580 
population and Columbia, the fifth largest city with population 84,531, with only two 
TIFs each.  The sixth and seventh largest municipalities, St. Joseph (population 73,990) 
and Lee’s Summit (population 70,700) each reported using nine TIFs (as mentioned 
previously). 
 It is important to note here that while Kansas City and St. Louis have 
significantly more TIFs, together accounting for almost 45% of the TIF districts, there is 
some variability in how each TIF district is reported and managed among the 
municipalities.  This variability shows up in whether a municipality chooses to account 
for each project in a TIF district as its own individual TIF plan, or as part of the same TIF 
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 Although 118 TIFs were reported, 3 were new and without ordinances yet – a pre-TIF state.  Those 3 
were dropped. 
30
 St. Louis County government has six TIFs reported. 
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plan.  For instance, Kansas City has a tendency to have multiple TIFs with similar names 
but different project letters or numbers.  It has 11 TIFs beginning with “22nd & Main” 
(but ending in project numbers 1, 2, 10, 12 & 13, 14, 16, 21, 22, 24, 27, 28), and eight 
TIFs beginning with “1200 Main” (but ending in project numbers  1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 13 & 
14).  Conversely, there are some municipalities that use a single TIF districts for multiple 
projects that present themselves overtime.  University City has done this, as well as 
municipalities like Cabool and Strafford.  The one district-many projects design is typical 
of TIF districts used to revitalize smaller downtown areas.
31
  Thus, it is even tricky to 
compare TIFs usage among municipalities by count alone. 
The mere fact that economic development projects have various states of 
“completion” or project statuses (which can vary in lengths of time and impacts, etc.), 
also lends itself to the difficulty of comparing the “numbers” regarding TIF projects.  The 
2009 Missouri Annual Report questionnaire provides the following categories to describe 
“project status:” inactive, seeking developer, starting up, fully operational, and 
dissolved.”  Of the 464 TIFs reported, 10 reports did not provide this information (2%), 
five (1%) reported their TIFs as being “dissolved,” and 35 (8%) were categorized as 
“inactive.”   More than half reported their TIFs plans as “fully operational” (256/464, or 
55%), 80 (17%) were categorized as “under construction,” 14 (3%) were categorized as 
“seeking developer,” 64 (14%) and were categorized as “starting up.”  
  It is not clear and it is suspected that there could be some misclassifications 
among fully operational, inactive, and dissolved.  Additionally, the criteria for deciding 
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 This is the type of “pro-active” TIF districting that is now in question after the Shelbina v. Shelby County  
court case. 
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how to categorize each project seem to rest with whoever completes the TIF 
questionnaire.  Perhaps a fully operational classification is a TIF project that is fully paid-
off, and should be called completed and dissolved.  Perhaps dissolved should only be TIF 
districts that never collected funds and were subsequently withdrawn and dissolved.  
Inactive actually could be that the TIF is not currently collecting funds but had in the 
past.  At this point it is interesting to note the various stages of classifications of the TIFs 
reported, although its analysis can only be used in generalities. 
In fact, this is probably the next stage of improvement possible with the TIF 
reports to the state of Missouri.   The state requires that the reports be filed.  But the 
accuracy of the information seems to vary.  This observation is based on the 
inconsistencies that are easily evident in perusing the reports, and in some cases, reports 
are considered incomplete.  It also seems to be unclear and thus some variation exists 
regarding at what point a municipality stops reporting a TIF (i.e. dissolved, or inactive?).   
Summary of Blight, Conservation, Economic Development Purpose 
Declaration/Selection 
The classification of a TIF district as serving the purpose of blight (removal), 
conservation, or economic development is an important decision, as well as in some 
respects political, as seen in the previous chapter.  In the previous chapter, some viewed 
the addition of “economic development” as an allowable purpose, as an avenue that 
allowed the TIF tool to be used by projects outside the original intention. Additionally, 
the Circuit Court in Pettis County found the economic development purpose 
unconstitutional in 1992.  Another, but much less important court case, stated that 
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although the TIF Commission could state the purpose of a TIF district could be more than 
one of the three qualifying purposes, the governing body of should only use one purpose 
when creating the actual district (Smith v Independence, 1995/1996).  To add context to 
that discussion, it would be interesting to note the percentage use of each classification in 
the basic database, over time.  One would expect that the economic development purpose 
would not be used soon after a court found it unconstitutional.  Additionally, one would 
expect that each municipality would only declare a single purpose not long after the 
Independence (1996) decision. 
The questionnaire for the Missouri Annual Report allows the selection of the three 
options, but in many cases more than one box is checked leading the possibility of seven 
combinations, plus being left blank.  Using the basic database, the numbers of single 
selections are as follows:  blight only, 296 (of 464, 64%); conservation only, 81 (17%), 
and economic development only, 20 (4%).  Blight was combined with conservation four 
times, with economic development 30 times, or with both 12 times, resulting in blight 
being at least one of the purposes stated of the 342 times (74%).  Economic development, 
in addition to being paired with blight 30 times and with both 12 times as just mentioned, 
was paired with conservation only 3 times, for a total mention of 65 times (14%).  
Conservation was mentioned a total of 100 times (22%).  This question was left 
unanswered 16 times (3%).  It is interesting to note that blight was the most common 
purpose used by far, followed by conservation, and that both of these purposes were most 
frequently used alone.  Economic Development was least used alone (20 times), and was 
most often used in combination with blight (30 times) – even more frequent than when 
used alone. 
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Taking a closer look at the 20 times when economic development was used alone, 
it is clear that the Kansas City area was an early user of this purpose, using it a total of 14 
of the 20 times (70%).  From 1988 to 1996 Kansas City used economic development 
alone five times (1988, 1991, 1993, 1994, 1996), Grandview used it twice (both in 1989), 
and Lee’s Summit used it once (1988).  Kansas City used in three more times in 1999 and 
2000, Lee Summit used it again it 2000, and Independence tried it once in 1999.  After 
2000, economic development was used alone only one more time by Lee’s Summit 
(2006).  Thus, economic development alone was used predominantly in the Kansas City 
area before 2001.    Other municipalities that used economic development alone before 
2001 were Boonville (1991), Fulton (1996), and Fenton (1998).  It was used only four 
times alone after 2000 by Bethany (2001), Moscow Mills (2003), Battlefield (2008), and 
as already mentioned, Lee’s Summit (2006). 
Kansas City has no TIFs using economic development in tandem with another 
purpose.  Five municipalities in the Kansas City area have used economic development 
with other purposes fourteen times, and surprisingly, Independence has done this the 
most with eight TIFs plans adopted between 1994 through 2004.  Liberty has three (2002, 
2006, 2008) and the other three municipalities are Grandview (2001), Parkville (2002) 
and Sugar Creek (2003) (each with one). 
O’Fallon was the first to combine economic development with another purpose in 
the St. Louis area (1992), and eight other municipalities in the St. Louis area have done 
the same.  Six years had passed before Fenton used a combination purpose that included 
economic development in 1998, and Ballwin followed in 1999.  Four years pass before it 
is used again(in combination)  in the St. Louis area by Maryland Heights in 2003, and a 
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few more years pass again before Eureka uses it in 2005.  Normandy and Wentzville both 
use a combination economic development purpose in 2006 and Clayton and Valley Park 
has done so in 2007.   
There are 22 times when the economic development in combination with at least 
one other purpose was used by 16 municipalities outside of the Kansas City and St. Louis 
areas that used economic development in combination with one or more other purpose.  
Of these 22 times, 10 municipalities used it 11 times before 2001 and nine municipalities 
used it 11 times after 2000 (Hannibal, Sikeston, and West Plains used it in both time 
periods)
32
.    
Combining the usage from the entire state, the following observation can be 
made:  Kansas City and the Kansas City area were leading users of the economic 
development purpose by itself.  The Kansas City area used it primarily in the late 1980’s 
and throughout the 1990s, and its use as a single purpose nearly ended by 2001.  
Independence, a municipality with the third highest number of TIFs, only used economic 
development alone only once (1999).  But Independence did use economic development 
in combination with blight eight times
33
, beginning in 1994 and continuing through 2004.  
The concept of declaring economic development alone as a purpose did not catch-
on in the St. Louis area – Fenton did it once in 1998.  Even using it in combination only 
happened two other times in the 1990s (O’Fallon -1992, and Ballwin – 1999).  The other 
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  Before 2001: Hannibal (1988), Clarksville (1989), Bethany (1994), West Plains (1994), New Florence 
(1996), Desloge (1997), Granby (1998), Neosho (1999), Sikeston (2-2000), and Osage Beach (2000). After 
2000: Hannibal (2001, 2
nd
 time), Strafford (2002), Sarcoxie (2003), Chillicothe (2004), Maryville (2004, 
2005), Sikeston (2004, 2
nd
 time), West Plains (2005, 2
nd
 time), Lake Ozark (2006, 2007), and St. Joseph 
(2008). 
33
 One of the eight times also included conservation. 
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six times it was used in the area it was used after 2003 and in combination with blight 
and/or conservation.  It is a little puzzling that any report has two or more purposes stated 
because of the Smith v Independence TIF Commission case in 1996, which ruled that for 
ordinances creating a TIF District should only have one purpose stated (although the TIF 
commission of each municipality can recommend more than one category of purpose). 
Pattern of Usage 
The pattern of usage analysis will use the municipality as the unit of analysis, 
using the enhanced database.   Once the first TIF districts were established in late 1986 
and 1987
34
, TIF districts have been established every year of the study period.  The 
numbers do not reflect the 13 districts created by six counties over the time period.  
Although the numbers reflect what is reported along with additional information from 
sources already identified, the numbers presented here should be viewed relatively to 
each other instead of an absolute sense due to possible omission of unreported TIFs.  The 
error is expected not to be significant, and some trends and patterns are still expected to 
be valid.  The enhanced database contains 119 municipalities with 496 TIF districts. 
The lowest number of TIF districts enacted in any year is in the first year with 
two, and the highest number reported in any year is forty-seven (2005).   The highest five 
years are consecutive in a bell-curve pattern from 2003- 2007, with numbers of 37, 45, 
47, 44, and 33 (respectively).    The “spike” years are progressive, with a spike in 1994 of 
25 (falling back to 12 in 1995), 31 and 32 in 1999 and 2000 (falling back to 11 in 2001), 
and the just mentioned highs of 45 and 47 in 2004 and 2005 (falling back to 44 and then 
                                                             
34
 Technically the 10
th
 & Troost was created in November 1986 but is being counted as 1987 for this 
analysis. 
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33 the following two years).  The study period ends in 2009 where the number stood at 
15, a low not seen since 1994 (12) with the exception of 2001, where the number was 
11
35
.  These low number years fall within economic recessionary periods.  These 
numbers are highly influenced by the patterns of usage of Kansas City and St. Louis since 
these two municipalities account for almost half of the TIFs reported.  Both these 
municipalities have different patterns of usage. 
The first TIFs were not created until 1987 by Kansas City first, and then 
Kirksville.  Two other large suburban cities in the Kansas City area were very early users 
(within the 1980s) – they were Grandview and Lee’s Summit.  In the St. Louis area, the 
very early users were the smaller, mostly inner ring suburbs such as University City, 
Ferguson, St. John, Webster Groves, and Valley Park.  The big “municipality” in the St. 
Louis area was the county of St. Louis, who was also an very early user of TIF with two 
projects in 1987 – removal of blight with the distressed area known as Robertson 
(removed all residential and school buildings) and replaced a closed drive-in with a 
shopping center (known as Dierberg’s Clocktower Shopping Center).  Both of these areas 
were unincorporated at that time
36
. 
Kansas City was the first city with a TIF and it continued to use TIF throughout 
the study period.  There are only three years that it did not create a TIF – 1989, 2001, and 
2009.  Kansas City averaged five TIFs/year, with two peak periods – 1994 (12) and 1999 
and 2000 (14 and 17 respectively).  These were the only years where Kansas City created 
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 The low numbered years of  2001 and 2009 fall within economic recessionary periods. 
36
 St. Louis County has a relatively large percentage of unincorporated areas, although both of these areas 
have been annexed by the municipalities of Hazelwood and Florissant.  Hazelwood took over the County’s 
Robertson TIF. 
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a number 10 or greater.  After creating 31 TIFs in two years, it created none in 2001.  It 
experienced a smaller peak in 2003 and 2004 (seven and eight respectively).   
The other major urban area, St. Louis, had a very different pattern of TIF usage.  
They had only created four TIF districts total before 1999 (one each in 1990, 1991, 1997, 
1998), when they created four more.  By the end of 2000 they had a total of 9 TIF 
districts – the remaining 106 were created after 2000.  The peak year was 2004 with 22, 
followed by strong usage in 2005 and 2006 with 14 and 16 districts created respectively.  
Whereas Kansas City usage diminished significantly after 2006 with a total of 4 TIFs 
from 2007 to 2009, St. Louis has created 33 districts in this same time period.  
Municipal Characteristic Patterns of TIF-Using Municipalities versus Non TIF-
Using Municipalities 
A logit regression analysis compared municipal characteristics of TIF using 
municipalities to non-TIF- using municipalities.   The dependent variable was a dummy 
variable of whether the municipality was a TIF-user or not.  The municipality 
characteristics used as independent variables were:  population size (2000 U.S. Census), 
percent persons below poverty (1999 U.S. Census), percent population growth (2000-
2009), and where the municipality is located – urbanized area, urban cluster, or rural. 
 Other characteristics were also experimented with, and include whether the 
municipality is a county seat, classification of municipality, classification of county, 
county population and assessed valuation of the county. The addition or replacement of 
these other characteristics to or for the independent variables actually used in the 
regression did not improve the model.  It is clear that there is overlap among many of the 
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variables – for instance, municipality classification is a function of population size, 
county classification is a function of county assessed valuation, etc.  The county assessed 
valuation variable did appear to improve the model, but a closer look at the distribution of 
the variable it was revealed this improvement was due in large part to the large number of 
TIFs in St. Louis County coupled with St. Louis County’s very large assessed valuation.  
Repeating the model with the exclusion of St. Louis County wiped out the improvement 
to the model, and thus the variable was dropped. 
The predicted behavior of the dependent variable to the independent variables is 
as follows: 
1. population size:  the larger a municipality, the more likely they are to have a TIF.  
This has been shown to be the case in Mason and Thomas’ (2010) research.  This 
is likely due to many factors, including:  TIFs were intended to be used in urban 
areas with decline; larger cities are more likely to have professional staffing able 
to implement a TIF; and larger cities have more land that may be in need of 
redevelopment/development, etc.   
 
2. percent persons in poverty37:  the higher the percent persons in poverty, the more 
likely the municipality is to use a TIF (positive coefficient).  This follows the 
intention of TIF – to be used in urban areas experiencing decline.  Although the 
predicated behavior test is along the lines of the original intent of TIF legislation, 
it is the contention of many who argue for TIF reform that it is the wealthier 
communities that have the capacity to implement TIFs. 
 
3. population growth:  municipalities that are experiencing population growth will 
be more likely to use TIF (positive coefficient).  Not exactly the intended user of 
TIF, but Anderson (1990) and Man (2001) have speculated that TIFs have been 
used to fund infrastructure in municipalities experiencing growth. 
 
4. rural-urban continuum38:  TIF use is higher in urbanized areas, followed by urban 
clusters, followed by rural areas, at any population size.  It is has been shown in 
                                                             
37
 Data Set used is Census 2000 Summary File 3 (SF 3)  -- Sample; Geographic Area:  Missouri - Place 
38
 U.S. Census definitions used:  “Urban Area”  -- “core census block groups or blocks that have a 
population density of at least 1,000 people per square mile and surrounding census blocks that have an 
overall density of at least 500 people per square mile.”  “There are two categories of urban areas.  An 
urbanized area (UA) denotes an urban area of 50,000 or more people.  An urban cluster (UC) is an urban 
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Mason and Thomas’ research that adjacency is a significant variable in TIF 
adoption, and adjacency is more readily available in urban areas.  It is suspected 
that competition for revenue sources (such as sales taxes) to fund government is 
higher in areas with more governments in close proximity, and less so in more 
sparsely organized communities.  Also the possibility for learning is higher in 
communities with close proximity.   
The binomial logit model used was: 
 TIF use (yes=1, no=0) = b1(2000 Census) + b2(% population growth) + b3(%  
persons below poverty). 
This model was done as a whole (all 342 municipalities), and then separated to 
compare this whole regression to repeated regressions that isolated different groups 
within the 342 municipalities by urban-rural categories of rural, urban clusters, or 
urbanized areas.  This isolation attempted to see the effect of rural/urban on TIF usage.  
 Analyzing all 342 municipalities (all Missouri municipalities size 1000 population 
or greater), the model as specified shows significance for the independent variables of 
population and population growth at the 95% confidence level, and for population growth 
and percent persons below poverty at the 90% confidence level.  The relationship of two 
of the three independent variables (population, population growth) is positive with the 
decision to implement a TIF, as predicted.  The percent persons below poverty has a 
negative coefficient, which is opposite of the prediction.   
Using the logit model as specified, the model has a pseudo R2 of .2389, 
sensitivity rating of 48%, and specificity rating of 92%, correctly classifying 77% of the 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
area with fewer than 50,000 people, but more than 2,500.”  For regression purposes, “rural” is defined as 
any municipality not in an urbanized area or an urban cluster.  http://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/rural-
definitions/data-documentation-and-methods.aspx 
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time whether a municipality has adopted a TIF or not.  The model has its highest error in 
predicting non-usage of TIF for a municipality that has implemented a TIF predicting 57 
municipalities as having a TIF while the actual number is 119 (48% sensitivity, 52% false 
negative).  Conversely, the model was more reliable in classifying only users of TIFs as 
users, only incorrectly identifying 18 non-TIF user as a TIF user out of 223 total non-TIF 
users (92% specificity, 8% false positive).   As the model moves from non-TIF user (0) to 
TIF-user (1), the independent variables change as follows:    
 + .00018(2000 census)  + .00929( % population growth)  - .03464(% persons below 
poverty). 
 The model output is different if grouped by degree of rural/urban (rural, urban 
clusters, or urbanized area).  The population variable remains strongly significant at the 
99% level in all scenarios except rural, where it remains significant at the 95% level.  In 
the rural group (112 observations which include 13 TIF adopting municipalities) 
population is the only significant variable.  Percent population growth is no longer 
significant at the 90% confidence level in any separated group (although it is as a whole 
group).  The group with the highest z score for percent population growth is the 
urbanized area, with a z score of 1.2 (p<.23).   
 What is most notable though is the impact of this separation on the percent below 
poverty variable.   As a whole this variable is negative and significant at the 90% 
(p<.064) confidence level.   In the 111 municipalities in urban clusters this variable 
becomes stronger in the negative direction at the 99% (p<.007) confidence level.  Even 
more interesting, in the 119 municipalities in urbanized areas, the coefficient changes 
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signs and has an opposite relationship than the urban cluster or rural communities does 
with TIF usage – as percent persons in poverty increases in urbanized areas, the 
likelihood that a municipality is a user increases (i.e. poorer municipalities in urbanized 
areas are more likely to use TIF than better off communities).  This opposite behavior in 
the urbanized area does not reach the significance level (p<.14).  Again, this is in contrast 
to communities in urban clusters.  Municipalities in urban clusters are less likely to have 
a TIF if they have a higher percent of persons in poverty.   
This change in direction of the percent persons in poverty can be further divided 
within the urbanized group to understand if St. Louis County moves differently than the 
other urbanized areas.  Regressing St. Louis County by itself, the coefficient and z remain 
about the same score (coefficient of .049 versus .044, and z score of 1.48 for both), 
showing the strong influence of St. Louis County on the urbanized areas’ regression.  St. 
Louis County has 69 of the 119 municipalities in urbanized areas within its boundaries, 
and of the 66 TIF-using municipalities, 36 are in St. Louis County and 30 are in the 50 
municipalities within the boundaries of the other urbanized areas.  The coefficient and z 
score for percent persons below poverty in urbanized areas not including St. Louis 
County are -.007 and -.08 respectively.  Additionally, the percent population growth’s z 
score improves slightly without St. Louis County, moving from 1.2 to 1.33 (p<18). 
The logit model for urbanized areas (including St. Louis County) correctly 
classifies TIF using from non-TIF using municipalities 89 out of 119 times, or 75%.  
Sensitivity is 68% -- of the 66 TIF using municipalities, 45 are correctly categorized and 
21 are not.  Specificity is 83% -- of the 53 non TIF using municipalities, only 9 are 
miscategorized as being TIF-users. 
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 The logit model of the urban cluster has a 70% rate of correctly classifying 
whether a municipality has implemented a TIF or not.  Among the 111 municipalities in 
the urban cluster, 40 have implemented a TIF (36%).  Sensitivity for actual TIF users is 
relatively low at 40%, missing more TIF-users than it correctly predicts, predicting only 
16 of the 40 TIF users correctly.  Again, specificity is relatively high at 87%, only 
misclassifying as a TIF-user 9 municipalities of the 71 municipalities in this group that 
have not implemented a TIF.   
The logit model of the rural area only has 13 TIF using municipalities among a 
total 112 municipalities.  The model predicts that only one municipality will use a TIF 
(which is correct about that municipality), but misses the other 12 TIF-using 
municipality.  By predicting that that 111 of the 112 municipalities have not implemented 
a TIF, it correctly predicts the remaining 99 non-TIF using municipalities.  Thus this 
model has a 89% rate of correctly classifying TIF use among the 112 rural municipalities.  
The model has a relatively low sensitivity and low pseudo R2 indicating other variables 
that have explanatory influence are missing from the model. (See Table 4.) 
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Table 4.      Logit Regression Results  
TIF Users, and TIF Users by Degree of Rurality  
(Urbanized Area with and without St. Louis County  
and St. Louis County alone)  
 
Independent  
Variable 
All  
 
 
 
 
Logit 
coefficient 
(z) 
Rural 
 
 
 
 
Logit 
coefficient 
(z) 
Urban 
clusters  
 
 
 
Logit 
coefficient 
(z) 
Urbanized 
Areas 
 
 
 
Logit 
coefficient 
(z) 
Urbanized 
Areas 
LESS St. 
Louis 
County  
Logit 
coefficient 
(z) 
St Louis 
County 
ONLY 
 
 
Logit 
coefficient 
(z) 
 
2000 Census 
 
 
0.00018 
 (6.11)** 
 
0.00073 
(2.02)** 
 
 
0.00015 
(2.90)** 
 
0.00016 
(4.01)** 
 
0.00018 
(2.63)** 
 
0.00015 
(2.94)** 
 
Population 
Growth 
(2000 – 2009) 
 
0.00929 
(1.79)* 
 
0.00902 
(0.71) 
 
.00717 
(0.67) 
 
 
0.00943 
(1.20) 
 
0.01581 
(1.33) 
 
0.039 
(0.52) 
 
 
% Persons Below 
Poverty 1999 
 
-0.03464 
(-1.85)* 
 
-0.00060 
(-0.01) 
 
-0.10355 
(-2.68)** 
 
0.04396 
(1.48) 
 
-0.0071 
(-0.08) 
 
0.04942 
(1.48) 
       
 
Constant 
 
-1.38715 
(-4.12) 
 
-3.42818 
(-2.98) 
 
-.12373 
(-0.18) 
 
-1.70465 
(-3.59) 
 
-1.9194 
(-1.92) 
 
-1.40488 
(-2.17) 
 
Number of  
municipalities         342  112   111               119     50  69 
Pseudo R2  .24       .06        .14  .29       .44     .20 
** p< .05 
   *p< .10 
 
Adoption Waves 
 The enhanced database has 119 municipalities who have adopted at least one TIF 
from the time period of 1987 to 2009.  The number of municipalities adopting their first 
TIF varies by year, ranging from a low of one in 2001 and 2009 (Florissant and 
Columbia) to a high of eleven in two years – 1994 and 2003.  The highest three-year 
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period was 1996, 1997 and 1998 when new municipalities adopting TIF numbered eight, 
nine, and nine, respectively.   Most years found from three to six new municipalities 
adopting TIFs for the first time – the two remaining years outside of this range are 1987 
and 1993, each year with two new municipalities. 
The 119 TIF-using municipalities were put into ordered categories based on when 
they adopted their first TIF district.  The ordered categories were numbered one through 
eight and called adoption waves.  Each adoption wave contained three consecutive years 
beginning with 1987 except for adoption wave eight which contained only the last two 
years (2008 and 2009).  The total in each wave is as follows:  wave one – 11, wave two – 
11, wave three –18, wave four – 26, wave five – 10, wave six – 21, wave seven – 18, and 
wave eight – 4.  
The question to answer was whether and how municipal characteristics related 
with when a municipality first adopted a TIF.  The same municipality characteristics were 
used as independent variables as were used in the TIF-user /non-TIF- user logit 
regressions  – population, percent population growth, and percent persons below poverty.  
An ordered logit model was used to regress these variables, asking the question of as 
various municipalities implemented a TIF at different times (adoption waves), how did 
the independent variables mentioned change.  The output of the ordered logit (ologit) 
was: 
-.00001(2000 Census) + .00334(% population growth) +.02801(% persons below 
poverty) 
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The only independent variable that was significant was population, which was 
significant at the 99% confidence level.  This model could not be improved upon by 
breaking it out by rural, urban clusters, and urbanized areas.  The pseudo R2 was very 
low indicating that this model has a very low explanatory power and that the adoption 
wave order (early adopter, later adopter, etc.) was influenced by other variables not 
included in the model.  (See Table 5.) 
 
Table 5.      Ordered Logit Regression Results 
  
TIF Users, and TIF Users by Degree of Rurality  
 
 
 
Independent  
Variable 
All  
 
 
 
OLogit 
coefficient 
(z) 
 Rural and  
Urban 
Clusters 
 
OLogit 
coefficient 
(z) 
 Urbanized 
Areas 
 
 
OLogit 
coefficient 
(z) 
 
 
2000 Census 
 
 
-0.00001 
(-2.58)*** 
  
-0.00009 
(-1.48) 
  
-0.01787 
(-2.17)** 
 
 
 
Population 
Growth 
(2000 – 2009) 
 
0.00334 
(0.64) 
  
.00288 
 (0.22) 
  
0.00278 
( 0.5) 
 
 
% Persons Below 
Poverty 1999 
 
0.02801 
(1.21) 
  
.01136 
  (0.23) 
  
0.03344 
(1.11) 
 
 
Number of  
municipalities              119      53   66 
Pseudo R2  .02     .01              .02 
***p< .01 
 ** p< .05 
    *p< .10 
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Simple counts do shed a little insight into adoption waves by rural, urban clusters, 
and urbanized areas.  Of the 13 TIF-users in the rural category, only three are in any of 
the first four waves (Cabool (1993) – wave 3; Granby and Hillsboro (1998) – wave 4), 
amounting to 23% before 1999, and 77% of rural municipalities adopting a TIF doing so 
after 1998. The mean statistic is 5.46 (between wave 5 and wave 6), and the median 
statistic is 6 (wave 6), with two more municipalities adopting a TIF in wave 5 followed 
by most of the 13 rural communities (#6) adopting a TIF in the 6
th 
wave. The last two 
rural municipalities in this group were created in the first year (2005) of the next wave.   
Of the 40 TIF-users in the urban cluster category, 23 are in one of the first four waves 
(58%, about 2.5 times the rate of the rural category).  The mean statistic for this group is 
4.45 between wave 4 and wave 5) and the median statistic is 4 (wave 4).  Of the 66 TIF-
users in the urbanized areas, 40 adopted a TIF in the first four waves (61%) and 26 first 
adopted in waves 5-8 (39%).  Recapping just the mean statistic of adoption wave by 
rurality:  rural – 5.46; urban cluster – 4.45, and urbanized area – 4.18.   Clearly there is a 
pattern that on average municipalities in the non-urbanized areas adopted TIF at a later 
rate than municipalities within urbanized areas.   
TIF Usage and Legislative Changes and/or Legal Decisions 
The 1996 House Interim Report on Tax Increment Financing paid particular 
attention to the rural attendees, and its report to the House of Representatives aimed to 
support smaller communities in their hopes to use TIF.  The legislature did request the 
Department of Economic Development to provide technical assistance and information to 
municipalities regarding TIF.  The early 2000s saw legislation implemented to assist 
smaller communities with economic development via MODESA, MORESA, and other 
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new or revamped tools such as NIDs and CIDs.   Additionally, the Department of 
Economic Development administered a Dream Initiative to assist smaller communities 
with economic development planning and implementation. 
The previous sections looked at TIF-use numbers and adoption waves and by 
degree of rurality.  The rate of adoption in rural areas increased significantly after 1998 
(after the 4
th
 wave), but the overall number (13 total) is still small.  Perhaps rural 
communities have less of a need for a tool such as TIF.  Or it could be that rural 
communities do not have the resources to make it happen.  Or it could be that rural 
communities learn from bigger communities, and thus are late adopters.  Yet, the overall 
small number (13) of TIF-users in areas classified as rural compared to the number of 
municipalities in the rural category (112) could indicate either low need or low ability to 
access the tool.  It is interesting to note that wave 6 contains the largest number of rural 
municipalities adopting a TIF, and the years of wave 6 (2002-2004) correlates with the 
time the Department of Economic Development was expanding staff, partially to meet 
the charge of assisting communities with the technical aspects of creating and 
implementing TIF districts and other available economic development programs. First-
time TIF municipalities in the urban cluster category are more evenly distributed in the 
first four and last four waves with 23 in the first four waves and 17 in the last four waves.  
Although some of the municipalities in the urban cluster also received assistance from the 
Department of Economic Development, especially in the last two waves (through the 
Dream Initiative program), the numbers and the distribution of urban cluster 
municipalities’ adoption wave do not clearly indicate a relationship. 
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With respect to economic development as the stated purpose for creating a TIF 
district, the historical development of the statute indicated that from time to time this 
particular purpose was controversial.  A circuit court deemed the purpose 
unconstitutional, and interest groups and legislators (wanting to “restore” the original 
intent and limit the statute’s use) attempted to delete it as an allowable purpose 
periodically, but to no avail. The legislature was able to make modifications to it in 1997 
limiting its use in potentially competition situations.  An earlier discussion in this chapter 
looked at how frequently this purpose was invoked, and its pattern of usage.  It is clear 
that this purpose is used relatively infrequently.  It was most likely to have been used in 
the Kansas City area in the 1990s.  It was more than likely not used alone, and most often 
it was used in combination with blight.  Although no causal relationship can be assured, 
the strong pattern does warrant a closer look, and some suppositions can be made (in the 
next chapter).  The usage did not seem to be impacted by the 1992 Pettis decision, but its 
noticeable decline in use after 2000 could have been influenced by the discussion to 
eliminate it as an allowable purpose. 
Hypotheses II and III 
The second hypothesis introduced in Chapter was: 
HII – TIF using municipalities are more likely to have a higher poverty rate. 
The null hypothesis: 
HII0: There is no relationship between municipal poverty rate (percent persons 
below poverty) and whether the municipality has adopted a TIF. 
Predicted value:  There is a positive relationship between whether a 
municipality has adopted a TIF and the municipality’s poverty rate.  In other 
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words, the higher the municipality’s poverty rate, the more likely the 
municipality has used a TIF.  
Significance of the % persons below poverty variable for all municipalities (over 1000 
population) was found at, but only at the 92% confidence level and with a negative 
coefficient.  This negative coefficient was the opposite of what was expected – as % 
person below poverty increased, the likelihood of a municipality using a TIF decreased.  
When these municipalities were separated by rurality, a significance was found in the 
urban cluster subset, also in the opposite direction and at the 99% confidence level.  In 
urban cluster municipalities, as % persons in poverty increased, the likelihood of being a 
TIF-using municipality decreased.  A much smaller negative coefficient was associated 
with the rural group but no significance was found at all.   
 But, this separation of rurality did reveal that the predicted positive relationship 
was found in the urbanized areas.  The z score was 1.48 (confidence level of only 86%).  
This urbanized areas result closely matches that of St. Louis County alone, and shows the 
strong influence of St. Louis County’s municipality characteristics on the total regression.  
If St. Louis County is separated from the urbanized areas, then the remaining urbanized 
areas would have a slightly negative coefficient also! 
 Summary – there is a significant relationship between % persons below poverty 
and TIF-use, but it is only reaches the significance level of 95% in the urban cluster 
group, and in this group the relationship is in the opposite direction than expected.  Thus, 
hypothesis II is rejected, although the finding is very interesting! 
 The independent variable population size is significant at the 95% level, no matter 
rurality, with a positive coefficient, as predicted.   The independent variable population 
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growth (2000-2009) reached significance at the 90% confidence level.  When subdivided 
by rurality, this significance was lost.  This tendency seemed to be largely influenced by 
urbanized areas other than St. Louis County.  While that subset seems to be more 
influenced by population growth, St. Louis County seems to be more influenced by % 
persons below poverty (although neither reaching significance at the 90% confidence 
level). 
The third hypothesis was also researched in this chapter.  The hypothesis: 
HIII.  Waves of adoption of TIFs by particular types of municipalities followed 
court decisions and statute amendments that lowered risks for that particular type 
of user/usage/investment.  In other words, An adoption wave pattern by type of 
municipality (size of population, growth of population, percent poverty) can be 
observed in an ordered logit regression. 
HIII0 – No “adoption of wave” by type of municipality (size of population, 
growth of population, percent poverty) is observed in an ordered logit 
regression. 
 (If no pattern is discerned, then there is no reason to look at what amendment 
or court decision could have impacted the ordered regression result.  If there is 
significance, then court decisions or legislative amendments will be perused 
for possible association.) 
Predicted Value:  Rural municipalities are more likely to use TIF in a later 
wave than municipalities in urban or urbanized areas. 
The ordered regression showed that municipal size (i.e. 2000 Census) was a significant 
independent variable at the 99% confidence level.  The pseudo R2 showed the model had 
very poor explanatory power (.02).  The coefficient for population size was negative, 
indicating that the later the adoption (higher number) the smaller the population size.  
This was the only variable that was significant.  When urbanized areas were removed 
from the regression the coefficient for the rural and urban clusters (combined together) 
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remained negative but the z score dropped -1.48, becoming no longer significant at the 
90% confidence level.   
 Summary – the null hypothesis is rejected because the independent variable 2000 
census (population size) is significant at the 99% confidence level.   
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II. Surveys and Interviews:  Municipalities, Professionals, and Legislators 
A small sample of municipalities were surveyed and interviewed, again with an 
eye towards adding context to other research information analyzed.  They were asked 
questions regarding whether they used outside consultants, and if internal staff also had 
economic development responsibilities.  Other questions included:  1) the degree of risk 
the initial and subsequent TIFs represented to the municipality, 2) whether they have 
comprehensive and/or economic development plans, 3) whether they have completed 
other economic development projects since 1990 without the use of a TIF, and 4) what 
other economic tools were used with the TIFs. 
The municipality selection criteria for the survey/interview instrument are as 
follows:  all municipalities over 100,000 population, and 40 municipalities from a 
random sample of the remaining TIF-using municipalities over 1,000 population.  An 
attempt was made to call or email the contact person identified on the Missouri 2009 
Annual TIF Report.  An introductory email was sent to targeted respondents requesting 
their participation.  The four municipalities over 100,000 population were interviewed in 
person or by telephone only (no survey instrument was included in the interview process 
of this group).  All others were asked to participate in a two-part survey/ interview 
process.  The two-part process was design to allow them to collect information that they 
may need time to gather, and to answer easy, routine questions at a time convenient to 
them.   Once this survey was returned, a telephone interview time was scheduled.  This 
allowed time to review some answers in advance, and thus have the ability to devise 
customized questions based on the survey answers.  All four municipalities over 100,000 
population consented to the individual interviews, and all were interviewed by phone call 
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except St Louis, which was in person. Twenty-one of the forty randomly selected 
municipalities agreed  
Table 6.  Municipalities Selected for Online Survey/ Telephone Interview, Participation, 
and Selected Answers 
 Municipality 
Randomly Selected 
Agreed to 
participate 
Returned 
online 
survey 
Interviewed 
via 
telephone 
Risk 
1st 
TIF 
Plan 
(econ / 
comp) 
 Blue Springs/Jackson x x x 1 both 
 Cabool/Texas x x x 1 no 
 Clayton/ St. Louis x x x 1 both 
 Columbia/Boone x x x 1 both 
 Country Club Hills/ St. Louis      
 Desloge/ St. Francois x x x 2 comp 
 Excelsior Springs / Clay/ Ray x x x 1 comp 
 Farmington/St. Francois      
 Florissant/ St. Louis      
 Gladstone/ Clay x x x 1 both 
 Grain Valley/ Jackson      
 Granby/ Newton      
 Grandview / Jackson x x x 1 both 
 Hermann / Gasconade      
 Jennings / St. Louis x x x 1 both 
 Kirksville/ Adair x x x 1 both 
 Kirkwood / St. Louis x x  2 comp 
 Lake Ozark / Camden/Miller      
 Maplewood / St. Louis x     
 Maryville / Nodaway x x x 1 comp 
 Miner / Scott      
 Monett / Barry      
 Moscow Mills / Lincoln x     
 New Florence / Montgomery      
 Normandy / St. Louis x     
 O’Fallon / St. Charles x x  1 comp 
 Platte City / Platte      
 Raytown / Jackson      
 Richmond Heights / St. Louis x x x 1 comp 
 Sedalia / Pettis x x x 2 both 
 Smithville / Clay / Platte      
 St. Charles / St. Charles      
 St. John / St. Louis x x x 4 both 
 St. Peters / St. Charles      
 St. Roberts / Pulaski      
 Ste Genevieve/Ste Genevieve      
 Strafford/Greene x x x 1 comp 
 Sugar Creek / Jackson      
 Unity Village / Jackson x     
 Wentzville / St. Charles       
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to participate, 17 (of the 21) returned the online survey, and 15 (of the 17) completed the 
telephone follow-up interview.  (See Table 6.) 
A short summary statistical will be presented first.  Next, more specifics from the 
survey/interviews in a comparative format are discussed. 
  Summary Statistics 
 Seventeen of the 21 participating municipalities said they use or have used an 
outside consultant (all but Independence, Cabool, Kirkwood, and Maryville).  Cabool 
cites finances as a reason for not having an outside consultant.  Independence and 
Kirkwood have internal capacity, and both Independence and Maryville use an economic 
development council (Maryville, as a county seat, relies heavily on their county’s 
economic development council).  Excelsior Spring has recently stopped using an outside 
consultant.  Not surprisingly, everyone who used an outside consultant was satisfied with 
their services except Excelsior Springs, who has recently terminated their outside 
consultant’s services.  Municipalities vary to the degree they used an outside consultant – 
to some, use of an outside consultant is routine, while to others, it depends on whether the 
project has special needs.  
 The four largest cities (Kansas City, St. Louis, Springfield, and Independence) 
have significant organizational structures designed to channel economic development 
activities, generally including an association with its own municipality’s economic 
development organization/council.   The other municipalities vary in their staffing for 
economic development personnel or delegation of economic development responsibilities 
to other staff.  Clayton, Gladstone, Grandview, Blue Springs, O’Fallon, and Jennings (6) 
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all report having a full-time person with economic development in his/her title (director 
of Economic Development, Economic Development administrator, director of Planning 
and Economic Development, etc.).  Two municipalities (Kirksville, Sedalia) have a 
Community Development or Community Services director/coordinator, whom spend 
20% - 30% of their time on economic development.   Otherwise, this function falls to the 
responsibility of the city manager, or a combination of the city manager, assistant city 
manager, city finance director, and city attorney, depending on their staffing levels.  
Thirteen of the 17 municipalities that returned the online survey categorized the 
amount of risk taken with their first TIF project as “1” on a five-point likert scale, with 1 
being “little risk” and 5 indicating “high risk.”  Five of these 13 stated the reason their 
initial TIF was a “1” (low risk) is because the TIF financing was structured in such a way 
that the municipality would not be responsible for any short-fall in captured revenues 
(Columbia, Richmond Heights, Grandview, O’Fallon, and Clayton).  Four others mention 
that they only have approved “pay-as-you-go” financing method (Maryville, Blue 
Springs, Gladstone, and Kirksville). Two other municipalities used the “but-for” reason 
to explain why their initial project was “1” level of risk (Cabool and Jennings) (the last 
two of the 13 did not list a reason).  Three of the 17 categorized the risk of their first TIF 
as “2” (still low risk) for the following reasons:  a “few local distractors” (Sedalia), “most 
of the area was undeveloped and what was developed needed much improvement” 
(Desloge), and that there is always a chance that the project “would not be successful” 
(Kirkwood).  The only municipality that categorized the degree of risk higher than “2” 
was St. John, rating their degree of risk as a “4,” stating that  their initial TIF was “one of 
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the first ones in the St. Louis area,” and as a result of this newness, there were likely to be 
“unknowns.” 
Only one municipality (Cabool) stated they had neither a comprehensive plan nor 
an economic development plan.  Otherwise, the remaining 16 (of 17) all had 
comprehensive plans and of those, 9 also had economic development plans (none had an 
economic plan without a comprehensive plan). 
Fourteen of the 17 municipalities stated that they have had at least one other 
economic development project since 1990 that was done without use of a TIF
39
.  In those 
cases, the economic tools used, if any, were:  Chapter 70 (Sales Rebate contracts), 
Chapter 100, Chapter 353, Enterprise Zones/EEZ, or TDDs (Transportation Development 
Districts).   With respect to their TIF projects, six municipalities indicated no other 
economic development tools being used with their TIF(s) (O’Fallon, Columbia, Sedalia, 
Gladstone, Kirkwood, and Clayton).  CIDs, TDDs, Chapter 353 were mentioned as the 
other economic development tool used with TIF by more than one municipality.  Two 
municipalities mentioned rebating utility fees (Cabool and Grandview), one mentioned 
assistance with acquiring property or right-of-ways in advance (Desloge), and another 
mention both Community Block Grants and the cost sharing program of Missouri 
Department of Transportation’s Revolving Loan Funds (Kirksville). 
Comparative Context of Municipal Initial TIF Adoption, TIF-Use, and Capacity 
                                                             
39
 The 3 municipalities that have not done any other economic development projects that did not involve a 
TIF are: Desloge, St. John, and Strafford. 
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The narrative information from the interview is presented in a comparative 
analysis format.  The municipalities will be discussed in groups.  The first two groups 
will be from rural-like communities, divided by smaller
40
 and larger
41
 (both will include 
some urban clusters).  The next grouping is the three municipalities in the Kansas City 
area
42
, and the fourth grouping is the six municipalities in the St. Louis area
43
. The last 
grouping will be the five largest municipalities
44
. 
The first group of municipalities is Cabool, Strafford, and Desloge.  They are 
grouped together because of the following characteristics – municipalities of 2000 census 
under 5000 population not located within an urban area.  Cabool and Strafford are 
classified as rural, although Strafford’s city clerk stated they are finally beginning to see 
some benefits from their proximity to Springfield (“just now getting that Springfield 
boom”).  Springfield is also the county seat for Greene County, where Strafford is 
located.  Strafford’s population is only 1845, yet the city clerk states that they benefit 
from a good location – they are about 15 minutes east of Springfield, right at Interstate 44 
with good access to railroads.  Strafford has experienced about 20% growth from 2000 to 
2009 (to 2211).The city’s location in combination with the skills of their outside 
consultant has recently helped Strafford to compete successfully for a John Deere “core 
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 Municipalities and 2000 census population:  Cabool – 2168, Strafford – 1845, Desloge – 4802. 
41
 Municipalities and 2000 census population:  Maryville – 10,581, Excelsior Springs –10,847, Kirksville—
16,988, and Sedalia – 20,339.  
42
 Municipalities and 2000 census population: Grandview -- 24,881, Gladstone – 26,365, and Blue Springs 
– 48,080. 
43
Municipalities and 2000 census population:  St. John – 6871, Richmond Heights – 9603, Clayton – 
12,825, Jennings – 15469, Kirkwood – 27,324, and O’Fallon – 46,169. 
 
44
 Municipalities and 2000 census population:  Kansas City – 441,545, St. Louis – 348,189, Springfield – 
151,580, Independence – 113, 288, and Columbia – 84,531.  Columbia was interviewed as a result of its 
random selection among municipalities under 100,000 (2000 Census), but happens to be the fifth largest 
municipality and is a better match to be grouped with these municipalities. 
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remanufacturing” facility. John Deere had indicated to Strafford that they also considered 
locating this facility in Germany.  The incentive used with John Deere to get this facility 
is a contracted tax abatement.   Their first TIF is a downtown project that the city initiated 
in 2002 to attract a supermarket and to address blighting as presented in vacant buildings.  
This remains their only TIF district, which added a Dollar General store two years earlier 
(using both TIF and CID). 
She states the city is well served and quite pleased with the services provided by 
their outside economic development consultant, Darrell Gross & Gross Associates. She 
describes him as a “can-do one person company.”  The city administrator’s position does 
include economic development responsibilities expected to take 10-20% of his/her time – 
but they haven’t had a city administrator since she has been city clerk (2002).   
Cabool is a similar size municipality in southern Missouri, and is clearly rural; 
about 70 miles east of Springfield, located at the intersection of two state thoroughfares – 
highways 60 and 63.  The population size has remained fairly constant from 2000 to 2009 
(minor loss of 1.5%).  The city clerk states that the city only has a Dollar General, and 
residence have to travel 15-20 minutes to go to either Mountain Grove to shop at the 
nearest Wal-Mart or to Houston (Missouri) to shop for clothes.  Cabool was an early 
adopter of TIF, creating a downtown business district TIF in 1993 which was able to 
attract a Dairy Queen in 1996.  This TIF district recently added a Subway restaurant in 
2007.  Cabool had an economic development person “back then,” when the TIF district 
was first created, but he left.  Currently their city administrator has economic 
development responsibilities, and is expected to spend about 30% of his time on this 
function.  She stated that this amount of time “seems about right” because the board of 
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alderman “seemed pleased.”  The city has wanted to hire a full-time economic 
development person “years ago,” but she stated that the budget is too tight for this.  They 
have had businesses move to Cabool without use of any economic development tools, but 
she stated the Board of Alderman occasionally will “offer a utility incentive to a new 
business.” 
Desloge is the largest of these three municipalities, and is classified as being in 
the urban cluster of Park Hill, which includes Park Hill and Bonne Terre, all of which are 
close to Farmington in the eastern side of the state.  Desloge is located on the divided 
state highway 67, and has experience a modest gain in population from 2000 to 2009 
(from 4802 to 5211, 8.6%)  Their TIF district is named “Highway 67 TIF District” 
(created in 1997), which the city clerk describes as individual projects implemented at 
various times.  One project is called “State Street Redevelopment” which dealt with 
stormwater and curbing, and another is called the “Highly Lane” project, where the street 
was redone and a water line added.  Although the TIF district includes a Wal-Mart, 
technically Wal-Mart did not receive a TIF.  The city used the TIF to acquire the property 
in anticipation of making it available to be acquired by Wal-Mart at a later date.  Wal-
Mart had an older store adjacent to the TIF district, and it was known that Wal-Mart 
wanted to build a newer store.  Park Hills attempted to lure Wal-Mart to their city, but 
they were able to keep Wal-Mart in Desloge.  She credits their ability to “keep the ideal 
property available for sale to Wal-Mart” when it was ready to build its new store as 
important to Wal-Mart’s decision to stay in Desloge. 
The Desloge city administrator spends about 25% of his/her time on economic 
development.  The city clerk mentioned that Desloge had an “economic development 
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committee a while back.”  Desloge does use outside consultants to assist them with 
specific tasks or projects.  She reported that Stifel Nicholas had informed them that their 
TIF would be “paid for in April.” 
In summary of this group – the smallest municipality was the earlier TIF adopter, 
adopting its only TIF in 1993.  It seems that the availability of an economic development 
person at that point in time could be have been a critical factor to Cabool being an early 
adopter.  Their TIF, although designed to attract business to their downtown, has seen 
very little use, which may be related to the economic development person leaving “back 
then” (Cabool 2011, interview).    Desloge and Strafford both hire outside consultants as 
needed.  Strafford’s consultant pro-actively seeks business opportunities for his client.  
Although Strafford’s city clerk mentioned that the city is beginning to benefit from its 
nearness to Springfield, she also felt that Springfield is its biggest competitor.  Since 
Springfield is also the county seat for Strafford, she states that the county-level 
government has been “very helpful” but at times it is felt that the Springfield Chamber of 
Commerce exerts pressure on the county government to favor Springfield.  Strafford and 
Cabool both have modest, pay –as-you-go TIFs.  Desloge has a TIF bond that likely was 
paid of this year.  Desloge was able to successfully staved off Park Hills from relocating 
the Wal-Mart store by use of the Highway 67 TIF district (but that was more than 10 
years ago).   Most noticeably, all three municipalities use the establishment of a TIF 
district in anticipation of attracting businesses to locate there in the future.  This is the 
type of use that the city of Shelbina attempted in the TIF district that was found invalid in 
the Shelbina v. Shelby County case. 
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The next grouping is the four larger municipalities between 2000 census 
population of 10,000 and 21,000, none located in urbanized areas (although Excelsior 
Springs is close to Kansas City’s urbanized area).  Three of the four are county seats 
(Sedalia, Kirksville, and Maryville), and these three municipalities have experienced 
similar low levels of population growth of between 2% and 4% between 2000 and 2009.  
Excelsior Springs, just northeast of the Kansas City urbanized area has experienced a 
stronger growth of 15.9%.  All four municipalities have a comprehensive plan – Sedalia 
and Kirksville also have economic development plans. 
All four cities applied and have been accepted into the state’s Dream Initiative45 – 
Excelsior Springs and Sedalia in 2006 and Kirksville and Maryville in 2007.  All of these 
municipalities had already adopted a TIF before participating in the Dream Initiative 
except Sedalia.  Sedalia is the county seat of Pettis County, which is the County whose 
attempt to form a TIF district in another city within its borders (Dresden) resulted in the 
court decision that found the economic development purpose unconstitutional.  Sedalia is 
the only municipality (of the 4 cities) that has established a new TIF since 2005, creating 
its first and only TIF district in 2008.  Maryville had just established its two TIF districts 
just before it became a Dream Initiative city, establishing them in 2004 and 2005.  
Kirksville first TIF was created in 1987 and is no longer reported, but it is named the 
Southeast Quadrant Economic Development Area and was described as an infrastructure 
project in Kenneth Thomas’ TIF database (used in this research to enhance the TIF 
database).  Kirksville created another TIF in 1999 to improve its downtown area’s 
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 Missouri Department of Economic Development program designed to assist municipalities with 
economic development.  It is a three year program that tailors a community’s need based on community 
assessment and buy-in. 
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appearance and building improvement (demolition and construction).  Excelsior Springs 
was another relatively early adopter, creating two TIF districts in 1994.  One is named the 
Wal-Mart/Elm TIF and the other is named the Price Chopper TIF.  Excelsior Springs has 
a total of four districts, creating the other two in 1999 and 2002.  The two TIFs in 1994 
used TIF bonds – the later TIFs did not. 
Excelsior Springs is the municipality that recently terminated the services of one-
man consultant.  The director of administrator services for the city stated that this 
consultant was given a very low retainer fee (estimated to be about $100/month), but 
accountability was their primary complaint because the consultant seldom gave oral or 
written reports of his activities.  This administrator also mentioned that an assistant city 
manager who had some responsibility for economic development has recently left, and 
her departure has left the city with a knowledge and information gap with respect to 
economic development activities. He did not identify any other internal staff as having 
economic development responsibility.  
In Maryville the only staff person with economic development responsibility is 
the city manager.  The city, as the county seat, partners with the Nodaway County 
Economic Development (a nonprofit corporation), and in essence, pays them to do 
economic development that benefits them all.  The city manager described Nodaway 
County as having about 22,000 population in an area covering 600 square miles of which 
12,000 of the 22,000 population (over half) live in the five square miles of Maryville.   
Thus, the county’s and the city’s aims are similar – Maryville is the “economic engine” 
of the county. 
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Sedalia listed its Community Development director as the only person having 
economic development responsibilities, listed at 30%.  The Community Development 
director specifically mentioned that their first TIF in 2008 was a result of the 
recommendation of the state (based on their participation in the Dream Initiative) and 
they identified PGAV as their outside consultant, (provided with their participation in the 
Dream Initiative). This TIF is listed as a pay-as-you-go, rehabilitation/redevelopment 
mixed residential and commercial project in Sedalia’s midtown, to include 26 subsidized 
and 30 market-rate housing units, with a grocery store.  The building will also benefit 
from a Missouri Housing and Development program.  Even still, the Community 
Development director categorized the risk-level at “2,” due to anti-TIF sentiments still 
lingering from the Pettis County court case almost 20 years earlier.  
Kirksville has three staffers that have economic development responsibilities – the 
city manager (about 10% time), the assistant city manager (about 20% time) and the 
Community Services Coordinator (about 20% time).  In describing their use of an outside 
consultant, the Community Services coordinator mentioned that the consultant was used 
in their “second and third [TIF] to complete the Redevelopment Plan,” revealing that 
although they have only two TIFs reported on the 2009 report, by the 2011 interview they 
had created another TIF district.  She describes their initial and second TIFs as having 
low risk because they were financed by a pay-as-you-go plan and the city itself was the 
developer.  She indicated on the survey that the next TIF has an increased level of risk 
owing to the participation of a developer who wants to use TIF bonds to fund 
improvements.  She wrote “there was not sufficient coverage to obtain the bonds.  At this 
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point the City is not at risk, but it does complicate things when there is an outside party [a 
developer] involved.” 
The municipalities were not all that concerned about competition for investment 
from other communities with the exception of Excelsior Springs.  Interestingly, although 
Excelsior Springs is located near the urbanized area of Kansas City, the focus of their 
concern were municipalities in the nearby state of Kansas.  The director of 
Administrative Services stated that Kansas (state) was 30 miles away and was 
aggressively courting its current businesses.  Thus, his concern was focused on business 
retention. 
In summary, among these mid-sized municipalities of between 10,000 and 21,000 
population (2000 census) varying levels of capacity were exhibited.  In Maryville’s case, 
the level seemed sufficient – mostly because of their reliance and partnership with their 
county’s economic development council.  Perhaps even Kirksville’s capacity is sufficient, 
even as they slowly try more “risky” ventures such as working with a developer.  Sedalia, 
the largest of the four municipalities at 20,339 (2000 census) is relatively new to using a 
TIF, deterred from using TIF earlier based on their county’s experience with TIF in 
Dresden in 1992.  It appears that Sedalia may be using the Dream Initiative as a way to 
overcome policy inertia – by using the strategy mentioned by another economic 
development professional (Springfield 2011, interview) –  bringing in an “expert from 
100 miles away” to gain credibility.  That “credibility,” in this case, would be provided 
by both the Department of Economic Development (as sponsor of the Dream Initiative) 
and the consultant (PGAV) that provides the service.  Excelsior Springs was a relatively 
early adopter (in 1994) and also has the highest number of TIFs (4) of this group.  Yet, 
Butler, Cassandra, 2012, p. 187 
the departure of a single employee can be disruptive to their momentum and or 
knowledge capacity and institutional memory.  Perhaps spreading the responsibilities 
among two or more employees, like Kirksville, and/or working with or creating an 
economic development council can help with institutional memory and knowledge 
capacity.  Even though they may have adequate personnel, none really seemed to be 
operating at above sufficient.  Clearly all four municipalities felt they could do better and 
would benefit from assistance from the state through participating in the Dream Initiative, 
which required them to apply competitively for a place (only ten cities were selected each 
year). 
The next group of municipalities is in the Kansas City suburbs, and all three 
municipalities are larger than any of the seven municipalities in the groups just discussed.  
Grandview, Gladstone, and Blue Springs have populations of 24,881, 26,365, and 48,080 
respectively (2000 census).  Grandview’s population has remained relatively the same 
from 2000 to 2009 at –0.7% growth (loss of 163 persons), while both Gladstone and Blue 
Springs have experienced moderate growth of 12% and 16% over the same time period.  
Blue Spring is the only one of the three cities that does not share a border with Kansas 
City – it is west of Kansas City, with Independence in-between on its northwest border 
and Lee’s Summit between it and Kansas City on Blue Springs southwest border.  
Gladstone was considered north of Kansas City until Kansas City annexed all the land 
around it on all four sides.  Similarly Grandview is south of most of Kansas City, 
although it shares a border with Kansas City on all of its sides except its southern border, 
which it shares with Belton and is also the southern border of Jackson County.   
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The staffing of these municipalities is noticeably better.  Both Grandview and 
Gladstone have economic development directors, and Blue Springs has an “accountant-
economic development” person, all devoting 100% of their time for economic 
development.  Blue Springs additionally listed the director of Finance (20% time) and the 
Assistant City administrator (30%) as having economic development responsibilities.  
Gladstone’s general counsel also has some responsibilities regarding their economic 
development activities.  All three municipalities also use outside consultants.  Blue 
Springs and Gladstone both report typically using a legal consultant and a different 
consultant to provide the cost-benefit analysis. 
All three municipalities have both comprehensive and economic development 
plans.  Grandview was one of the earliest user of TIF, creating two TIF district in 1989, 
and also has one of the highest number of TIF districts with 14 TIF districts reported. The 
status of two of them
46
 is listed as “dissolved.” Blue Springs’ first TIF was also in the late 
1980’s (as reported in the online survey) and is known as the Highway AA & 40 TIF.47  
The Assistant City Administrator related the city was an early adopter of TIF because 
they had a specific identified need at that time – to build a new road to create better 
access to the businesses at this particular intersection.  Blue Springs reported three TIFs 
on the 2009 Annual Report. 
Gladstone only has one TIF district which was created in 2005, making Gladstone 
fall into the category of a late adopter.  Although many late adopters present with 
capacity issues, this is not the case with Gladstone.  Gladstone’s preferred incentive tool 
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 One of the dissolved TIF districts was created in 1989, the other TIF district was created in 1993. 
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 This TIF district is not in the basic or enhanced database. 
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for retail projects – when they choose to use an incentive – is the Chapter 70 sales tax 
reimbursement (i.e. contracted sales rebate).  She describes Gladstone as “the model” for 
use of this tool, and many municipalities consult and learn how to use this tool by 
Gladstone’s examples.  Also worth noting is she describes the leadership of the city as 
“visionary.”  She states that the administration is “open-minded about incentives,” and 
each incentive is “customized” when used.  She described their philosophy as “liberal in 
thinking and conservative in action.”   She also noted that the city manager is opposed to 
using incentives for greenfield development.  This discussion about leadership 
philosophy and vision led to the obvious subject of how long this leadership had been in 
place.  The economic development director (the interviewee) had been with Gladstone for 
6-1/2 years, while she estimated that the city manager had been employed by the city for 
15-17 years and the assistant city manager had been employed by the city for 14-17 
years.   
Even Gladstone’s outcome regarding the one TIF district is interesting.  The 
economic development director shared that the TIF was created with the purpose of 
seeking a developer to redevelop a 1960s era outdated shopping mall.  Previously they 
had attempted to blight the shopping center under a Chapter 353 plan, but the owner of 
the shopping center sued the city to stop the blight designation.  The owner spent 
approximately $1 million to remove the five blight criteria used to designate it as 
blighted.  Although the TIF district still exists, it is not considered active, and thus 
Gladstone has no active TIFs.   Gladstone’s policy is to only approve pay-as-you-go 
financed TIF. 
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Blue Springs and Grandview also have a preference for pay-as-you-go TIFs.  Blue 
Springs did allow one of the developers to use TIF bonds that were “issued backed by the 
quality of the developer” (Adams Farm TIF, created in 2007) (Blue Springs 2011, 
interview).  Blue Springs also has a policy of a TIF being no higher than 15% of the 
anticipated total project costs. 
The Assistant City administrator of Blue Springs views the bordering 
municipalities of Independence and Lee’s Summit as well as Grain Valley as its 
competitor for retail investment and for shoppers.  The economic developer director of 
Gladstone views competition from a different perspective – she describes competitive 
pressure in the form of UBG funds and green space.  Gladstone cannot compete with the 
“urban core’s” ability to use UBG (Urban Block Grants) nor the outer-suburbs (including 
Kansas City in this case) availability to offer green space (Kansas City annexed all the 
land around Gladstone, thus Gladstone does not have green space). 
This group in summary – a much higher level of municipal capacity is noticed in 
this group.  This group of municipalities is significantly larger than the others, and the 
staffing level is much larger.  Their degree of nuances and sophistication in use of 
economic development tools on a whole is much more evident.  Although the bigger size 
could explain most of these greater staffing capacities/capabilities advantages, it is also 
important to realize that the Kansas City area is the center of the earliest users with 
experts with some of the best knowledge of the TIF tool who also had the desire spread 
the usage of TIF in Missouri.  It is also evident that these municipalities in the urbanized 
area feel competitive pressures from their surrounding neighbors more so than the 
municipalities in the rural or rural-like communities previously mentioned.  
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There are more municipalities in the St. Louis area surveyed group (six), which is 
compatible with the fact that there are more different municipalities using TIF in this 
area.  Five of the six municipalities are located in St. Louis County and the sixth city is in 
St. Charles County.  The St. Louis County municipalities are generally much smaller than 
the municipalities surveyed in the Kansas area.  The municipalities – St. John, Richmond 
Heights, Clayton, Jennings, and Kirkwood – vary in size, with 2000 census population 
sizes of 6,8712, 9,603, 12,825, 15,469, and 27,324 respectively.  The only St. Louis 
County municipalities experiencing growth in population from 2000 to 2009 was Clayton 
(25%).  Kirkwood was fairly stable losing only 1.9% population, while the other three 
lost between 5% and 8%.  O’Fallon is located near the outer edge of the St. Louis 
urbanized area, in the county of St. Charles.  It has the largest population of the six 
municipalities at population of 46,169 (2000 census) and has experienced the largest 
growth from 2000 to 2009 at 70.8% (2009 est. population of 78,850).   
All of these municipalities with the exception of Clayton are relatively early 
adopters of TIF.  St. John was very early, adopting its first TIF in 1989.  Richmond 
Heights’ TIF (1991) was the important St. Louis Galleria TIF, which is an important TIF 
in the historical development of the statute and the subsequent patterns of its use.  
O’Fallon soon followed with a TIF in 1992 (Venture), Kirkwood created two TIF 
districts (Kirkwood Commons in 1994 and Pioneer Place in 1994); and Jennings created 
two TIF districts in 1997 (Louisa Foods and Stout Industries).  Clayton only created a 
TIF district in 2007, and only because a developer approached the municipality and 
requested a TIF.  Because of the timing of the TIF district (recession) this district was 
listed as inactive because the developer had difficulty getting financing. 
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Outside of St. Louis city proper, Jennings is the municipality in the St. Louis area 
with the highest number of TIFs (7).  Jennings is an inner-ring suburb that shares a border 
with St. Louis.  They employ a director of Planning and Economic Development that 
estimated that he spends approximately 70% of his time on economic development 
activities.  He is also a long-time employee of Jennings, and formerly had the title of 
director of Public Works.  What should be noted about this director is that he formerly 
was an employee of St. Louis County, which is also an early user of TIF.  When he began 
working for Jennings around 1996 he discovered, through a proactive business retention 
program that he was starting, that two businesses were in the mist of moving to other 
counties (Jefferson and St. Charles) (Butler 2006, 22).  Through knowledge, capacity, 
and networks gained through his former county employment, he was able to retain these 
two companies in Jennings through the creation of these two TIF districts.  The county 
also worked closely with Jennings in the redevelopment of an outdated shopper center 
(Northland Shopping Center).  The county made important land purchases of the 
shopping center property, assuring that it would be available for repurchase by 
developers at a reasonable cost when the time came.  This shopping center TIF was 
created in 1999. 
St. John is also surprising it its capacity as a smaller municipality of only about 
7000 population.  Not so surprisingly though, they also have a long-time employee that 
currently serves as City Manager as well as Police Chief.  In this position, he has primary 
responsibility for economic development, and the Assistant City manager also is the TIF 
treasurer while the Finance director has responsibility for preparing all financial 
documents pertaining to economic development programs.  They have used TIF for both 
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industrial development (1989 TIF district along the 170 Innerbelt between St. Charles 
Rock Road and Natural Bridge) as well as retail project on St. Charles Rock Road (Shop 
n Save strip mall, TIF created in 2001).  The City Manager is a long time participant in 
the MEDFA organization, and its predecessor, the Missouri Tax Increment Financing 
Association). 
The director of Finance for Richmond Heights estimates that the City Manager 
and City Attorney may spend up to 10% of their time on economic development, and the 
Building Commissioner/Zoning Administrator may spend up to 5% of his/her time on 
economic development.  Clayton has a full-time economic development director, as does 
the city of O’Fallon.  Like Clayton, Richmond Height has recently experienced creating a 
TIF district for a developer that has been unable to get financing. 
Richmond Heights created the Hadley Township Redevelopment TIF in 2006.  
This redevelopment project required the acquisition of a substantial number of residential 
properties, and thus had high citizen interest and impact.  The failure for the developer to 
obtain financing has left the impacted residential properties in a worst situation – similar 
to those in Sunset Hill’s failed TIF.  Richmond Heights has recently provided incentives 
to two hotels developed in their boundaries, but used Chapter 353 funding
48
without use 
of TIF.  Gene Norber mentioned the Cheshire Inn transaction in his interview (Norber 
2011, interview) stating that the Chapter 353 incentives were used in this project to avoid 
the TIF approval process of the new county-level TIF.  
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 The Cheshire Inn is located in both Richmond Heights and the city of St. Louis.  Both municipalities 
granted Chapter 353 funding. 
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One might find it surprising that the city of O’Fallon, with such a large population 
while still experiencing explosive growth, only has one TIF which was created in 1992.  
The city attempted to create a downtown TIF district in 2003 which met with strong 
citizen opposition, which after a significant struggle, had to be abandoned.  They have 
been active in the use of other incentives, especially Chapter 100 incentives.  
Kirkwood’s two TIF are related, although the first TIF was intricate and complex.  
Kirkwood discovered that the Target store in their area was planning on relocating to 
build a bigger store.  Meanwhile, the county was actively seeking a municipality to annex 
an unincorporated community adjacent to Kirkwood known as Meachum Park.  
Kirkwood did annex Meachum Park, and this transaction also included involvement of 
the Missouri Housing agency and the federal Housing and Urban Development 
Departments, as project included redevelopment of HUD sponsored low-income housing 
in the Meachum Park area.  Target stores were enticed to build their new store in the 
Meachum Park Redevelopment Project TIF.  The vacated property vacated by Target was 
redeveloped by the Pioneer Place TIF created in 1995 (Kirkwood 2011, interview).  They 
have not created any new TIFs since 1995. 
Summary of this group – by municipality size, municipalities in the urbanized 
areas showed more staffing capacity than similar size municipalities in outstate Missouri.  
The role of the county-level government was actively visible in a few cases (Jennings and 
Kirkwood), while the ability to network with others and to participate in organizations 
such as MEDFA is also evident (St. John, Richmond Heights, Jennings).  Again, the 
importance of leadership and capable personnel is showcased in the sample of 
municipalities surveyed in St. Louis County (i.e. St. John, Jennings), often overcoming 
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size (St. John) or budget (Jennings) restraints.  Additionally, it is interesting to note that 
when political pressure makes it difficult to get approval for use of TIF, municipalities 
have been able to find other economic development tools to partner with private investors 
(i.e. Richmond Heights, O’Fallon). 
 The five largest municipalities in Missouri all vary in how they use TIF.   
Columbia, the smallest of the five (2000 census of 84,531), just created their first TIF in 
2009 (the last year covered in this study), while Kansas City, the largest municipality 
(2000 census of 441,545) establish the first TIF commission the same month the TIF 
statute was enacted and its first TIF in November of 1986.  While Kansas City and St. 
Louis, the two largest municipalities in the state both report a similar number of TIFs 
(108 and 115 respectively), there is a marked drop in created district in the next size 
municipalities of Springfield with 2 TIFs and Independence with 17 TIFs.  Although 17 
TIFs is a big distance from 108 or 115 TIFs, the city of Independence is the third highest 
user of TIFs (and the fourth largest municipality).  The third largest municipality, 
Springfield, has only created two TIFs, as has the fifth largest municipality, Columbia. 
 Columbia’s recent entry as a TIF user is largely credited to the retirement of a 
long-time city administrator (Ray Beck) in 2006.  This city manager had  held that 
position since 1985 and had been a city employee for 42 years when he retired, and he 
had a philosophy “not to use public funds for private benefit” (Columbia 2011, 
interview).  Columbia is centrally located in the middle of the state, midway between the 
state’s two large municipalities and on the major east-west Interstate 70.  It also is home 
to the state’s main campus of its flagship university (University of Missouri) and only 30 
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miles from the state capital.  Columbia has also experienced a population growth of 21% 
from 2000 to 2009 (to 102,324). 
In 2009 Columbia established its first two TIF districts in its downtown area.  
Although other developers have requested TIF use on other projects outside the 
downtown area, the city has established a policy to limit TIF to the downtown area for 
now (Columbia 2011, interview).   The city first TIF is a renovation of an old hotel now 
known as the Tiger Hotel, which is an historic “turn of the century” hotel.  The assistant 
city manager refers to this project as its “learning tool” regarding TIF use.  He also 
mentioned that the community “had affection” for this property and that the owners had 
attempted to create a viable business over the last 10 years but had not been successful. 
Columbia has also recently opened an IBM facility (2011).  In this instance, IBM 
worked with the Missouri Partnership to find a location in Missouri and to participate in 
two state-level incentive programs – the Missouri Build Program ($11.6 million) and the 
Missouri Quality Jobs Program ($14.7 million).  Another company, ABC Labs, was 
granted a Chapter 100 incentive in 2006. 
The assistant city manager is expected to spend approximately 10% of his time on 
economic development.  The area has a county economic development organization 
known as REDI (Regional Economic Development, Inc.) that is “charged with attraction, 
retention and economic gardening for Columbia/Boone County” (Columbia 2011, 
interview).  They have also used outside consultants to do a marketing study 
(Development Strategies) and a land-use study (Sasaki), as well as legal (Gilmore & Bell) 
and financial (Stifel Nicholas) consulting.  As a large municipality that is the county seat, 
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the city does not view nearby cities as its competition.  Because of Columbia’s size, the 
assistant city manager feels more competitive pressure from larger Missouri cities such as 
St. Louis, Kansas City, and Springfield (Columbia 2011, interview).  
Springfield is in many ways similar to Columbia – it is a large municipality of 
151,580 residents (2000 Census), and the county seat of Greene County, with a relatively 
low number of two reported TIFs, and a large state university in its boundaries (Missouri 
State University).  It is located in southwest area of the state on Interstate 44 (an interstate 
starting at St. Louis and continuing through major cities in Oklahoma and terminating in 
Texas).  It is also the major urbanized area next to the tourist area of Branson, Missouri.  
There are many ways in which Springfield is different from Columbia too – starting with 
its more developed in-house economic development organization and familiarity with 
TIF use.  Besides having an Economic Development Director, the department has a 
planner (who manages brownfield grants), a commercial loan officer (who specializes in 
SBA loans) and two other “traditional” staff (who focus on tax abatements).  They 
occasionally use outside consultants depending on the project’s need, including outside 
legal assistance or when an outside consultant can add more credibility (an “expert from a 
100 miles away”).  This need for an “expert” is sometimes a function of the dynamics of 
the city’s governance.  The need for an outside consultant might also be a function of 
workload considerations, complexity of a project, or a need for a special expertise.   
Interestingly, although the city enacted its first TIF in 1994, it ultimately never 
used it as such, opting instead to fund the infrastructure needs through a sales tax rebate 
contract.  Thus, that TIF district was formally “revoked” in 2010, and is not included as 
one of the two TIFs reported to the state.  The first TIF was a redevelopment for Target 
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Department Stores and required the moving of a high voltage power line.  A half-cent 
sales tax was levied on the site.  The Economic Development Director describes the 
contracted sales rebate program as “great, easier to do, and only impacting sales taxes.”   
She states that they have done about ten sales tax rebate contracts (Chapter 70). 
Springfield used a series of community-wide strategic planning sessions “in the 
1990s” to assist in the development of their comprehensive planning document called 
“Vision 2020,” and the Jordan Valley Park redevelopment concept arose from this 
process. The strategic plan (i.e. comprehensive plan) was updated again in 2004.  From 
the original Vision 2020 process, it was known that the community wanted the 
convenience of a park centrally located inside the city, using Forest Park in St. Louis as 
their desired model.   .  The Jordan Valley TIF in 2000 was a redevelopment of a “former 
blighted industrial area into parks, water features, civic center & exposition hall, 
recreational ice facility, minor league baseball facility and a business-class hotel and 
conference facility” ( Missouri 2009 Annual TIF Report).  Both a local and a state TIF 
were used and a CID district was also created.  John Q. Hammons, a wealthy real estate 
developer, hotel magnate, and community philanthropist, was involved with the overall 
development.  The Economic Development Director described this project as including a 
“good old boy network.”  This project issued $19 million in bonds, and the subsequent 
TIF on a different project has a pay-as-you-go funding (Commercial Street 
Redevelopment TIF) because the city will no longer “back bonds.”  She stated that the 
city’s “political capital” has been spent.  
The Economic Development Director also mentioned that Springfield does 
actively lobby legislators in Jefferson City.  She stated that her interest in lobbying 
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activity regarding TIF is protecting existing usages and “protecting from other negative, 
onerous changes” (Springfield 2011, interview).  She also mentioned that she testified 
with Kay Barnes (former Mayor of Kansas City) in lobbying for MODESA, and that she 
also lobbied for the MODESA Lite version, which they used to retire the debt for a 
parking structure.  She is currently a board member of MEDFA (Missouri Economic 
Development Financing Association). 
Independence is within Kansas City’s urbanized area yet covers more land than 
St. Louis city
49
 with 78 square miles (Independence 2011, interview), and 2000census 
population of 113,288.  Although the Community Development Director describes 
Independence as a “very old city,” she estimates that about half of Independence’s land 
area is still undeveloped (Independence 2011, interview).  The city has experienced a 
modest growth from 2000 to 2009 of about 7% to an estimated 2009 population of 
121,180.   
Independence’s first TIF is unique.  The city is the hometown of former United 
States President Harry S. Truman.  Thus, the city attracts tourists who want to visit 
neighborhoods and buildings associated with the President.  The older neighborhood was 
in a state of decline and had the attention of Independence’s governing council.  During 
this time, a non-profit hospital in the area changed ownership to a for-profit hospital, 
suddenly putting the hospital on the tax-paying roll.  A Chapter 353 corporation was 
created, and a program was devised that the Mid-Town Truman Road Corridor Plan and 
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Redevelopment Project TIF
50
 (mostly generated by the change in tax status of the 
hospital) was used to fund the Chapter 353 corporation, allowing homeowners a source of 
funding to improve their properties and to obtain tax abatement on the improvements.  
This seemed to work well until the hospital built a new hospital in Independence, thus 
abandoning the older hospital.  This property is being repurposed, but the Chapter 353 
Corporation has been able to reverse the decline that the neighborhood had been 
experiencing.  
The city has a separate Economic Development corporation that has the 
responsibility of attracting businesses and other economic activity.  The Community 
Development director stated that Independence does not use outside consultants.  The 
City-Manager’s office has economic development responsibility, and his office has the 
following staffing to assist in this charge:  an economic development manager, a deputy 
city manager, an assistant city manager, and the city manager.   
Although the city has a comprehensive plan, this plan is generally only used for 
legal purposes.  For guidance and decision-making, the governing board relies on its 
strategic vision document which consists of four strategic goals.  Although this document 
is fairly succinct and under a page in length, a truncated version of the four goals is:  1) to 
develop and support vibrant neighborhoods and a high quality of life, 2) to foster a viable 
local economy with an expanding employment and tax base, 3) to ensure long-term 
financial stability, and 4) to meet existing and emerging transportation needs through the 
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timely maintenance of City infrastructure 
(http://www.ci.independence.mo.us/citycouncil/StrategicGoals.aspx). 
The Community Development director stated that the city had implemented an 
internal policy of pay-as- you-go about four or five years earlier, and the city does not 
help private developers in obtaining financing – developers are expected to get their own 
financing based on their own credentials.   She also observed that only one TIF has been 
approved in the three years she has been with the city.  The city has four “large” 353 
corporations, which are mostly used in residential areas, and they also have some CIDs. 
St. Louis city is its own county and located on the eastern border of Missouri with 
Illinois, containing 62 square miles with the Mississippi River as border on one side and 
St. Louis County surrounding the remaining sides.  This dynamic is most notably 
different from the largest Missouri metropolitan city of Kansas City, which has 315 
square miles and located on Missouri’s western border and contained in four separate 
counties (Jackson, Cass, Clay, and Platte).  Kansas City has grown substantially through 
annexation, most notably since the 1960s (resulting in its location in multiple counties) 
(Kansas City 2011, interview).  Conversely, St. Louis’ boundary was set in 1876 by state 
law
51
, which separated St. Louis city from its county, creating a city within its own 
county.  St. Louis and Kansas City essentially report about the same number of TIFs in 
the 2009 Database with St. Louis reporting the most  (115 and 108 respectively).  As 
mentioned earlier in Chapter Four, St. Louis had only created four TIFs by 1999, thus 
most of these St. Louis TIFs were created in the last decade of this study. 
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St. Louis does have a separate organization that manages much of its economic 
development responsibilities.  The St. Louis Development Corporation (SLDC) is an 
“umbrella organization” that is the home of or provides staffing to the following:  the TIF 
Commission, the Planned Industrial Expansion Authority (PIEA), the Industrial 
Development Authority (IDA), the Port Authority, the Land Reutilization Authority 
(LRA), Land Clearance for Redevelopment Authority (LCRA), Enhanced Enterprise 
Zone Board (EEZ), the Preservation Board, and its Planning Commission, among others.  
SLDC does not usually use outside consultants, but will use consultants occasionally for 
a specific job.  An example mentioned was that the City had recently retained a 
consulting company to develop a land-use and marketing plan for the “North Riverfront” 
area (St. Louis 2011, interview).   
The mission of SLDC as listed on their website is “fostering economic 
development and growth in the City of St. Louis through increased job and business 
opportunities and expansion of the City's tax base,” and later stated as “to stimulate the 
market for private investment in City real estate and business development and improve 
the quality of life for everyone who lives, works, and visits the City” (http://stlouis-
mo.gov/government/departments/sldc/about-SLDC.cfm).   The city does not have a real 
comprehensive plan, but uses a land-use plan in its place.  The city updated its land-use 
plan in 2005, having relied on its 1947 Comprehensive Plan until then.  The newer plan is 
titled “The Strategic Land Use Plan of the St. Louis Comprehensive Plan.”  Both plans 
are essentially land use plans and not comprehensive plans, and the City does not have an 
economic development plan.   All incentive plans/proposals must go through and be 
approved by the Planning Department (St. Louis 2011, interview).  
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St. Louis’ emphasis in the earlier years of this study was on using real estate tax 
abatements.  The Director of Commercial Development for SLDC stated that before the 
1990s this was the most commonly used tool, and Chapter 99 tax abatements were 
especially used for smaller projects.  The City’s first TIF  is St. Louis Marketplace, 
located near their border with Maplewood.  He states that its original use was retail, but 
the location was not good for this purpose.  Additionally St. Louis Marketplace opened 
with “a number of national retailers” such as Kmart, PACE, Builders Square, and Phar-
Mor Drugstore.  He mentioned the 1990 TIF project also had the misfortune of many of 
these national retailers going bankrupt in the first three to five years of the TIF project.  
The $15 million in TIF bonds issued were backed by the city. The Commercial 
Development Director states that the City did not lose money even though it was not 
considered a successful retail project, and the property is currently 95% occupied and has 
more employees in total than when it was primarily retail space (St. Louis 2011, 
interview).  He recalled the city began using TIFs more regularly in the late 1990s and 
early 2000s.   
The City had a high number of vacant buildings downtown in the 1990s of about 
120 and by adding TIF to their economic tool box for blight removal, they have been able 
to lower that number to about 20 buildings (St. Louis 2011, interview).  These projects 
are also often paired with historic tax credits and or brownfield credits.  The director also 
compared the overall pattern of TIF designation between St. Louis and Kansas City, 
stating that Kansas City has more TIF “districts” while St. Louis has more TIF “projects,” 
again likely due to the high rate of residential projects St. Louis has.  He mentioned that 
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St. Louis has only four “district” type-TIFs, and he named three of them – Grand Center, 
Lafayette, and the Delmar Loop. 
The Director of Commercial Development estimated that approximately 65 – 70% 
of the City’s TIFs are residential projects. The City does not have a specific size the 
project should be – they let the developer determine this – but in general he believes that 
the projects needs to be at least $3 million to have a positive “cost-benefit” report.  He 
states that this high rate of residential projects is explained by developer demand – these 
are the type of projects “brought” to the City by developers.  He generally describes the 
TIFs created by the City as “low-risk” now, since the City has not backed in bonds since 
the St. Louis Marketplace project, and the projects meet the “but-for” test.   
Given the high rate of residential projects, it is interesting to note the impact of 
the St. Louis School District representation on its TIF Commission.   The Director of 
Commercial Development states that the relationship with the St. Louis School Board is 
“interesting” and notable for how cooperative the School Board representative usually 
was with the City’s representatives.  He credits two reasons for this cooperative 
relationship – that the “but-for” was truly met, and therefore there was really no 
“downside” to doing the TIF project, and that even though many of these projects were 
residential, they added very few students to the school district.   He stated that in the last 
five years more residential projects have been low-income, and now perhaps 10% of the 
residential projects are low-income (identifiable because they also use low-income tax 
credits). 
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Regarding the City’s downtown area, the director of Commercial Development 
has two major concerns – the lack of parking space and the lack of new buildings, with 
the last building being built in 1989.  Parking space is a big complaint of major law firms 
housed downtown, and the lack of new office space is a competitive concern in retaining 
and attracting new businesses.  He is also surprised that there are not any electronic 
retailers located in the City’s boundaries, and believes that the City is generally 
underserved by retailers.  He noted that many of the TIFs formed in the last three years 
are inactive due to the developers’ inability to obtain financing.  The City has a dedicated 
lobbyist that lobbies both in Jefferson City and at the federal level.  With respect to the 
TIF statute – he likes it like it is, and would not want it to be changed in any way. 
 Kansas City could be said to be the center of TIF use in Missouri.  It is now the 
largest city in Missouri, it is one of the two largest creators of TIF districts/projects in 
Missouri, it created its TIF Commission the same month the TIF statute was enacted, and 
the case that validated the TIF statute was from Kansas City.  Kansas City surpassed St. 
Louis as the largest city in Missouri with the 1990 census – although both cities were 
losing population, Kansas City loss was less
52
 (U.S. Census), and since 1990 Kansas 
City’s population has stabilized, even growing slightly.  Kansas City and St. Louis had 
similar square miles in 1950. 
Kansas City has an economic development organization, the Economic 
Development Corporation of Kansas City (EDCKC) to serve as an umbrella to many of 
its economic development programs.  The organization’s website state this 501c4 
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organization was established in 1987 and houses six statutory programs (including TIF, 
LCRA, MODESA, Port Authority, EEZ, and a loan program).  The webpage also states 
they have 30 staff persons, and their mission is to “drive economic development and 
create an environment in which businesses and residents prosper…” 
(http://edckc.com/about-edc/). 
 The Executive Director noted that the first TIF, 10
th
 & Troost (the Dunn case), 
was never “activated” and has since been terminated.  Consequently, he considers the 
first TIF as the TIF that was proactively implemented to “stop decline and remove blight 
in a largely African-American community known as the Eastside” (Kansas City 2011, 
interview). 
 In Kansas City all plans must be approved by the City’s Commission for Zoning 
& Land Use.  Although they do not have an economic development plan, they do have a 
written plan called the “Focus Plan” (Forging our Comprehensive Urban Strategy), which 
was written in the early 1990s and guides their activities and functions as their 
comprehensive plan (Kansas City 2011, interview).  The new mayor has plans to update 
this document.  This document required many different citizen workgroups collaborating 
over time to develop the original plan
53
 and will require the same effort to revise it. 
 The Kansas City uses outside consultants and routinely issues a request for 
proposal every two years to keep a list of pre-qualified consultants available for use as 
needed.  The lawyer for the TIF Commission is the only outside consultant that is usually 
hired by retainer.  Developers are also required to pay the costs associated with Kansas 
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City assessing the merits of their proposed TIF project and must make an initial deposit 
of $20,000.  Kansas City estimates this function costs about $35,000 to $60,000, and the 
developer is notified as funds are spent and more money needs to be deposited.   As an 
example of associated costs, the Executive Director mentioned they recently mailed 
notices to 600 property owners, costing $5 each.  The cost-benefit analysis is done in-
house – the cost-benefit model used is one custom made for Kansas City by an outside 
consulting firm. 
 Kansas City does have some municipal backed TIF bonds, about eight to ten 
projects, mostly downtown hotel projects begun in the 1990s (Kansas City 2011, 
interview).  The last project that has bonds backed by the credit of Kansas City is the 
Power and Light District in 2004.  The Power and Light District is also notable for its use 
of MODESA.  He stated that Kansas City lobbied heavily for MODESA so it could be 
used with this project (recall that the Springfield interviewee mentioned they also lobbied 
with Kansas City for MODESA).  Kansas City retains a lobbyist in Jefferson City.  The 
Executive Director mentioned that this lobbyist was also instrumental in Kansas City’s 
ability to be excluded from the county-level TIF amendment a few years earlier. 
 As evident with the Power and Light District TIF
54
, the Executive Director stated 
that Kansas City typically uses a series of economic development tools – and many of 
those tools require state approval and implementation.  TIF is considered a “real-estate 
financing” tool, and job creation or retention programs are frequently paired with TIF if 
appropriate – the Missouri Build program was given as an example of a job program.  
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Other commonly paired tool is Chapter 353, which is controlled through the PIEA, and/ 
or tax abatements through the LCRA and/or the EEZ
55
.  The LCRA can use a lease-
buyback strategy for facilities, freeing the tenant from owing  property taxes (as the 
government entity owns the building and thus property taxes are not even assessed), but 
allowing the tenant to purchase the building for a perfunctory amount (generally $1) after 
the lease expires.  Chapter 353 is commonly used on projects that do not generate 
revenues such as housing projects (and not retail). 
 Kansas City has a new mayor who desires to send the message to developers and 
businesses that the city is again “open for business” (Kansas City 2011, interview).  The 
new mayor, Sylvester James, has replaced Mark Funkhouser (former city Auditor who 
became mayor in 2007).  The former mayor’s platform was that restraint was needed 
regarding the use of incentives, and the Executive Director characterizes former Mayor 
Funkhouser’s position as being anti-development.  Mayor James has opted to appoint all 
new members to the TIF Commission, and fortunately the new Chair has served on the 
Commission before and thus brings “institutional memory” (Kansas City 2011, 
interview). 
 Kansas City feels a great deal of competitive pressure from the neighboring state 
of Kansas.  In addition to Johnson County (Kansas) being the one of the five richest 
counties in the country (Kansas City 2011, interview), the Executive Director asserts that 
the current first-term governor of Kansas is encouraging Johnson County to “poach” 
businesses from Kansas City, Missouri. 
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 Kansas City consciously annexed unincorporated land “north of the river” in the 
1960s with the desire to build “high-end” housing and multi-housing units (Kansas City 
2011, interview).  To this end, TIF is often used to help build infrastructure in these areas.  
Prospect North is one of these projects and was briefly mentioned as a “negative poster 
child” by the Gladstone interviewee.  When asked about this project, the Executive 
Director stated that Prospect North was a casualty of the developer’s capacity to perform.  
He stated that this TIF went bankrupt because a key person in the developer’s 
organization died and those left within the organization were unable to replace his 
abilities (Kansas City 2011, interview).   
 Summary of the five largest municipalities – they all have the capacity they need 
to meet their economic goals.  Columbia and Springfield have some features in common, 
including being the economic engine of their urbanized area which is surrounded by a 
large rural community.  Springfield is still almost 50% larger than Columbia, and thus 
has more in-house capacity and even much more in-house experience using incentives, 
based on Columbia’s recent entry into using economic incentives.  Independence is in-
between Columbia and Springfield in size, and is located in an even larger urbanized area 
anchored by Kansas City.  And yet, it has some similar features – primarily access to a 
large area of undeveloped land.  All three of these larger municipalities have well-
developed economic development organizations/councils that supplement and partner 
with these cities, thereby adding to their capacities.  
 Yet, although each municipality has some common characteristics, it is evident 
that each municipality’s prior history, prior and present leadership, and prior and present 
political dynamics also significantly impact each of these large municipalities’ use of TIF 
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and other economic development incentives, resulting in fairly customized pattern of TIF 
usage among the largest municipalities. 
Consultants / Professional Interviews 
 Five consultants, all well-known within the Missouri economic development 
community, were interviewed to gain from their experience and to have access to their 
insights regarding some of the themes present and or emerging from the research.  Three 
of them are general economic development consultants, and they range from working in a 
one-person organization to being a planning division for a firm that also includes an 
architectural division.  The other two professionals specialize in either the legal or bond 
financing aspects of economic development.  The five interviewees are (in alpha order):  
John Brancaglione (Vice President, PGAV), Mark Grimm (Attorney, Gilmore & Bell), 
Larry Marks (Principal, Development Strategies), Gene Norber (President, Economic 
Development Resources), and Laura Radcliff (Senior Vice President, Stifel Nicholas).  
 John Brancaglione has many years of experience with economic development and 
urban planning including dating back to the federal Urban Development Action Grants of 
the 1970s.  At the time of the interview, his company had consulted on over 400 TIFs 
nationwide, about 100 of them in Missouri.  He views his firm’s customer as the 
municipality (versus the developer) in most cases, but even when he has been first 
approached by the developer, the ultimate customer is the municipality (including 
county-level government).  He believes that about 90% of TIF projects are municipality 
driven and arises from their planning efforts, which identify opportunities.  Even more 
predictive than municipal size (or form of government) in determining whether a 
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municipality is likely to use a TIF is the “aggressiveness” of the municipality.  Also 
important, Brancaglione states, is whether there is cohesiveness among the various 
components of leadership (mayor, councils, etc.) within their government, and whether 
their government is “stable.”  Among his clients is a small town of Orangeville, IL (2000 
census of 751), and Chicago.  
 Brancaglione states that the municipal characteristic that most impacts a 
municipalities need for a TIF is shifting demographics.  In these instances, municipalities 
have properties that are no longer functional – and inner-ring suburbs are an example of 
this phenomenon.  “Industry wants to locate where workers live, and move out, resulting 
in a decline in an industrial/commercial base” (Brancaglione 2011, interview). 
 In discussing the city of St. Louis Brancaglione made several statements.  In 
general he views St. Louis’ use of TIF as “reactionary” and not pro-active.   In reference 
to St. Louis’ slow start regarding TIF usage, he stated that St. Louis had an attitude very 
similar to that of the city of Memphis – “tax abatements will fix everything.”  But he 
stated that as a result St. Louis city had a high vacancy rate in their downtown area until 
they started using TIF.  He explained that downtown projects tend to be “too hard” 
because of outdated electrical, elevators, plumbing, etc.  Tax abatement does not provide 
borrowing ability (i.e. upfront cash) to remedy those situations but TIF does.  He stated 
that the vacancy rate improved significantly after St. Louis began to use TIF and other 
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tools besides tax abatements.  He stated that the city’s use of other tools coincided with a 
report
56
 done by the SLDC that recommended such.  
He did not think it unusual that St. Louis city did not have a comprehensive plan 
other than what is essentially a land-use plan.  He said that until recently the city of 
Chicago has been operating under David Burnham’s 1909’s “Plan for Chicago.”  He 
stated that it was very difficult to develop any plan for all of Chicago because the city had 
many strong neighborhood organizations.  He could see the potential for a similar 
problem in St. Louis, of which he could identify a few strong neighborhoods such as the 
Central West End and Lafayette. 
He mentioned the West County court case as important, particularly because it 
further clarified the “but-for” clause.  Brancaglione states that “the beauty of the West 
County case,” is that the ‘but-for’ clause does not mean that “nothing else would 
happen,” but could be viewed in light of its current use and could consider the decline of 
revenue generated by another use compared to its current use.  Using West County as an 
example, he believes that the West County Mall would have been torn down in another 
10 years and redeveloped as an office park, which would have generated less income for 
the municipality compared to what it was generating at that time as a mall. 
Brancaglione mentioned the addition of EATs as an amendment that has had the 
most impact on TIF usage.  He stated that capturing sales tax for TIF usage was a 
suggestion of the Clayton School Board during the Galleria project.  He views the 
addition of the “economic development” purpose for TIF usage as “not smart,” primarily 
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because it is not constitutionally supported, and thus bondsmen do not consider this use a 
“clean” bond.  Another amendment that he feels was “detrimental and unnecessary” is the 
county-level TIF commission – he asserts that there are other provisions of the statute 
that if enforced would reduce intra-county competition. 
Gene Norber of Economic Development Resources is a planner by training 
(Harvard University) with a background as a shopping center developer before becoming 
a consultant.  His clients include municipalities as well as developers or businesses.  He 
generally has developed long-term relationships with his municipal clients, and his clients 
are primarily in the St. Louis or Chicago areas, generally in inner-ring suburbs.  The size 
of municipalities he has worked with ranged between 350 to 40,000 in population, but 
typically his municipal clients range between 5000 to 20,000 (Norber 2011, interview).  
He sees projects initiated both by municipalities and developers and could not 
estimate how frequently projects are initiated by either party – “municipalities have plans 
they are trying to fulfill and developers are constantly seeking business tenants” (Norber 
2011, interview).  He stated that developers tend to be aware that some incentives may be 
available and make inquiries about such, but not necessarily demands with a set 
expectation.  He stated that incentive amounts seem to evolve as discussions take place 
between the municipality and the developer regarding “what each party is looking for or 
otherwise expecting” (Norber 2011, interview).   
Norber believes that municipalities usually need “assistance with the mechanics 
of the tool” (Norber 2011, interview).  Additionally, they often need assistance or 
practice with “the art of negotiating the deal” (Norber 2011, interview).  Staff capacity is 
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the biggest predictor of a municipality probability of using a consultant.  Most 
municipalities do not have the need for a full-time person with the ability to determine 
and present cost figures for TIF, and even when that capacity is available in-house, that 
staff person generally has other responsibilities that may crowd out their ability to do so.  
Using economic development tools require “crossing the t’s and dotting the i’s” (Norber 
2011, interview). 
The Galleria project’s impact on shaping “TIFs as we know it” stands out in 
Norber’s mind also (previously mentioned by Brancaglione).  He recalls that “everybody 
in town worked on that project,” including people from the state department.  His role 
included critiquing (i.e. “looking hard at”) the developer’s projection of sales and costs 
and working closely with the city manager of Richmond Heights.  He recalled that the 
Clayton School Superintendent (Don Senti) pushed hard to have sales taxes included for 
capture in the project in order to pay the project off faster.  With respect to court cases, 
Norber felt that the Dunn case, which validated the constitutionality of the statute, had the 
most impact of any court case.   
Larry Marks is one of three principals at the consulting firm of Development 
Strategies.  Development Strategies describes their firm’s purposes as “guiding effective 
decisions in economic, community, and real estate development,” which they accomplish 
by providing “research, planning, counseling, and appraisal” services 
(http://www.development-strategies.com/about/aboutin.htm).   Development Strategies 
clients are mostly developers or businesses (he estimates 90%) and he views the 
processes of economic development including TIF use as definitely being developer 
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driven.  Typical functions performed by their firm include: cost-benefit-analysis, 
blighting designation, revenue projections, and “but-for” analysis. 
Half of their business is in the St. Louis area (with the remaining being in the 
Midwest or coastal areas).  He notes that Chapter 353 was the economic development 
tool most often use by his clients until the mid-1990s, when TIF began replacing Chapter 
353s because there was “more money in TIFs” due to multiple revenue streams and its 
ability to fund infrastructure and development costs (Marks 2011, interview).  He has 
noted a recent trend back to Chapter 353s. 
Marks’ experience is that although there is generally some “give and take” 
between municipalities and developers, developers are frequently able to receive the 
incentive amount that they request.  St. Louis city seems to “take a closer look” at the 
figures requested than some other municipalities.  Marks also noted a difference in how 
TIF is use in St. Louis and Kansas City and believes this is largely due to how differently 
each city interprets the statute.  He observed that Kansas City allows TIFs for new 
construction and new buildings, while St. Louis limits TIF to rehabilitation, renovation, 
and infrastructure only. 
Marks shared some other comments, including the negative impact the present 
recession has had on the financial analysis of potential projects.  He describes this as 
follows:  developers cannot get tenants  developers cannot get financing or interest 
rates are higher  project less profitable  project requires a higher TIF amount to be 
profitable  but revenues generated by TIF are projected to be lower as a result of the 
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recession.   He also remarked that the East-West Gateway report regarding incentives has 
“diminished enthusiasm” for TIF.   
Relatedly, he states that the general population does not understand TIF, thereby 
leading to their belief of TIF being a “give-away.”  He is concerned that the whole 
conversation about whether or not to use a TIF is wrong.  He believes He states that a 
public discussion on the topic of how we tax and how we distribute/redistribute these 
taxes needs to take place.  This conversation should include how the federal government 
stopped funding local infrastructure, and also should include the proposed legislation in 
the legislature regarding ‘point of sales taxes versus pool cities’ in St. Louis County and 
its impact on municipalities and citizen services (Marks 2011, interview).   
Mark Grimm is an Attorney for a public finance law firm.  Gilmore & Bell state 
on their website that they represent governmental entities “as bond counsel in municipal 
finance transactions and as special counsel for economic development projects” 
(http://www.gilmorebell.com).  Municipalities generally retain his firm’s services early in 
the project in order to get procedural assistance.  He states that creating a TIF 
district/project has many procedural requirements, and one of the biggest mistakes he has 
seen municipalities make is not having adequate counsel to ensure that procedures are 
properly done.  Improper procedures in TIF creation can either result in the TIF being 
invalidated or expose the municipality to financial liability (Grimm 2011, interview).   
He views the addition of EATs as easily the most impactful amendment to TIF – 
“nothing else comes close” (Grimm 2011, interview).  A distant second place would be 
the state TIF, placed distantly because it is used so seldom (Grimm 2011, interview).  A 
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barrier to TIF use is that a few amendments and court decisions have slanted TIF use to 
becoming “developer dependent” (Grimm 2011, interview).  By this is meant that it is the 
developer who must submit the “but-for” affidavit and it is the developer who must 
submit the cost-benefit analysis report. 
Regarding court cases, he views both the Dunn and the Quiktrip cases as 
important because they upheld the TIF statute.  He is concerned about the impact of the 
Shelbina court case on the use of TIF because the decision seems to invalidate project 
descriptions that are either inadequate or too broad.  This decision will make it harder to 
do area-wide redevelopment of a downtown or similar area one parcel at a time (Grimm 
interview, 2011).  He considers it “ironic” that the Shelbina court decision along with the 
“but-for” affidavit and the cost-benefit analysis responsibilities being given to the 
developer have together made it harder for a municipality to be the “driver” of their 
development. 
Laura Radcliff is a Senior Vice President in the public finance division of Stifel 
Nicholas, an investment banking firm.  Although she estimates that about half the time 
the developers are her clients and the other half of the time their client is the municipality 
(or governmental entity), she also estimates that about 85% of TIF projects are initiated 
by the developer and only 15% are initiated by the municipality.  As a general rule, she 
finds that the a project needs to be a minimum of $3 million to be above the breakeven 
point (big enough to absorb the cost of doing a TIF and still make a positive return) 
(Radcliff 2011, interview).  She also emphasizes that the market is really important – the 
market needs to be there! 
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Radcliff states that the biggest risks or mistakes she has seen municipalities make 
fall in the following categories:  1) wrong team of professionals, 2) wrong project size, 3) 
incorrect determination of TIF eligible costs, 4) improper procedures, 5) selling bonds 
that cannot be repaid, 6) erroneous projections, and 7) wrong bidding requirements and/or 
accepting the lowest bid.  She also felt that perhaps a municipality may need to take into 
consideration more qualitative factors (versus only quantitative factors) because they 
should want to protect their reputations.  She also mentioned that sometimes 
municipalities elect to extend their risks beyond TIF bonds by guaranteeing bonds, and 
mentioned Kansas City as an example. 
Another cause for concern that Radcliff mentioned is that some developers have 
been “caught between construction bonds and TIF bonds” (Radcliff 2011, interview).  
This is generally a problem with construction bonds that were taken out before 2008 with 
the expectations of being paid off by (or converted to) TIF bonds – but the market 
changed before this transaction could occur.  The market change (i.e. recession) lessened 
the projected revenue stream incomes, thus resulting in a reduction of the maximal 
amount of TIF bonds the project could obtain.  This has had a negative impact on the 
finances of those developers as well as the impacted projects. 
Legislators Interviews 
 Four legislators were interviewed in an attempt to get a legislator’s perspective on 
the historical development of the TIF statute and its use.   All four legislators have served 
on one or more of the three legislative TIF committees mentioned in the historical 
development of the TIF statute chapter – the 1996 and the 2000 Missouri House of 
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Representatives Interim Committee studying Tax Increment Financing hearings or the 
2005 Missouri Senate Interim Committee.  The legislators and their position on these 
committees are as follows:  Henry Rizzo, chair of the 1996 House Interim Committee and 
co-chair of the 2000 House Interim Committee; Timothy Green, the other co-chair of the 
2000 House Interim Committee and a member of the 2005 Senate Interim Committee; 
Carl Vogel, member of both the 1996 and 2000 House Interim Committees; and John 
Griesheimer, chair of the 2005 Senate Interim Committee. 
 All four legislators had the same understanding of the purpose of TIF – to assist 
cities with decline.  Rizzo (from the Kansas City area), when asked to summarize his 
overall opinion of the TIF statute selected “great” (Rizzo 2011, interview), while 
Griesheimer, a representative from the Washington, Missouri area selected “good” 
(Griesheimer 2011, interview).  Both Vogel (Jefferson City area) and Green (St. Louis 
area) selected “mixed” as their overall opinion of the TIF statute (Vogel 2011, interview; 
Green 2011, interview). 
Rizzo served as chair or co-chair of the first two legislative interim committees 
(studying TIF).  Rizzo was acutely aware of the lack of developer’s interest in Kansas 
City and views TIF as an important tool in attracting developers to invest in cities, and 
this largely accounts for his selection of “great.”  He believes that the changes to the 
statute have generally “improved” the statute over time.  He can think of no negative 
changes, and views amendments that strengthen the “but-for” test as one that has 
improved the statute.  He would like to see more state scrutiny of TIF, particularly 
regarding the processes and procedures occurring at the TIF commission level.  He also 
would like to see the state investigate bonding procedures.  Otherwise, he views the 
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current statute as “very user-friendly” but in constant need of guarding against the 
potential for abuse.  He is concerned when municipalities and developers use “the letter 
of the law” versus the spirit of the law. 
Carl Vogel served as a member on the same two committees that Rizzo chaired 
and co-chaired.  Although he also agrees that over the years the TIF amendments have 
served to improve the Act, he feels the overall impact of TIF is mixed because of the 
following “stumbling blocks”” 1) the definition of blight, 2) the “but-for” concept, and 3) 
the use of TIF in retail, especially retail moving around in the same areas.  He sees the 
“same old”  political/philosophical arguments in the debate over TIF use – why should 
new developers/businesses have access to tax breaks not available to older 
developments/established businesses, and elected officials should not pick winners and 
losers.  He feels the legislature has been successful in better defining TIF.  Although he 
feels that the statute is “rather onerous” to use, he feels that the more distressed 
communities still have access to TIF usage through their relationship with a developer 
(Vogel 2011, interview).  A good side effect of the TIF process not being particularly 
user friendly is the likelihood that it will assist the municipality in choosing only 
competent developers (Vogel 2011, interview).   
Vogel adds a more rural perspective, stating the importance of transportation 
routes and municipal growth.  He stated that job opportunities are related to 
transportation access.  He mentioned an internal “mindset” struggle that rural 
communities often have as a result of new highways and the growth that often follows as 
a result.  That struggle is the friction that often arises as original residents want to 
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“control growth” and have a tendency to want to keep things “the same,” while newer 
residents are not as tied to tradition and customs. 
 Timothy Green is a St. Louis County resident and served on the 2000 House 
Interim Committee (as co-chair) and on the 2005 Senate Interim Committee (as a 
member).  His “mixed” opinion of the TIF statute follows closely the issues addressed in 
the hearings by the St. Louis area constituents regarding intra-county competition and 
concerns about TIF use abuses.  In addition to having a “mixed” view of the TIF statute 
overall, his believes that changes to the TIF statute over time has resulted in a more 
diminished or corrupted Act. 
  In particular his is concerned about the definition of blight, and is disappointed that the 
legislature has been unable to amendment the definition to reflect a “true” meaning of the 
word.  He also views the “but-for” clause as problematic.  He states it is hard to know 
what would have happened otherwise, and companies are hired to tell the municipalities 
and developers “what they want to hear” (Green 2011, interview).  He stated that the 
current definition of blight is supported by a court decision (which he did not name) 
which allows the definition of blight to be essentially “in the eye of the beholder,” and 
this determination has been instrumental in developers “shopping for TIFs among 
neighboring communities” (Green 2011, interview). 
He gave the example of the recent loss of a WalMart store which straddled the 
border of both St. Ann, Missouri and Bridgeton, Missouri to a different location in 
Bridgeton (a move of about one mile) as an example of the “loose” definition of blight, 
and how it can result in a “bad use.”  Other bad uses mentioned were the location of the 
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St. Louis Mills TIF project in a flood plain and the assertion that the former Mayor of St. 
Peters “TIFFED the whole city” (Green 2011, interview).  He lists the Buzz Westfall 
Shopping Center (in Jennings, Missouri) as an example of a good use of TIF.  The former 
Northland Shopping Center was in a “low income community and in disrepair with no 
tenants” (Green 2011, interview).   
 Green mentioned he was pleased he was able to get the county-level TIF 
Commission amendment passed – an amendment that he authored.  His main regret is 
that he was unable to get the county-level TIF amendment to apply to all of Missouri.  
The aim of this amendment was to avoid municipal competition for investments and to 
hinder developers from “shopping” for incentives (Green  2011, interview). 
 To Griesheimer, TIF has being a “vital” tool for both large and small cities, and 
although he thinks of the TIF law as “not perfect,” he believes the law as amended now 
curbs most of its abuses.  He credits much of the improvement in the TIF law to the 
amendments made in 2007 and 2009, with the most important of these changes being the 
requirement for a county-level TIF at least in the St. Louis area.  He stated that the 2005 
Senate Interim Committee hearings quickly became a “rural versus urban battle” because 
TIF did not appear to be abused in rural areas.  While St. Louis area participants 
characterized the area as a “hotspot” for TIF abuse, the position of out-state hearing 
participants was “if it ain’t broke don’t fix it” (Griesheimer 2011, interview).  He stated 
that the importance of the county-level TIF commission amendment may currently be 
masked as a result of the  economic recession, which has had an effect on dampening 
economic development overall, including the use of TIF.  He expects that the positive 
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impact of the county-level TIF commission will become more evident as the economy 
recovers. 
He regrets that he was unable to get enough support from other legislators to 
modify the definition of blight.  And although he also is aware that the “but-for” is still 
problematic, with “beauty being in the eye of the beholder,” he states that the “but-for” 
clause needs to be left in the Act.  He also would have like to have been able to ban TIF 
use on greenfield development state wide, but again, good not garner enough support of 
other legislators.   
Hypothesis  
The Fourth Hypothesis asked a question about a municipality’s ability to implement a 
TIF district, and postulated that municipalities who were not able to either hire staffing 
with higher capacity or hire the specialized outside expertise would find it difficult to 
create and implement a TIF district.  The hypothesis was stated as: 
HIV – Use of TIF by a municipality is limited by a municipality’s ability to hire 
particular internal staff or retain specialized outside assistance. 
 
The TIF Annual Report database clearly showed a positive, significant relationship with 
TIF use and municipal size.  Although this does not directly answer this question, 
municipal size is often related to budget size, which can be an indication of staffing 
capacity.  This would seem to support the hypothesis but this is an indirect assumption.  
The TIF Annual Report database did not include the type of information to address this 
question directly, and so the intention was to collect information from the interviews to 
answer this question.  The number of completed responses from municipalities does not 
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lend itself to quantitative analysis outside of the summary statistic presented at the 
beginning of this section.  Additionally, since the survey is of TIF-using municipalities 
only, it does not allow for comparison against non-TIF using municipalities.  Thus, this 
question cannot be answered in any conclusive way as a result of this research, but the 
following additional anecdotal information can be gleaned.    
 Of the four cities (Cabool, Kirkwood, Independence, and Maryville) that stated 
that the did not use outside consultants, only Cabool stated that they would like to have 
access to the expertise provided by outside consultants but they could not afford it.  Of 
the remaining three municipalities that stated that the do not use outside consultants, one 
could consider the partnership that Maryville has with its county’s economic 
development organization fulfills this need.  Similarly Independence also partners closely 
with its municipality’s economic development council, which enhances its own in-house 
capability.  It is important to recall that the city of Independence has the next highest 
numbers of TIF outside the two largest municipalities with 17, so experience is a teacher.  
An interesting aspect is the long institutional history the city of Independence has with 
economic development tools – a former mayor of Independence is Richard King, who 
was considered one of the state’s leading experts in TIF and other economic development 
tools before his death in 2006.  In addition to being a former mayor (1974-1978) Richard 
King held two positions with the state in the early 1980s – he was Executive Assistant to 
the Governor (1981-1982) and Director of the Department of Revenue (1982-1985). 
 Other than the four municipalities just mentioned, the sample of municipalities all 
supplemented their own staffing with the use of outside consultants.  As the grouping of 
cities became larger in rural areas, more ability could be seen, although in instances it is 
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questionable whether that increased ability was sufficient.  This supposition gathers 
support from the action of the State Department of Economic Development, which 
specifically targeted the larger rural-like municipalities to provide support and assistance 
in developing knowledge, skills, and experience with the economic development tools 
based on each community’s needs. 
 The sample of similar sized municipalities in St. Louis County did not get this 
same type of assistance from the state, but its absence did not seem to be that noticeable.  
These urbanized area municipalities (in the under 20,000 population category) seem to 
have either specific capacity – i.e. an economic development person (Clayton, Jennings, 
O’Fallon), a long-term staffer with economic development experience (Kirkwood, 
Jennings, St. John) or county-level assistance (Jennings, Kirkwood). 
 The larger municipalities that were sampled were from the Kansas City urbanized 
area (with the exception of O’Fallon).  Those municipalities also had good capacity, 
which is likely due to their size (i.e. and corresponding budgets).  But one cannot 
discount location – Kansas City has played an important role in the development and use 
of TIF in Missouri. 
 The five largest municipalities all had either large staffs or had moderate staffing 
paired and supplemented by an economic development council.  It is clear that these 
larger municipalities have internal staffing with capacity and ability to focu s on 
economic development as deemed necessary and or desirable, and they make the 
necessary arrangement to hire outside consultants as needed. 
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 The outside professionals (consultants, lawyer, banker) all had clients that saw 
value in and had ability to hire them.  Brancaglione felt that a municipality possessing an 
aggressive attitude was a key predictor of whether it would be a TIF user, as well as a 
certain degree of harmony among the governing council and/or executive leadership.  
Grimm stated that a municipality that did not utilize an experienced public finance lawyer 
really should have one in-house or risk creating procedural mistakes that could leave 
them financial liable or risk creating an invalid TIF. Radcliff mentioned other pitfalls that 
would make creating a TIF without adequate professional skills and know-how a 
financial disaster.  Also, although not tightly connected, some consultants indicated that 
TIFs were more likely to be municipality driven if the municipality had a plan (economic 
development or comprehensive) that they were attempting to implement.   
 Three of the four legislators felt the statute currently is “user--friendly” which 
would lessen the need for a higher level of capacity and staffing if that were to be the 
case.  The fourth legislator had a very opposite response, calling the requirements needed 
to access the Act as “onerous,” and implying that municipalities that did not have 
adequate staffing could relying on the capacity of a capable developer.  Of course, in this 
type of scenario, the development is not likely to be municipality- driven. 
 Although this analysis is not quantitative and lacks a control group (i.e. non-TIF 
users), these interviews seem to support the hypothesis that staffing capacity (internal and 
external) available to a municipality impacts its ability to create and implement a TIF.  
These TIF users either had adequate staffing or were able to supplement staffing with 
outside professionals. Outside professionals could identify a clear need for their services, 
even among municipalities with adequate and knowledgeable staffing.  Additionally and 
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perhaps even more specifically, leadership also seem to matters.  It would seem to 
indicate that if this expertise/experience/capacity could be operationalize as an 
independent variable, adding it to the logit models specified in the previous section of 
this chapter could improve its explanatory power.  But these are only impressions and are 
not claims that the hypothesis is supported conclusively.  
Next Chapter Preview 
 The final chapter integrates the findings of this chapter with those of the last 
chapter and puts them into context by themes, issues, or topics.  It also puts the findings 
in the context of the literature review. 
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Chapter Five – Analysis of Findings and Conclusion 
 
This chapter pulls together the results of the findings of the previous two chapters 
– the historical development of the TIF Act as researched, and the assessment of who is 
using TIF and the patterns of TIF usage along with adoption patterns.  It is expected that 
in some areas the qualitative information in the historical development of the statute 
chapter will add context to the quantitative data in the TIF usage patterns chapter, and 
vice-versa.  But in many instances the findings of the research are still inconclusive and 
can benefit from further insight provided from the interviews of professionals in the field, 
or from legislators involved with the legislation.   
Firstly, this chapter will recap the hypotheses and related findings.  Next, one will 
find an analysis and review of the findings, organized by themes.   Under the general 
topic of “Who is Using TIF and TIF Adoption Patterns” are the themes of: 1) who is 
using TIF; 2) patterns of adoption; 3) leadership, capacity, learning, and planning; and 4) 
other economic development tools.  Under the general topic of “Historical Development 
of the Statute,” the themes discussed are: 1) important amendments and court cases; 
politics and interest groups; risks, bonding, and municipal pitfalls; 4) original intent, 
current intent.  The last topic is an analysis of this research and policy change concepts 
with an emphasis on the Hacker Four Modes of Policy Change. 
Recapping the Hypotheses and Results 
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 The four hypotheses have been introduced in Chapter Two and reviewed 
immediately after the research findings related to each hypothesis.  This section just 
recaps the earlier stated results.   
Hypothesis 1  
HI:  Changes to the TIF statute broadened the availability of its use by local 
governments, especially to local governments that did not fit the original 
“targeted” definition. 
There were a few amendments that did broaden or attempt to broaden TIF usage for other 
purposes or users, such as the economic development criteria and amendments aimed at 
assisting rural governments with their technical abilities to access TIF as a redevelopment 
tool. Thus this research supports this hypothesis. However, the need to change the statute 
to allow broader usage in most cases was not necessary, because the definition of blight, 
which was an allowable purpose, did already allow broader use of TIF than originally 
intended. 
Hypothesis 2 
HII – TIF using municipalities are more likely to have a higher poverty rate. 
The research showed mixed results.  Support was found for this hypothesis in urbanized 
areas, using a logit regression analysis that used percent person below poverty as the 
representative independent variable.  This finding was largely influenced by how St. 
Louis County uses TIF, as St. Louis County has a significant number of municipalities 
with a TIF district.  Support for this hypothesis was not found in the urban clusters, with 
the poverty variable having a significant opposite relationship.  Thus this hypothesis is 
supported but with qualifiers. 
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Hypothesis 3 
HIII.  Waves of adoption of TIFs by particular types of municipalities followed 
court decisions and statute amendments that lowered risks for that particular type 
of user/usage/investment.  In other words, An adoption wave pattern by type of 
municipality (size of population, growth of population, percent poverty) can be 
observed in an ordered logit regression. 
The described ordered logit regression analysis only found the population variable 
significant and the model had very low explanatory power.  Smaller municipalities 
tended to be later adopters.  The research findings suggests missing variables that if were 
added could improve the effectiveness of this model, and perhaps the model could be 
better specified.  
Hypothesis 4  
HIV – Use of TIF by a municipality is limited by a municipality’s ability to hire 
particular internal staff or retain specialized outside assistance. 
This question could was not addressed quantitatively, but the anecdotal information 
gleaned from interviews of 21 municipalities, and professionals in the field seem to lend 
support that municipality capacity, either in-house or with the addition of outside 
professionals, is an important factor in being able to effectively create and implement a 
TIF project or district. Legislators also were sensitive to this need as they added 
amendments to have the Department of Economic Development attempt to make 
technical information about TIF usage more readily available and understandable, and to 
provide programs to assist municipalities in their abilities to using the statute.  The 
legislators also enacted other TIF-like statutes, some with the aim of making the 
incentives more readily accessible. Anecdotally there appears to be support for this 
hypothesis. 
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Who is Using TIF and TIF Adoption Patterns 
Who is Using TIF in Missouri 
The quantitative study shows that TIF is being used by municipalities of all 
population, rural and urban, rich and poor.  Even so, there are characteristics that make it 
much less likely that a community is a TIF user.  Population size does matter—the bigger 
the community, the more likely they are to have a TIF district.  Communities that are 
relatively small (under 1000) population are highly unlikely to have a TIF, and even 
municipalities under 2500 population are not likely to have a TIF either.  This finding 
supports that of others (Forgey 1993, Mason and Thomas 2010).  Approximately one–
third (119 of 342) of all Missouri municipalities over the size of 1000 population (2000 
U.S. Census) have adopted a TIF at some point in the study period. 
The sheer number of TIFs constituted by the two major metropolitan 
municipalities (Kansas City and St. Louis) account for about 45% of the total TIF 
districts in this study (108 and 115 respectively of 496).  The other 117 municipalities 
constituted the remaining 273 TIFs.  Although TIF use is commonly studied either in the 
two major metropolitan areas (St. Louis and Kansas City), there are 45 counties outside 
of these two areas that also contain at least one TIF.  For TIF using communities in the 
more rural areas it is very noticeable that almost all of them are located within five miles 
of a road that is considered a major thoroughfare. 
Pattern of Adoption, Usage 
TIF is being used primarily in the metropolitan areas of Kansas City and St. 
Louis.  This appears to be in accord with the original intent as expressed in the HB1411.  
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In the 2009 Missouri Annual TIF Report, 45% of TIFs were located in these two cities, 
and 82% were located in the eight counties within these two metropolitan areas.   
Although Kansas City established a TIF Commission as soon as the Act was 
enacted, it was four years later before it attempted to establish its first TIF district.  
Apparently, as Michael White had said in his 1985 lecture, TIF would not be considered 
a useable program until it had been deemed constitutional by the Missouri State Courts, 
ideally the Missouri Supreme Court.  In practice, this seems to be a necessary pre-
condition to attract bond money.  This milestone was attained in 1989.   
In addition to Kansas City being an early and frequent user, so were other larger 
municipalities in the Kansas City area such as Grandview, Independence, and Lee’s 
Summit.  Yet even in the late 1980s and early 1990s there were some smaller and outstate 
municipalities such as Kirksville and Hannibal
57
 who became early adopters of this new 
tool.  St. Louis first used TIF in 1990 in the St. Louis Marketplace project.  It has been 
noted that St. Louis was a very infrequent user of TIF until the 2000s.   
Why was St. Louis slow to use TIF in the 1990s?  In 1985 Michael White 
discussed that Chapter 353 was just then becoming used with any regularity.  This had 
been St. Louis preferred tool (along with Chapter 99).  Perhaps it is also a function of the 
experience St. Louis had with its first TIF project, the St. Louis Marketplace.  The St. 
Louis Marketplace project was not considered a success by many during that time, and its 
“failure” had quite a few negative consequences.  The St. Louis Marketplace project 
bonds were backed by the “full faith and credit” of St. Louis city, which is not usually the 
                                                             
57
 Hannibal used this TIF to build a levy for flood protection. 
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case (at least not now) with TIF bonds.  The retail project also was born in a recessionary 
period and a few of the “big box” national retail tenants of the St. Louis Marketplace 
went out of business such as Builder’s Square and PACE.  The TIF bonds for this project 
just recently expired, and though the project is popularly considered a failure, the director 
of Commercial Development said that the city did not lose money on the project (St. 
Louis 2011, interview).  It is probable that problems with this first project, along with St. 
Louis’ comfort with the Chapter 353 were factors in St. Louis’ slow pattern of TIF usage. 
Yet Brancaglione noted that St. Louis was not able to get forward momentum in 
its aims to revitalize its downtown area using Chapter 353 alone.  He compared St. Louis’ 
attitude as similar to Memphis’ that “tax abatement will fix everything.” What tax 
abatements did not provide was upfront funding like TIF funding could.  Brancaglione 
noted that downtown revitalization frequently involves replacing old and outdated 
building systems such as electrical, plumbing, and elevators (items that benefit from 
upfront funding).  A report written by the St. Louis Development Corporation in 
December 1997
58
 recommending the use of TIFs seemed to be a catalyst.   
The report mentioned two salient problems that needed addressing:  1) that 
between tax abated, tax-exempt, and blighted properties (11%, 23% and 25% 
respectively), the city only had about 41% of their land left from which they could expect 
to collect property taxes; and 2) everyone who applied for tax abatement felt entitled to it, 
making it difficult politically to reject an application.  This describes St. Louis’ problem 
with “erosion of targeting” with respect to its Chapter 353 economic development tool.  
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As part of its findings, this document recommended that St. Louis limit tax abatement to 
certain type of projects and a shorter time period (i.e. retargeting, in effect), and that TIF 
become used more regularly by the city in other types of projects, mentioning downtown 
specifically.  Parts of these recommendations were based on observations of Kansas 
City’s experience with TIF.   
Persons in Kansas City were much more proactive with TIF from the start, 
including taking a significant role in drafting the initial legislation and subsequently 
defending its constitutionality.  Kansas City’s TIF Commission was formed in 1982, and 
as the legislation was being validated, communities in the Kansas City area began to 
create multiple TIF districts (i.e. Kansas City, Independence, Grandview, Lee’s Summit).  
After Kansas City and St. Louis, these larger suburban municipalities in Kansas City are 
the next most frequent users.  The Kansas City area municipalities were the trendsetters 
for this legislation, and some of these persons also took responsibility in spreading 
information about how to use TIF for other municipalities.  This was evident in the 1985 
lecture White gave to the Midwest Research Institute and the formation of the Missouri 
Tax Increment Financing Association later (1991). Of which many Kansas Citians were 
founding board members.   
Kansas City had an interesting bubble pattern in the late 1990s and early 2000.  Its 
peak creation of TIF districts were in 1999 and 2000, with 31 TIF projects in total.  This 
is in contrast to zero TIF projects in 2001.  Attempting to “digest” these 31 TIF projects 
could partially explain the lack of creating any TIFs in 2001.  A closer look at the TIFs 
created in 1999 and 2000 shows the problem of variation in what constitutes a reportable 
TIF district or project.  The 22
nd
 & Main area constituted 10 TIF districts, Brush Creek 
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constituted four TIFs, River Market constituted three TIFs, and Hotel Phillips and 19
th
 & 
Terrace each have two of the 31 TIF districts.  These five areas accounted for 21 of the 
31 TIF districts created in those two years by Kansas City.  It is possible that these spiked 
numbers just reflect a new strategy in TIF district formation by the city. 
Municipalities in St. Louis County are the other major users of TIF usage.  Many 
note the structure of St. Louis County as being a major reason for intra-county 
competition for investment dollars.  There are 90+ municipalities located within the 524 
square miles of this county during the study time period.  The earlier users of TIF were in 
the inner-ring suburb areas such as Jennings, Maplewood, Richmond Heights, Ferguson, 
Cool Valley, and St. John.  The outer-rings tended to adopt TIF more in the later 1990s.  
Wildwood, one of the two cities of greater than 30,000 in the entire state without a TIF, is 
one of the county’s most recently incorporated cities, being incorporated in 1995.  It 
contains large areas of greenfields, being largely undeveloped. 
The adjacent county of St. Charles also warrants mention.  The major cities in St. 
Charles – St. Charles, St. Peters, O’Fallon, and Wentzville spread out from St. Louis and 
St. Louis County via Interstate 70.  This county has been among the fastest growing 
counties in the United States throughout the study period.  All four of these cities have at 
least one TIF.  O’Fallon was an early user in 1992, but a later attempt to create another 
TIF in 2003 met with opposition, and it has not implemented any new TIFs.  However, 
they are in the process or have recently (2009) issued Chapter 100 bonds for real and or 
property tax abatement for three companies (MasterCard International, Centene 
Corporation, and Fireman’s Fund/SJ Progress Point, LLC) (O’Fallon municipal survey, 
2011).  The letter from a St. Charles city official (included in the 1997 Report of the 
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House Interim Committee Studying Tax Increment Financing) foreshadowed how St. 
Charles County municipalities were to use TIF – primarily for development on 
undeveloped land. 
The other two municipalities in the top five largest cities (besides Kansas City, St. 
Louis, and Independence) are Springfield and Columbia.  Their patterns are totally 
different than the others, and they only have two TIF districts each.  Columbia’s TIF 
districts are most notable, only coming about as late as 2009, the last year in the study.  It 
seems that one of the most important factors in Columbia’s having a TIF even now is the 
retirement of a long-time city manager in 2006 (Columbia 2011, interview).  Springfield 
has experienced governing councils that have supported TIF use and at other times 
governing councils that have opposed TIF use.  The economic development 
administration has found the sales tax abatement contract a useful and less controversial 
too to use in partnership with private retail investors (Springfield 2011, interview). 
In the more rural counties there is likely to be only one or two TIFs in the entire 
county (45 counties with 58 TIFs).  These rural municipalities are located close to main 
transportation arteries of the state, and about half the time the municipality will be a 
county seat. Intra-county competition in these areas tend to be low – in fact, these 
municipalities are often considered “economic engines” for their areas, which may 
include the entire county.  In many of these cases the county government works together 
with the municipality creating the TIF district, although there have been cases where this 
cooperation did not exist.  These cases were evident in court cases where the county was 
reluctant to remit taxes to TIF accounts, as in the Quiktrip, Desloge, and Shelbina court 
cases. 
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The logit regression analysis showed a different relationship with poverty and TIF 
use between communities situated in areas with over 50,000 people (urbanized areas) 
than those under 50,000 but more than 2,500 (urban clusters – these numbers are 
calculated by adjacent census block density, not official boundaries).  In urbanized areas, 
TIFs are more likely to be used in communities with higher poverty percentages.  In 
urban clusters, TIFs are more likely to be used in communities with lower poverty 
percentages.  This could possibly explain some of the mixed results of earlier studies that 
indicated in some studies that TIF use seems to be associated with fiscal stress (Mann 
1999), in some studies TIF use seem be to fund infrastructure needs associated with 
growth (Anderson 1990, Man 2001), while others found a relationship with TIF use and 
low-income communities (Chapman 2001, Dye 1997).  
In this study the important of considering the degree of rurality of the 
municipality was made evident. Brancaglione’s professional observation is that an 
important indicator of TIF use would be changing demographics – similar to the changes 
taking place in inner-ring suburban areas.  TIF use by inner-ring municipalities was 
particularly noted in this analysis, and St. Louis County’s pattern of use dominated the 
regression analysis for urbanized areas, with higher poverty rate communities using TIF.  
The municipal interviews seemed to indicate that urban clusters were more likely to use 
TIF as an economic engine, and perhaps they needed to have a minimal amount of fiscal 
capacity (which is associated with staffing capacity) to be able to be proactive in this 
manner.  It is clear that municipalities located in urban clusters use TIF for 
redevelopment purposes also (i.e. mostly downtown projects) but it is not as clear if they 
are impacted by changing demographics to the same degree that inner-ring suburbs 
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appear to be.  The urban clusters use of TIF being higher among municipalities with 
lower percent poverty levels might be a better fit for Reese’s (1997) and Peter and 
Fisher’s (2004) supposition that cities that are economically better off are more able to 
devote resources to economic development. Another factor that might warrant a closer 
look given these opposite relationships with TIF use and percent poverty is Guehlstorf 
and Thiesing’s finding related to administrative capacity, political culture, and “other 
complicating factors,” where they found that in a relatively small sample, “moderate 
administrative capacity and “high complicating factors” were more represented among 
Illinois TIF using cities in the St. Louis metropolitan area (than non-TIF using cities in 
the same area). 
Leadership, Capacity, Learning, and Planning 
Leadership played a crucial role in determining when Columbia first adopted a 
TIF, and is likely to play a strong role in other municipalities as well.  In fact, this is 
likely one of the missing variables of the logit regression models for both whether a TIF 
had been implemented or not, and in which time period a TIF was first initiated by a TIF-
using municipality.  Tony St. Romaine, current Assistant City Manager of Columbia, 
stated that the former manager (Raymond Beck) had been City Manager for about 22 
years, and did not believe in providing incentives to developers or corporation.  Under 
this philosophy, the downtown area had continued in a state of slow decline and, in 
essence, one long-serving city manager prevented TIF use in Columbia throughout his 
tenure which ended in 2006. 
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When asked what municipal characteristic separated TIF-using municipalities 
from non-using ones, Brancaglione answered that TIF-adopting municipalities tend to be 
more “aggressive” in mindset.  He thought size of community is secondary to this trait.  
As an example, he mentioned his clients ranged from as large as Chicago to as small as 
Orangeville, Illinois (about 500 population) (Brancaglione 2011, interview).  He feels 
another municipal characteristic that is important is that the government – mayor, 
alderpersons, and/or city administrators – gets along.  
An obvious case where leadership matters is Kansas City, where mayoral 
candidates discuss the merits of economic development prominently in the 2007 mayoral 
campaigns (Grenz, 2007).  This scenario whereby either mayoral and/or councilperson 
elections have been significantly impacted by questions of public subsidies of private 
development projects  has also been seen in smaller cities such as O’Fallon, Olivette, 
Florissant, Sunset Hills, and Rock Hill.  When an issue such as TIF usage is considered 
ripe for campaigning, it may also be divisive, and the characteristic of municipal 
cohesiveness or lack thereof may also be visible in these examples. 
An interview with a smaller rural community such as Cabool gives an impression 
of the importance of personnel throughout time.  Some time ago they had an economic 
development person who set up their first and only TIF district in 1993.  They are adding 
one business at a time as they find interested businesses.  The district started with a Dairy 
Queen in 1993, and recently added a Subway (fast food restaurant) in 2007.  They have 
wanted to hire another economic development person for a while but their budget is too 
tight.  They have little in the way of retail in their community, and must drive about 15-
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20 minutes to purchase clothing (Cabool 2011, interview).  Noticing the modesty of these 
two Cabool TIF projects (Subway and Dairy Queen) is hard to miss. 
Jennings and Maplewood in the St. Louis area have had an important key 
employee in place throughout the 1990s and 2000s.  Maplewood’s city manager has 
provided leadership that has improved Maplewood’s bottom line significantly during his 
twenty-five year tenure. At one time he was President of the Missouri Tax Increment 
Financing Association, in addition to also having held the Presidency for other municipal 
organizations such as the Missouri City Managers Association and the St. Louis Area 
City Management Association.  The city of Jennings hired a director of Public Works 
with experience from the St. Louis County Government.  He has used his experience and 
county government networks fairly efficiently to assist the city of Jennings in some 
significant economic development projects.  Although these examples are anecdotal, it 
gives a strong impression that having a knowledgeable, capable person in the right place 
at the right time is an important, although hard-to-measure variable.  Operationalizing 
such a variable, as well as operationalizing a variable for municipal “aggressiveness” and 
“cohesiveness” would likely improve upon the regression models in the previous chapter. 
Many municipalities add to their knowledge and capacity through the retention of 
outside consultants on an as needed basis.  Most of the municipalities interviewed (17 of 
21)
59
 said they used outside consultants at least on occasion.  Kansas City routinely 
announces a Request for Qualifications (RFQ) every two years in order to have an up-to-
date list of pre-qualified outside consultants.  All of the cities that used an outside 
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 Municipalities interviewed that indicated that they do not use outside consultants:  Independence, 
Maryville, Kirkwood, and Cabool. 
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consultant at least occasionally were satisfied with their consultant’s services except one.  
Of the four municipalities indicating they do not use outside consultants, Independence 
and Kirkwood have in-house capacity and Maryville is a county seat that contracts with 
their county’s economic development organization (Nodaway County Economic 
Development).   The small rural town of Cabool (2000 population 2168) is the 
municipality that states they cannot afford an outside consultant or an in-house economic 
development person, and thus the city administrator devotes approximately 30% of his 
time on economic development.  
These outside consultants/professionals were usually a combination of economic 
development consultants, municipal or economic development lawyers, and/ or public 
financing banker.  It was not unusual to find a city using one firm to establish the 
existence of blight and another firm to do the cost-benefit analysis; or one firm to help 
follow the legal procedures, and another to help structure a sellable bond.  Sometimes, as 
one municipality’s economic development director put it, it is good to hire an “expert 
from 100 miles away” even if you can do it in-house (Springfield 2011, interview).  
Sometimes an external expert’s opinion has more weight in a governance body than a 
familiar staff person’s opinion. 
Organizational membership in certain groups seems to provide exposure to 
various economic development tools and how they are being used in municipalities, 
providing learning opportunities from the actual experiences of other municipalities 
across the state.  Also, outside professionals and consultants are often conference 
presenters, sharing general information that can be useful for many attendees.  Besides 
the learning that can occur within conference presentations, attendees have opportunity to 
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dialogue and learn from each other.  Two important statewide organizations that provide 
these types of support are MEDFA (Missouri Economic Development Financing 
Association) and the Missouri Municipal League.  Many municipalities depend on these 
organizations to keep them informed about state legislative issues and court decisions 
pertaining to economic development.  Both organizations maintain lobbyists. 
 Planning is a task associated with management and leadership.  The TIF Act in 
many places encourages planning, requiring that a redevelopment plan be approved and 
that the plan be compatible with a city’s comprehensive plan.  It also requires that a cost-
benefit analysis be provided to all taxing districts that assesses the potential impact for 
their individual taxing districts.  Thus, the TIF Act presumes a city already has a 
comprehensive plan.  Some cities also have economic development plans, or an economic 
development plan as a chapter in their comprehensive plan. 
It is no surprise that some smaller municipalities may not have the budget to hire 
personnel to perform planning functions or to hire an outside firm to do so for them.  
They might only have a comprehensive plan if they are required to have one in order to 
use an economic development tool.  But based on the largest cities in Missouri, one 
wonders if there is also a size when a municipality is almost too large to have a 
comprehensive and/or economic development plan.   
St. Louis city has been guided by their 1947 Comprehensive Plan until very 
recently, when in January 2005 they adopted a new land-use plan called the Strategic 
Land-Use Plan, 2005 (note: still not a comprehensive plan).  There have been 
amendments to the 2005 Strategic Land-Use Plan, but no strategic updates per se.  On St. 
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Louis city’s website, they readily discuss this.  In the introduction to their new land-use 
plan, they state: 
In 1947, more than fifty years ago, the City of St. Louis adopted a land use plan. 
The City has been living with this outdated land use plan ever since. Now, the 
City’s Planning and Urban Design Agency is proposing a new land use plan. A 
plan prepared by professional land use planners based upon continuing 
consultation with the City’s twenty-eight aldermen, who are closely connected 
with the aspirations and dreams of the people who live in each of the City’s 
neighborhoods and the businesses that make up our City’s economy.  
http://stlouis-mo.gov/government/departments/planning/planning/adopted-
plans/strategic-land-use/introduction.cfm 
This statement inadvertently acknowledges that both the 1947 Comprehensive Plan and 
its replacement are really land-use plans.  It hints at the difficult of obtaining agreement 
among the 28 aldermanic wards by stressing the advantages of having “continuing 
consultation” with aldermen who have constituents that evidently have differing 
“aspirations and dreams.” 
The newest mayor of Kansas City, Sylvester James, has made updating their 
FOCUS plan a priority (Gonzales 2011, interview).  FOCUS stands for Forging Our 
Comprehensive Urban Strategy.  FOCUS was the result of a two-stage, five-year process 
started by former mayor Emmanuel Cleaver in 1992.  It was a very citizen participatory 
process, culminating in a plan approved by Kansas City’s City Council in October 1997.  
There is no mention of a comprehensive plan before this one.  It appears that Kansas City 
has relied on its City’s Commission for Zoning and Land Use to approve all economic 
plans (Gonzales 2011, interview). 
Brancaglione did not find the lack of existence of a true comprehensive plan for 
the state’s largest two cities at certain times during the study period surprising.  He stated 
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that Chicago also had until fairly recently relied on Daniel Burnham’s 1909 
comprehensive plan
60
.  This resulted largely from the inherent difficulty of creating a 
single plan in a city that has many strong neighborhoods (Brancaglione 2011, interview).  
This scenario could explain why Missouri’s two largest municipalities find it challenging 
to construct a comprehensive plan or a comprehensive economic development plan than 
is politically acceptable to all constituents.   
Even comprehensive planning in the next two largest municipalities seems to be 
time consuming and with a large amount of citizen input necessary.  Springfield has a 
comprehensive plan called Vision 20/20.  It was the result of a major citizen participation 
planning initiative in the 1990s.  This process was updated, again involving citizen 
participation, and the latest version is known as the 2004 Vision 20/20 document.  
Independence has a comprehensive plan that was approved in 1993 (and it has later 
amendments).  This plan is primarily used to meet legal obligations such as those 
associated with implementing a TIF, but the city has a strategic vision composed of four 
strategic goals that guide the decision-making of the governing council and city 
administrators in general (Clark 2011, interview) .  Seemingly, devising a comprehensive 
plan is a major undertaking – perhaps even more so for the largest cities. 
Other Economic Tools 
   Hal Van Slyck (Missouri Department of Economic Development) has noted the 
decreased use of TIF in the last few years of the study period (2007-2009).  This 
slowdown of TIF use is largely thought to be due to economic recession.  Some 
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professionals and legislators believe the requirement of a county-level TIF Commission 
in the St. Louis area (East-West Gateway area) has also had a dampening effect.  Hal Van 
Slyck has also noted an uptick in the use of CIDs (Community Improvement Districts).  
This tool, although created nearly 10 years ago and mentioned by Richard King as having 
distinct advantages (such as being able to use funds for “maintenance” expenses, i.e. 
some operational expenses), is just now getting real usage (again, that slow start to actual 
usage of an economic tool). 
 Along with the increased usage of  CIDs, municipal survey respondents 
mentioned using Chapter 100 Tax Abatements instead of TIFs on quite a few projects 
(O’Fallon, Columbia, Jennings, Grandview), and a resurgence in the use of Chapter 353 
Tax Abatements either alone or with a TIF (Richmond Heights, Excelsior Springs, 
Grandview).   Municipalities reported using TDD’s in conjunction with TIFs (Blue 
Springs, St. Johns, Richmond Heights).  Some municipalities have found that sales rebate 
contracts (Chapter 70 Sales Tax Reimbursement) are sufficient, and use them instead of 
TIFs for some projects, especially retail projects (Springfield, Gladstone).  Additionally, 
it should be noted that other tools such as MODESA and MORESA have many of the 
features of TIF and are intended to be an alternative option to using TIF. 
 
Historical Development of the Statute 
Important Amendments and Court Cases 
 The amendment that had the most impact on the TIF Act is the sales tax 
amendment. This is a unanimous selection of all the professionals interviewed 
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(Brancaglione 2011, Grimm 2011, Marks 2011, Radcliff 2011, Norber 2011).   Although 
a casual observer may assume that this came about as developers looked for additional 
funds to capture in order to make more projects “doable,” it is important to know the role 
school districts played in lobbying for this amendment.  This amendment was strategic on 
their part – the more funds captured from non-property taxes, the faster the TIF district 
would get paid off and the sooner they could benefit from the new property’s tax 
increment. 
But like most decisions or most solutions, there are pros and cons.  This 
amendment happened just as TIF use had been validated, municipalities were attempting 
to readjust to less funding from federal and state governments, and the prominence of the 
sales tax was increasing as a funding source for local governments.  There was already a 
motivation for local governments to look at increasing retail within their boundaries to 
improve their revenue streams.   
The ability to use TIF as a competitive tool, or conversely, the ability for 
developers to use TIF to “negotiate” for a better deal by pitting one locality against 
another was an unintended consequence of this amendment.  This regional competition to 
have sales tax generated within a particular municipality’s boundaries creates a 
competition that in many respects is harmful at a regional level (East-West Gateway 
Council of Government, 2009).  The 1997 amendment attempted to curtail this intra-
county competition by not allowing the amount equal to the prior year’s EATs generated 
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by that retailer to be included in any new EATs calculation
61
.   The 1997 amendment also 
added a limitation for the economic development purpose, stating that under this purpose 
development “will not be solely used for development of commercial businesses which 
unfairly compete in the local economy” (99.805(5)).  The later was designed more to 
curtail “big box” retail establishments from driving small “mom and pop” type of 
businesses out-of-businesses, especially in smaller towns. Yet, attendees to legislative 
hearings in Jefferson City from the St. Louis area continued to express intra-county 
competition as a problem in subsequent legislative hearings. 
In 2007 the state legislature made a new attempt to resolve the St. Louis area 
problem.  The 1997 amendments did not seem to be effective enough to quell the 
problems that were still dominating state legislative hearings about TIF (2000 House 
hearings and 2005 Senate hearings).  From the 1990s, TIF representation by the local 
government had been slowly eroded by increased representation from other taxing 
districts, and then county-representation.  This dilution did not seem to be sufficient.  The 
East West Gateway Council of Governments recommended that county-level TIF 
commissions be formed.  Although the Chair of the Senate Commerce committee, John 
Griesheimer, desired such a committee for the entire state, he was only able to have the 
county-level TIF applied to the St Louis area (i.e. service area of East-West Gateway 
Council of Governments, less Franklin County). 
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 Specifically, 99.805(4) reads “Economic activity taxes,”…..For redevelopment projects or 
redevelopment plans approved after December 23, 1997, if a retail establishment relocates within one year 
from one facility to another facility within the same county and the governing body of the municipality 
finds that the relocation is a direct beneficiary of tax increment financing, then for purposes of this 
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revenues from economic activity taxes which are imposed by a municipality or other taxing district over the 
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Another important amendment occurred in 1997.  One aim of the amendment was 
to strengthen the “but-for” test.  At this point a municipality could just perfunctorily 
make a “but-for” statement and it would be accepted as true, or, at least having met the 
legal requirement.  The legislature meant to make this a more serious criterion by 
requiring the developer to sign an affidavit to the effect that “but-for” the TIF the project 
would not be done. Additionally the amendment required a cost-benefit analysis that 
would consider the impact of the TIF district to all taxing districts involved.  These 
requirements were made on the developer.   
Professionals in the field believe that although well-meaning, this requirement 
also had unintended consequences.  Requiring that the “but-for” affidavit and the cost-
benefit analysis be submitted by the developer created a power-shift from the 
municipality to the developer according to Grimm (Grimm 2011, interview).  Although it 
is probable that the legislature required this responsibility of developers in order to spare 
municipalities the burden of this cost, the unintended consequence is that now the 
developer is an indispensable component of constituting a TIF district.  Now the 
formulation of a TIF district is not completely in a municipality’s control.   It is possible 
that a municipality that is proactively identifying and seeking 
development/redevelopment projects may have to “negotiate” somewhat with a potential 
developer since it is they (and not the municipality) who are the necessary “designator” 
of the “but-for” requirement. 
This ‘power-shift’ may present problems in many cases, but it does not seem to be 
an issue in Kansas City (again, perhaps a function of strength of size and capacity).  
Kansas City expects a developer to deposit into the city’s account generally from $35,000 
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to $60,000 to reimburse the city for doing the initial research and analysis to consider the 
project and suggested tax incentive (Gonzales 2011, interview).  A $20,000 deposit is 
paid up front, and this account is replenished as expenses are incurred.  Kansas City has 
had a cost-benefit model custom made for them, and in most cases do cost-benefit 
analysis in-house (Gonzales 2011, interview). 
One other legislative amendment mentioned in interviews of consultants and 
legislators.  It is the 2007 amendment that created county-level TIF commissions in the 
St. Louis area counties (with the exception of Franklin County).    John Griesheimer, 
chair of the 2005 Senate Interim Committee Studying TIF viewed this change alone as 
being “huge” and probably underestimated.  He believes this change will have a strong 
impact in reducing inter-municipality competition, but it may be underappreciated at this 
time due to the general poor economic conditions (recession, etc.)  Both Griesheimer and 
his co-chair of the committee, Timothy Green, had wanted the county-wide TIF 
commission provision to apply statewide, but politically were only able to have it apply 
to the St. Louis area.  
Two (of the three) economic development consultants interviewed do not 
underestimate the county-level TIF commission, and mentioned its passage as 
unfortunate.  Larry Marks mentioned that in some projects Chapter 353 is being preferred 
to TIF in order to avoid the county-level TIF commission.  A project mentioned as a 
possible example of this was the Cheshire Inn (located in both St. Louis and Richmond 
Heights).  Brancaglione felt that the county-level TIF commission was unnecessary 
because the Act already included provisions to limit intra-county competition, and 
perhaps the better action would have been to better police those provisions. 
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When asked what court cases they deemed to have had the most impact on TIF 
usage, the cases that were mentioned are Dunn, QuikTrip, J.G. West, Shelbina, and 
Centene cases.   The professionals interviewed mentioned these cases for the following 
reasons:  1) Dunn supported the validity of the statute (Brancaglione, Grimm, Norber); 2) 
Quiktrip also upheld the validity of TIF (Grimm); J.G. West further clarified the “but-
for” clause (Brancaglione); Shelbina restricts the creation of TIF districts in a pro-active 
approach (Grimm)
62
; and Centene
63
 and its impact on the “social liability” purpose 
(Norber).    Brancaglione stated that the West County case (J.G. West) made clear that 
“but-for” did not necessarily require that “nothing else would happen,” but could be in 
light of current and/or other use.  Grimm remarked that it was ironic that legislation and 
court decisions make it harder for municipalities to be the drivers of TIFs (referring to 
Shelbina court case and the “but-for” affidavit and cost-benefit analysis legislation). 
Politics and Interest Group Lobbying 
It is clear that political actions shaped the statute to what it is today.  The statute 
was first enacted as a result of a shift in federal policy which resulted in less money being 
remitted to states and towns.  Local governments found themselves in the midst of a tax 
resistant citizenry, and Missouri citizens passed a constitutional amendment known as the 
Hancock Amendment.  TIF was devised to give particular local governments a tool in 
which to attract private investments.  The architecture of the statute did not expressly 
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 Centene Plaza Redevelopment Corp. v. Mint Properties, 2007, is an eminent domain case under Chapter 
353. 
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limit usage to this targeted group of local governments, and overtime, other groups began 
to use TIFs, some more frequently than others.   
The presence of lobbyists was felt – both to limit use of the statute to its original 
targeted group, and to “leave it alone.”  Both groups were effective – somewhat.  
Ironically, the momentum for change is to change TIF use back to its original intent, as it 
seems that the statute as written never was, in practical terms, limiting.  Although some 
changes have been made in this direction, these amendments have been “contained.” 
Examples of this containment are varied.  For instance the 1997 amendment to add 
restraint to the usage of the “but-for” test has not demonstrably stopped any projects from 
being granted TIF money.  In fact, the Missouri Appeals Courts had to chastise the City 
of St. Peters for asserting that its 370 District TIF would not have been done “but-for” 
this TIF, because bonds had already been acquired beforehand (Great Rivers Habitat 
Alliance, 2008).  Kansas City’s lobbyist was able to keep the 2007 amendment that 
created a county-level TIF commission away from being applicable to them (by 
containing it to the East-West Gateway service area only) (Gonzales 2011, interview). 
It is also revealing to see how much drafting of legislation occurred outside of the 
legislature.  And this little feature might have been the key to why erosion of targeting 
was so invisible, and so effective.  The lobbyists and outside professionals seem to be 
submitting both the legislative bills and “drafting” the actual statutes.  These interest 
groups being an integral function of this procedure alone can help explain why the pro-
development groups, i.e. – the “growth machines,” were able to use TIF without new 
amendments. 
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It is interesting to note the strategic use of one type of tool by both legislators and 
interest groups – “the report.”  Woven throughout this research is the strategic 
commissioning and placement of studies and reports.  Reports and studies were 
commissioned or done in many cases to impact the discourse regarding TIF use in one 
way or another.  Legislators held hearings and then issued reports on those hearings 
which included recommendations.  In particular, the 1996 and 2005 legislative reports 
and the recommendations they contained seemed to precede actual related changes in the 
law
64
.  The Brookings Institution report on TIF use was often mentioned in the St. Louis 
discourse and the Kelsay study was found in TIF discourse in the Kansas City area.  St. 
Louis city’s adjustment to more regular TIF use was preceded by a report that 
recommended such.  The East-West Gateway study has also had impact, with one 
professional particularly mentioning the “diminished enthusiasm” the report has had on 
TIF usage. Reports may have been used just to report facts and findings.  It is clear that in 
addition to providing information, these studies and reports were used as effective tools 
to influence and perhaps change the direction of public discourse about TIF usage, and to 
lessen or reduce resistance to amendments that were proposed – i.e. agenda setting. 
It is significant to note that the historical development of the definition of “blight” 
is a significant barrier to “targeting,” and the lack of a concrete way of truly determining 
what development would take place otherwise is also a barrier to targeting. It is relevant 
that legislators and community supporters of “blight removal” envision one set of 
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expectations while the legal definition which determines the allowable determinations of 
what constituents blight invokes a wider set of circumstances unanticipated by those 
legislators and community persons.  But this disparity is understood by the drafters of the 
legislation – and they know that by following the letter of the law they have access to a 
broader use of blight than the general citizenry expects, and thus have little need to 
pursue wider criteria to access economic tools that can be used with a blight 
determination.  Many efforts have been made to revise the definition of blight in the 
Missouri legislature but they have been unsuccessful.  The definition of blight has been 
confirmed at the highest court of the land in 1954 and has decade of jurisprudence 
accepting the definition as is.  Path dependency and institutionalization are barriers to 
change at this point in time. 
The courts look closely at the wording of the statutes, and legislatures responded 
to court decisions.  The administrative branch responded to legislative requests.  The 
legislators interviewed made references to the battle of the out-state / in-state 
constituents, which apparently had different needs and desired different outcomes than 
each other.  An example of this was the restriction on greenfield development, which was 
a “hot-spot for abuse” in St Louis (Griesheimer 2011, interview).  But he stated that out-
state Missouri felt “it ain’t broke so don’t fix it” (Grieshemier 2011, interview).  Carl 
Vogel, the former Senator from the Jefferson City area had a more rural perspective.  His 
perspective of a typical TIF using municipality is a rapidly growing community, rural in 
mindset but is experiencing population growth because of new highways and naturally 
occurring growth.  The rural mindset causes the citizens to want to remain the same, but 
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they also know that they have got to manage their growth (i.e. conflict of the old and the 
new) (Vogel 2011, interview). 
Risks, Bonding, and other Municipal Pitfalls 
 Risks and investing, investing and risks go hand-in-hand.  Investors typically 
want to avoid risk unless it can be measured and they can get paid for taking it.  Risks 
associated with legislation that eventually is deemed invalid is in most cases considered a 
bad investment and is avoided by businesses.  This behavior is seen in the inactivity of 
the TIF Act until the Act was validated by the Missouri Supreme Court.  This behavior is 
also seen in the economic development purpose being infrequently used.  Brancaglione 
explained that the economic development purpose was “not smart” because bondsmen do 
not consider bonds associated with these types of TIF projects “clean” because they are 
not “constitutionally supported” (Brancaglione 2011, interview).   
 In this respect, it seems that legislators should want to be very cognizant in 
constructing economic development statutes.  It seems that if they could construct the 
statutes in such a way to assure validity or to provide an avenue whereby the validity 
could be confirmed more quickly would be advantageous.  Recall the TIF Act was 
enacted during a recession which had passed and  had a chance to return again before it 
began to be used. 
 Recently some developers have been caught on the wrong-side of a risk as a result 
of the 2008 recession.  Laura Radcliff
65
 mentioned some developers have taken out 
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construction loans that were intended to be converted to other types of loans (perhaps TIF 
bonds) but because of the economic downturn, have been unable to convert those 
construction loans (Radcliff 2011, interview).   
 Municipalities take risks too, and can make mistakes which increase their risks.  
Grimm mentioned the biggest mistakes that he has seen municipalities make is in not 
following TIF procedures correctly, which can result in a TIF being invalidated, or 
exposing the municipality financially (Grimm 2011, interview).  Radcliff listed the 
following as the biggest mistakes she has seen municipalities make:  1) wrong team of 
professionals; 2) wrong size of project; 3) procedural mistake, 4) mistake of TIF eligible 
costs; 4) selling bonds that can’t be repaid, and 6) erroneous revenue projections.   
Original Intent, Current Intent 
The Real Property Tax Increment Allocation Financing Act of 1982 was designed 
to provide distressed urban areas within an economic redevelopment program which 
would make redevelopment more competitive with development on undeveloped land or 
less financially distressed areas.  To many people, this is still the aim of the program and 
its use should be limited to this aim.  Twenty-seven years is a long-time for a program 
best use to remain its original intent. 
As it was, TIF use was almost immediate after its constitutional validation, and 
was used by urban and non-urban areas alike, although it is most often used by the two 
major urban cities.   Though the “intentions” were expressed in legislation, these 
intentions were not expressed concretely in the wording of the statutes.  The statutes, as 
worded, allowed TIF to be used by non-urban, non-distressed municipalities who were 
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already searching for ways to partner with the private sector to bring or enhance 
investments in their municipalities.  These communities did not have to expand the TIF 
Act to get access to its benefits – they already had access, through following “the letter of 
the law.”  Many feel that the broad definition of what constitutes blight provided access 
to the “unintended,” such as West County Center.  Another concern was the “but-for” 
test, and how it was deemed to have been met.  Others were concerned that the economic 
development purpose would provide this entry.  What is certain is that a tool that was 
designed to give urban distress areas a targeted advantage has been eroded from the start. 
This erosion was willingly expanded by the legislators in the mid to late 1990s to 
accommodate more rural communities.  Legislators noticed that a few rural communities 
expressed a need that was partially filled with TIF use.   Legislators later facilitated 
legislation (i.e. MORESA and MODESA Lite) that was more tailored to smaller 
communities.  This expansion to non-rural areas did not seem to meet with opposition.  It 
could be because TIF use in the non-metropolitan area is still relatively low compared to 
urban areas.   
Additionally, urban areas are not typically competing with rural areas for the 
same investment opportunities, and thus the advantage the TIF Act sought to provide was 
not relative to  rural development or rural redevelopment.  Urban redevelopment 
generally competes with surrounding areas, such as outer-ring suburbs.  Legislation was 
able to preserve this advantage somewhat in the St. Louis area by disallowing TIF use on 
“greenfield” developments in the East-West Gateway of Governments service area.  
Missouri also has the interesting challenge of having its two largest metropolitan areas on 
state boundaries lines.  Kansas City is acutely aware of and concerned about competition 
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for investment dollars with the Kansas state metropolitan area (Gonzales 2011, 
interview).    
Do all communities need economic development tools that allow them to partner 
with the private sector, and if so, what form should those tools take?  The state acted to 
give this targeted advantage to distressed urban areas in the early 1980s, when urban 
areas clearly needed it.  Yet other changes were occurring around the same time.  
Funding for local governments was being devolved downwards.  This left local 
governments looking for solutions to retain their local funding sources and to make up 
funding that they no longer could expect from the federal or state governments.  Sales 
taxes became available at about this time, and it was natural for municipalities to attempt 
to capitalize on this opportunity.  In addition to a redistribution of funding occurring 
among the levels of governments, capital had become more mobile.  Especially in the 
urban areas, the competition was no longer just a neighboring municipality, but perhaps 
even another country.  But this is also true in out-state Missouri, where the small city of 
Strafford recently competed against a German city (among others) for a John Deere core 
remanufacturing facility.  So although there was a clear need in the targeted urban group, 
there was a new need being generated among the non-targeted group. 
Yet this competition for capital does have a “race-to-the-bottom” capacity that 
does need structure and governance from a more regional or higher level.  As White 
stated in his 1985 talk which referenced Chapter 353 tax abatements – it is unreasonable 
to think that a municipality (or developer, for that matter) will not try to use any tool 
legally available to it.  The creation of county-level TIF commissions and limitation of 
development on greenfields in certain areas are examples of the legislature’s attempts to 
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provide this type of structure and regional governance.  And thus we have come to an 
“evolved” intention of TIF – to be used as part of an economic development tool box, as 
well as redevelopment, as stated by Brancaglione in his 2000 newspaper commentary. 
The newer evolved intention has left the gate and is not likely to be put back in.  
Possibly the best those who are “originalists” can hope for is to keep the restriction on 
TIF usage that they currently have now.  It is unlikely that they will be able to roll-back 
TIF usage to the original intent.  But originalists should also be aware that the front 
seems to have moved away from the TIF statutes – the erosion they fear is likely to occur 
in statutes outside of the TIF Act. 
This Research’s Addition to Policy Change Framework 
 This research has followed the development of a statute, The Real Property Tax 
Increment Allocation Redevelopment Act, from its enactment in 1982 through 2009 – 27 
years.  Observations have been made along this research and analysis regarding the 
importance of policy change concepts such as incrementalism and path dependency 
which have been evident throughout this research.  Perhaps the most impactful evidence 
of path dependence is the judicial jurisprudence of the definition of blight.  The contour 
of the definition of blight was firmly planted in the Berman v Parker decision, a decision 
made in the 1950s at the highest court in the land.  This decision has the features of a 
self-reinforcing policy-feedback, and has been reinforced by the court system’s 
institutional custom of following “precedence.”  Legislators and other political actors 
have noted the impact of the definition of blight on how TIF was actually used in 
municipalities, and interest groups formed to fight this perceived erosion of targeting that 
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the definition seemed to let occur.  But try as they might and did, political actors were not 
successful in modifying the definition of blight. 
 Evidence of incrementalism was seen throughout the 27 years of amendments – 
perhaps mostly in defining redevelopment plans and how they were to be approved by a 
community.  Another area that saw incremental changes was the exclusion of certain 
taxes.  Interestingly, the TIF commission membership specifications had incremental 
changes that over time, in some cases, have resulted in a fundamental change.   
 This research highlights the importance of court decisions in the policy change 
process, at least for policies regarding economic development.  There is strong evidence 
that capital investors look to lower risks by using the pre-condition of validation by the 
courts before “trusting” an economic development program with their financial 
investments.  This has had the undesirable effect of slowing the actual usage of economic 
development tools, including TIF, since these validating court cases generally happen 
many years after the statute’s enactment.  Investors and practitioners of economic 
development have shown that they will even avoid using certain provisions of a statute if 
its use has not been specifically affirmed via a court decision – case in point, the 
economic development criteria of the TIF statute was seldom use, and in the projects it 
was cited as a criteria, it was usually in combination with another criteria that had been 
supported by a court decision. 
 The importance of the courts in economic development can also be seen in 
Hacker’s 2 x 2 Modes of Policy Change framework.  Hacker’s model has as one of the 
independent variables the amount of flexibility that the administrative or bureaucrats 
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have in “designing” how the program is implemented.  This flexibility was clearly 
impacted by the decisions of the courts in the numerous cases the Missouri court system 
heard involving TIF projects.  Administrators (via municipal officials and governing 
councils) operated freely in the upper right-hand corner of “conversion” unless a 
successful court challenged restrained their breadth of decision-making.  This can be seen 
in the formulation of redevelopment plans which were eventually reined in by court 
decisions of the Ste. Genevieve, St. Charles West, and the St. Peter cases.  It is also 
clearly a factor in the McKee Northside project.  In essence, the court decision in McKee 
lower court and Appeals court decision (which likely is following precedence of the 
earlier Shelbina court case) has in effect closed or is closing the door for St. Louis city’s 
administrators to “convert” the TIF statute in the proposed way, and if they lose the case 
at the Missouri Supreme Court level, they will not be able to continue the project in its 
current configuration and still receive the desired incentives. 
 When the desired usage could not be implemented in the conversion quadrant 
(upper right-hand), then if the composition of the legislative and executive branch 
allowed, political actors tended to move into the layering quadrant (lower left quadrant) 
to “add” a new provision or modification.  This movement may have been prompted by a 
court decision that closed the door for the administrator to use their own discretion in the 
conversion quadrant.  Examples of this could be the Quiktrip case, where the court case 
ruled that County administrators could not withhold any taxes not exclusively exempted 
by the statute.  Subsequently, legislation was periodically ‘layered’ to exclude certain 
taxes.  
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 Sometimes it was clear that a desired provision was not flexible enough to be 
implemented by administrative discretion within the conversion quadrant.  In these 
instances, again if the political dynamics of the legislature and governor’s office allowed, 
attempts were made for these provisions to be permissible via the layering quadrant or the 
revision quadrant.  An example of this would be the addition of the economic activities 
taxes to the TIF statute.  Municipal administrators did not have the flexibility to do this 
on their own, but the legislators and governor were willing to add this provision.  Another 
example of layering would be the addition of the economic development criteria to the 
statute, or the several changes to the TIF commission composition.  An unsuccessful 
attempt at layering was made by those who wanted to change the definition of blight with 
the aim of restricting TIF usage. 
 Hacker’s 2x2 framework is also informative regarding Peter and Fisher’s erosion 
of targeting concept.  It has been stated that targeting of erosion was expected to take 
place as other political actors that were not part of the “target” worked to gain access to 
the advantage.  In this particular case, lobbying to gain the tax advantages of the TIF 
statute was not necessary because the statute did not need to be changed for others not 
targeted to also use it.  As compared to the “original intent” and the spirit of the law 
(versus the letter of the law), using the blight or conservation criteria allowed the TIF 
statute to be used in more ways than just stopping or reversing decline in urban areas.  
Court decisions allowed administrators and bureaucrats the flexibility to make decisions 
within the boundaries of the letter of the law.  And these are the boundaries that are 
typically relevant with respect to economic development policies.  Administrators and 
bureaucrats were able to convert the original intent and broaden it to cover purposes that 
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are legally allowed by the definition of blight that has evolved through a half-century of 
legal jurisprudence. 
 An important insight to this occurrence could be gleaned from Hacker’s (2004) 
supposition regarding resistance to change.  In the TIF statute’s case, the statute was 
easily converted by the “other” users of TIF because its availability for these uses were 
not expressly excluded.  Thus interests groups did not need to form to gain access to the 
TIF tool – to the contrary, interest groups formed in an attempt to limit TIF use to its 
originally intended target users, and an opposing interest group formed to retain access to 
TIF in its broader context.  Hacker’s article containing the 2x2 focused primarily on 
social welfare policy (instead of economic development policy), but he stated the 
following: 
In sum, although the prospects for internal policy change [conversion or drift 
quadrant] are shaped by a policy’s specific characteristics, formal policy change 
[layering or revision quadrant] depends principally on whether the basic political 
structure and partisan context privileges the status quo.  When it does, pragmatic 
advocates of change may find it more attractive to adapt existing policies to their 
ends than to wage a frontal assault.  For this reason, political settings that militate 
against authoritative change [layering or revision] encourage reformers to seek 
conversion or erosion of existing policies.  In these contexts, not only do 
reformers find it difficult to establish new policies or replace existing policies, but 
they are also better able to block efforts to close gaps between a policy’s original 
aims and its actual effects.”  (247) 
Although interest groups attempted to restrict TIF use to its originally targeted use of 
redevelopment in declining urban areas, this attempt had only seen the modest of 
accomplishment and is considered by many to be unsuccessful overall.  In the case of 
economic development policy, it could be said that the precedence of court jurisprudence 
regarding the definition of blight was a key factor, if not the key factor, in privileging the 
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status quo. Municipalities (and their allies in this case, the developers) were able to 
successfully block any efforts that would significantly “close gaps between a policy’s 
original aims and its actual effects” (Hacker 2004, 247). 
As one legislator contemplated – if only the spirit of the law could be the guiding 
force instead of the letter of the law.  Regarding economic development policy, the spirit 
of the law is not likely to be sufficiently restrictive.  If limitation or targeting is desired, it 
is strongly suggested that this desire be backed by the letter of the law. 
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Appendix B 
Discussion Guide – Consultants 
1.  What services do you offer (division specific)?  What other services does your 
organization provide (outside of your division)? 
 
2. Approximately how many TIF projects have you consulted on?  
 
3.  Who is your customer?  (developer, business organization, municipality).  If more than 
one, what percentage of your business is each? 
 
4. How do you handle potential conflict of interests?  (developer/municipality; 
municipality/municipality; etc.) 
 
5. In what geographical areas do you work? (states, nationally, etc.)   
 
6. How long have you been a consultant for TIF projects?  What percentage of your 
business (division level) deals with TIF projects?  
 
7. How often do you think TIF projects are initiated by the municipality (in MO.)?  How 
often do you think TIF projects are initiated by the developer?  How often do you think 
TIF projects are initiated by the business?  
 
8. How often are you able to make an objective evaluation of what the TIF amount should 
be? How often does the developer or business makes its own evaluation and request?  
Are you asked to validate this amount?  If so, how often have you estimated a higher 
amount/lower amount? 
How often does the municipality accept/approve your recommended amount?  How often 
have they approved a higher amount, and why did they do so?  How often have they 
approved a lower amount, and why did they do so? 
 
(If they work with municipalities)   
9. When you work with municipalities, which titles of employee do you frequently find 
yourself working with? 
 
10.   How much of a teaching function do you find yourself performing with the level 
employee that is your inside contact?  How often is that person able to “supervise” your 
work, or otherwise meaningfully evaluate your work?  What do you find is the ideal 
arrangement? 
 
11. At what point are you generally retained?  (A developer contacts you, a developer 
contacts the municipality, a municipality decides it needs more revenue and wants to 
develop an economic development plan, you notice a need and solicit the municipality to 
develop an economic plan, etc.) 
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12. How long is the average engagement?  How often is the arrangement a long-term retainer 
for economic development in general versus project by project? (%) 
 
13. What observations would you like to share about your experience being retained by 
municipalities?  (Their needs, their challenges, etc.) 
 
14. What municipal characteristics do you think make a difference in a municipalities needs 
for TIF usage?  What municipal characteristics do you think make a difference in how a 
municipality would use an outside consultant such as yourself? 
 
(If they work with developers) 
15.  What functions are you to perform for developers?  Do they vary much by specific 
developers? – If so, what conditions exist for that difference?  Approximately how many 
developers have you worked with?  What is the average number of TIF projects you have 
worked on with each developer? 
 
16.  Do they ever ask you to work on a contingent basis?  What is the normal retaining 
arrangement? 
 
17. What observations would you like to share about your experience being retained by 
developers?  (Their needs, their challenges, etc.) 
 
(If they work with businesses) 
18.  What functions are you to perform for businesses?  How do they vary among different 
business clients and what conditions exist for that difference?  Approximately how many 
business clients have you worked with?  What is the average number of TIF projects you 
have worked on with each business client? 
 
19. What observations would you like to share about your experience being retained by 
business clients?  (Their needs, their challenges, etc.) 
(other) 
20. Have you been asked / called to be an expert witness for a court case? Please state the 
court case and what you were asked to answer. 
 
21.  As a consultant organization, have you lobbied (outside of an association) for any 
amendments or changes to the TIF Act?  What were they, and why? 
 
 
22. Are they any “user” barriers to usage of TIF that you feel are unintended?  What are they, 
how does that impact its use, and how can it be fixed? 
 
(if consultant is a law firm) 
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23. How long has your firm been in this type of business (tax increment financing 
consulting)? 
24. Is your law firm the lawyer on record for all of the municipal’s/developer’s/business’ 
legal needs?  (if not) what are the parameters of your services to any particular client who 
also uses your economic development skills? 
25. What do you find are the more significant barriers in the law for using TIF for economic 
development at the municipal level?  Is this good or bad?  (identify which with each 
barrier identified) 
26. What service do you provide that you find most valuable to your clients? 
27. Describe the characteristics of a municipality that absolutely needs your services.  
Describe the characteristics of a municipality that may be able to get by without the 
services of a firm like yours. 
28. What is the biggest mistake a municipality/developer/business may make if they don’t 
have legal assistance of an experienced legal firm? 
29. Is your  firm’s expertise dependent on the reputation of 1 or 2 lawyers, or would this 
specific area of practice exist regardless of the employment of 1 or 2 specific persons?  (if 
not, please identify the few specific persons.) 
 
(if consultant is a financial services/bond financing firm) 
30.  How long has your firm been in this type of business? (tax increment financing)? 
31. At what point is your firm usually retained for services? 
32. Who usually recommends your participation – outside consultants, law firms, other 
clients, developers, etc.? 
33. At what $ project size do you recommend the services of a firm like yours?  Why? 
34. What do you find to be the biggest risks in using TIF?  (to the municipality, to the 
developer, to the business, to the bond owner?) 
35. What is the biggest mistake that municipalities/developers/businesses make when 
selecting a bond financing company? 
36. Is there a type of municipality/developer/ business that should not use bond financing, or 
should not use TIF?  What is that type, and why? 
 
Discussion Guide  --  Legislators 
1.  What is your opinion of TIF (Real Property Allocation Act of 1982)? 
(open-ended) 
(summarize as great /good/ mixed/ not good/ bad) 
2.  How would you describe the original purpose of the TIF ACT, and how would you 
describe its purpose now? 
 
3.  Has the Act been improved over time or has it been diminished (i.e. corrupted)? 
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(open-ended) 
(summarize as improved/diminished) 
a.  What changes do you think have improved the Act, if any? 
b.  What changes do you think have diminished the Act, if any? 
 
4. Are there changes that have been proposed but were not made?  
(yes/no)   
 
 If so, what were they, when were they proposed, who proposed them, who were the 
advocates for that change, and why do you think the proposed change /proposed changes 
was/were unsuccessful?  
 
5.  a.  Describe the typical community that IS using TIF.   
(open-ended, probe for size of pop., physical size, administrative capacity, ?) 
 
b.  Describe the typical community that SHOULD BE using TIF – is it the same as the 
community that is actually using TIF, or different?  If different, why do you think that is?  
(If different, look for  “but-for” concerns, broadening of target, blight definition concerns, 
competitive disadvantages, ?) 
 
6. Practically speaking, how “user-friendly” do you consider the ACT to be?  (user-friendly, 
not user-friendly)  Why?  If not user-friendly, do you think this helps limit its use to the 
intended user, or hinders the intended user from benefiting from it? 
 
7.  Are there any parts of the statute that you feel : 
a.  Should be stronger/improved (yes/no) 
b. Should be weakened (yes/no) 
c. Narrowed (yes/no) 
d. Broadened (yes/no) 
e. Deleted due to no longer necessary (i.e. outdated) (yes/no) 
f. Deleted because it is counterproductive (i.e. did not perform as designed) 
(yes/no) 
g. Clarified (yes/no) 
h. ? 
Please elaborate, explain any yes response. 
8. Should any additions be added to the statute? 
(yes/no)  If yes, please explain. 
 
9.  What changes to the Act (if any) do you think substantially changed who could use TIF 
or substantially changed how TIF was used? 
 
10.  Can you describe how the following changes came about to the best of your memory? 
(probe for interest groups involvement, beneficiaries) 
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a. Local sales tax available for capture  
b. State TIF (sales tax & earnings tax) available for capture  
c. Inclusion of “economic development” as an allowable purpose 
d. Exclusion of “greenfields” in St. Louis area only 
e. ? 
 
11.  I recently ran across the charge of the Joint  committee on tax policy to conduct a study  
to “allow municipalities within the state to engage in tax increment finance-like projects 
with optional tax abatement in any area of such municipality regardless of the existence 
of blight.”  Are you familiar with this charge, and if so, can you explain how it came 
about? 
 
12.  Do you think that the “but-for” clause serves any useful purpose, theoretically and/or 
practically?  (distinguish answer between theoretical and practical) 
 
13.  Which lobbyists/ interest groups contact you regularly about economic development 
issues – TIF, Tax abatements, etc.? 
 
14. Have you or anyone else identified any other changes to the TIF ACT that is currently 
being considered, or that you think may be considered in the future?  If so, please explain 
(What  & Why). 
 
15.  Are you considering any new economic development tools that would replace, or 
complement TIF?  If so please describe, and explain why it is being considered.  
(replacement, complement)   
 
16.  Is the TIF statute still current, i.e. relevant for today’s problems?   Can your answer be 
related to explaining why there was a need for specific new incentive statutes for 
example, the Ford Plant in Kansas City or the Northside/Paul McKee project in St. 
Louis? 
Discussion Guide:  Municipal TIF Telephone Survey 
1. When was the first TIF project ever approved? (check record, if different, verify). 
 
2. How did the first TIF project come into existence?  
 
 Did the city proactively do a strategic plan, decide which projects would be appropriate, 
and look for a developer?  (yes/no) 
If yes, did the RFP come first, or did you consult with a developer about the possibilities, 
and then develop a RFP? 
 
3. Who keeps your records regarding your TIF projects? 
4.  Do you have records on all TIF projects ever approved, not approved? 
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5.  Does the city have an economic development plan?  When did the city develop its first 
economic development plan?  Was it first developed before a redevelopment plan was 
needed? 
 
6. Do you have an outside consultant for economic development?   
 
If no, why not?  (cost too much, budget too tight, prefer in-house for proprietary 
information, project was not big enough, we have expertise in-house, etc.)  Do you have 
internal staff that has responsibility for economic development?  If so, what is their title?  
What percentage of their time is devoted to economic development (annual basis)? 
 
If yes, what are their names/company names?  Are they on retainer or do you use the 
same one as needed?  If more than one, how do you decide who to use and when?  When 
is the first time each one was used, when was the most recent time one was used?  If you 
use only one, why do you prefer that particular consultant/company?  (try to verify for 
each project listed by that municipality)   
 
 If yes (cont.) Why do you use outside consultants? 
(more cost effective, experienced gathered among varied clients, can use as needed, 
recommended by developer, knows the specifics regarding meeting statute regulations, 
can do it quicker, etc.) 
 
If yes, are you satisfied with the services they have provided?  Have they enhanced your 
municipality’s ability to evaluate projects and /or make a better decision? 
 
If yes, does the project needs to be a certain size?  Are there other criteria that determine 
when you prefer to use an outside consultant? 
 
7.  How much risk did the initial TIF represent to the municipality?  Why?  Has the degree 
of risk been reduced over time?  If yes, what conditions exist that has caused the amount 
of risk to be reduced?  If no, what conditions exist that has caused the amount of risk to 
stay constant/increase (circle one)? 
 
8.  Has the city ever lobbied or worked with a lobbyist or organization that lobbies to make 
any changes to the TIF legislation (i.e. interest group)?  What changes, and what 
lobbyist/lobbying organization/interest group?  Are there any changes that currently need 
to be made to the TIF Act in your opinion?  If so, what would they be, what impact 
would that have, and who could benefit from this change/these changes? 
 
9.  How did the following TIF projects come into existence?  (List projects on TIF report.)  
What other economic tools/ incentives were used in each case? 
 
10.  Have you had any other major economic development projects since 1985 that did not 
use TIF?  What were they?  What conditions existed that TIF was not needed?  What 
other economic development tools were used, if any? 
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Appendix C 
 
Map of Missouri with Municipalities using TIFs Marked (except in St. Louis County) 
 
 
 
 
(yellow dots denote municipality selected for survey/interview randomly, green dots 
denote municipalities interviewed because size of 100,000 + (2000 census), blue dots are 
all other TIF-using municipalities) 
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Map of St. Louis City and St. Louis County with municipalities using TIFs Marked 
 
 
 
 
 
(yellow dots denote municipality selected for survey/interview randomly, green dots 
denote municipalities interviewed because size of 100,000 + (2000 census), blue dots are 
all other TIF-using municipalities) 
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Map of Kansas City Area with Municipalities Using TIFs Marked 
 
 
(yellow dots denote municipality selected for survey/interview randomly, green dots 
denote municipalities interviewed because size of 100,000 + (2000 census), blue dots are 
all other TIF-using municipalities) 
 
